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Information Environment and Gains from Corporate Takeovers 
By Yujun He 
Abstract 
Motivated by the inadequate research in understanding the determinants of takeover 
wealth creation, as well as the theoretical and practical importance of information 
environment in the takeover market, this thesis examines the wealth effects of 
information environment on UK takeovers. It regards information dissemination as a 
process inherent in takeover announcements, along which, factors capturing the 
characteristics of information sender, information content, information recipient and  
market condition, are addressed to form three key research issues.  
First considered are the wealth effects of misvaluation conditional on information 
signalled by payment and financing methods of takeovers. The results indicate that a 
price run-up via an upward revaluation follows undervalued bidders releasing good 
news (non-equity financed cash deals). Secondly, this research is concerned with the 
wealth effects of investor sentiment, towards the information released, at a whole 
market and individual firm level. The results show that high investor sentiment drives 
up target firms‘ announcement returns and further causes an increase in takeover 
premium. The last issue addressed is the relation between information asymmetry and 
gains to frequent bidders. The results suggest that information asymmetry declines in a 
merger series while serial non-equity financed cash deals generate decreasing bidders‘ 
announcement returns since the scale of their upward revaluations continually 
decreases with subsequent announcements. These three groups of results form a 
mechanism of information environment‘s wealth effect as follows. Takeover 
announcements release new information. With the arrival of new information 
investors update their assessments of firm value. The scale o f revaluation is 
determined by a firm‘s information asymmetry, the direction of it depends on firm 
misvaluation, information signalled by takeover announcements and the investor 
sentiment in interpreting this information.  
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1.1 Research Motives and Overarching Research Focus  
With the intensified competition in the capital market, corporate organizations 
have put an increased focus on their value creations to ensure an advantage over 
competitors. Investing in value-enhancing projects and further realizing organic 
growth is a strategic plan that a firm may consider. However, with the advanced 
regulations in the market for corporate control and the developed technologies that 
facilitate capital flow, a growing number of companies have turned to an alternative 
approach; that of takeovers. Through takeovers, firms expect to create value by 
improving efficiency and productivity of the resultant unit after takeovers (Bradley et  
al., 1983). Since the market for corporate control enables resources to move quickly to 
their highest-value use, takeovers should create benefits for the firms involved, along 
with the economy as a whole. However, counter-arguments suggest that the great 
majority of takeover deals fail to deliver these expected benefits; destroying rather 
than creating value. Furthermore, it can be argued that the corporate control market 
damages the morale and productivity of corporate organizations and gives rise to 
monopoly concerns (Jensen, 1988).1  
Intrigued by the original takeover objective of value creation, and the controversy 
surrounding takeover outcomes, financial economists have engaged in accruing 
considerable knowledge of the takeover market. This research area forms a significant 
strand of corporate finance studies. The empirical evidence provided indicates that, in 
                                                 
1
 For example, takeover and restructuring activit ies usually involve major organizational changes. This 
sometimes results in ―contractions involving plant closings, layoffs of top -level and middle managers, 
staff and production workers, and reduced compensation…The value restructuring creates do not c ome 
from increased efficiency and productivity; instead, the gains comes from lower tax payments, broken 
contracts with managers, employees and others, and mistakes in  valuation by inefficient cap ital market.‖ 
(Jensen, 1988, p.22).  
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general, takeovers generate substantial gains for the created combination; however 
such gains are not distributed evenly between both parties. Shareholders of bidding 
firms suffer from wealth loss, while target firms receive large wealth gains (e.g., Dodd, 
1980; Franks et al., 1991; Andrade et al., 2001).  
By extrapolating upon traditional theories (for example, economies of scale, 
economic disturbance theory and agency costs of free cash flow), extant literature has 
developed several schools of thought in theorizing and rationalizing the motives and 
value effects of takeovers. These include the efficiency theory (Bradley et al., 1983), 
neoclassical theory (Gort, 1969; Harford, 2005), hubris theory (Roll, 1986), 
managerialism theory (Jensen, 1986) and the misvaluation theory (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 2003; Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan, 2004). Although these theories expose 
takeovers to the influences of different factors, such as operational efficiency, 
economic disturbance, hubris, managerialism motives and misvaluation, the 
building-blocks of these theories simultaneously highlight the role of information and 
its implications.2 In particular, the market mechanism that underlies neoclassical 
theory, managerialism theory and misvaluation theory is one where information is not 
freely available and investors disagree on its implications. Therefore, a research focus 
concerned with information environment in the market for corporate control will 
reveal a better understanding of mergers and acquisitions.  
In addition to the importance of information environment from a theoretical 
viewpoint as discussed above, the traits of information distribution in corporate 
                                                 
2
 For a literature rev iew specific to these theories, as well as discussion on their information related 
building-blocks, see section 2.2. 
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practice also stress the necessity of a research focused on the relevance of information 
environment to the takeover market. Companies involved in merger negotiations are 
obligated to disclose their activities to bidding and target firms‘ shareholders, the 
takeover panel and the public. The Takeover Panel Code, not only attempts to enforce 
the accuracy of information but also, works to ensure prompt information 
distribution.3  
However, despite the Takeover Panel Code, information remains unevenly 
distributed between firms and outside investors due to the nature of information 
distribution in corporate practice. Two main points, highlighted by Myers and Majluf 
(1984), can account for the nature of information distribution. Firstly, although a firm 
is legally obliged to supply sufficient verifiable information to reveal its true condition, 
the costs in obtaining and verifying this information may be significant, and thus 
hinder investors‘ access to such information. Secondly, even if there are no costs 
incurred and no need to guard proprietary information, outside investors may still find 
themselves subject to an information disadvantage. This is because the organizational 
knowledge possessed by managers allows them to interpret the information and 
analyze potential impacts on the organization from an insider‘s perspective. Such 
organizational knowledge, as well as the interpretation based on this information, is 
unattainable for outside investors. This inevitable, uneven information distribution 
may result in potential gains, generated by an information advantage, to firms 
involved in the takeover market.  
                                                 
3
 The Takeover Panel Code regulates the UK takeover market. It requires that ―shareholders must be 
given sufficient informat ion and advice to enable them to reach a properly informed decision as to the 
merits or demerits of an offer. Such information must be available to shareholders early enough to 
enable them to make a decision in good time‖; and that ―before the offer document is made public, a  
copy must be lodged with the Panel. Copies of all other documents and announcements bearing on an 
offer and of advertisements and any material released to the media (including any notes to editors) must 
at the time of release be lodged with the Panel and the advisers to all other parties to the offer and must 
not be released to the media under an embargo‖ . 
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The importance of information environment in the corporate control market, in 
both a theoretical and a practical context, leads to growing economics of unevenly 
distributed information (information asymmetry). This notion underlies extensive 
work, for example, on agency cost (e.g., Jensen, 1986), adverse selection (e.g., Brown 
and Ryngaert, 1991) and revaluation via information dissemination (e.g., Draper and 
Paudyal, 2008).  
The theoretical implications of information environment, particularly information 
asymmetry, on corporate takeovers primarily surround the payment mechanism of 
transactions. More specifically, the payment mechanism is regarded as an information 
carrier which determines the value effects of acquisitions (Myers and Majluf, 1984; 
Eckbo et al., 1990). Acquiring firms may hold private information which is unknown 
to the market. The unevenly distributed information gives rise to the possibility that 
managers, who possess the private information that their firm‘s shares are overvalued, 
will in turn use these inflated shares to acquire a target firm. Investors then interpret 
the signals conveyed by this equity payment, and further evaluate the prospects of the 
acquirer based on their interpreted information. Once recognizing the adverse 
selection problem, they will consequently evaluate the acquiring firm downwardly. 
Therefore, negative announcement-period returns are generally associated with 
bidders making equity payments.4 
The information asymmetry in these studies is un-quantified. A more recent 
study of Draper and Paudyal (2008) however, quantifies this asymmetry and provides 
some insight into its relevance to bidders‘ gains in the presence of misvaluation. If 
                                                 
4
 This conjecture has been supported by abundant empirical findings. See for example, Frank et al. 
(1991), Andrade et al. (2001) and Bouwman et al. (2003). 
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bidders‘ gains could be deconstructed into synergies and revaluation gains, 
information asymmetry poses the potential to drive bidders‘ share prices through 
revaluations. More specifically, if a firm were previously undervalued and subject to 
severe asymmetric information, improvements in information dissemination through 
takeover announcements could draw the attention of the investment community and, 
accordingly, generate the opportunity of revaluating existing assets and growth 
opportunities. Therefore, compared with bidders surrounded by less severe 
information asymmetry, acquirers with greater asymmetric information expect larger 
absolute changes in stock returns via revaluation. 
Nevertheless, despite the above focus on information asymmetry surrounding 
acquiring firms, and on methods of payment as an information carrier, these research 
attempts tend to be inadequate when examining the relationship between the value 
effects of corporate takeovers and the information environment. This is because 
neither the information asymmetry nor the information carrier can sufficiently capture 
all elements existing in a broad information environment.  
This limited focus of extant studies, as well as the aforementioned importance of 
information environment from both theoretical and practical perspectives, gives an 
axis and direction in which this study is set. This thesis aims to extend takeovers to a 
broader, dynamic information environment by examining the effects of several 
information elements inherent in the information dissemination process of takeover 
announcements. The use of these information elements, including information 
(information content signalled by takeover announcements), information sender 
(information asymmetry surrounding acquiring firms and information uncertainty 
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regarding target firms), information recipient (investor sentiment involved in 
interpreting the information) and market condition (misvaluation), is intended to 
comprehensively represent this information dissemination process. In light of such an 
information dissemination process, this thesis examines the value effects of the 
information environment, and of the changes in this environment, on corporate 
takeovers. Further, it examines the mechanisms under which these value effects work. 
The interactions to be examined, between information environment and takeovers, 
are hypothesized along the information dissemination process as follows. Information 
asymmetry surrounding an acquiring, or target firm, impedes investors from 
evaluating this firm‘s value and its growth opportunities; this can further give rise to a 
misvaluation of the firm concerned. Accordingly, a change in this evaluation, 
especially in the misvaluation, is expected with changes in the information 
environment surrounding the firm. Specifically, with the arrival of new information 
via takeover announcements, investors update their assessment of a firm‘s value. This 
revaluation process depends on both the contents of information sent out by the 
announcements and the investors‘ sentiment involved in interpreting this information. 
If investors can always rationally estimate stock returns, then expected returns 
conditional on bad news released would be negative for a stock subject to severe 
asymmetric information. Conversely, the expected return conditional on good news 
announced would be positive for such a stock. However, as suggested by behavioural 
finance literature, investors‘ reactions are not always rational and thus their 
predictions of stock performance are not necessarily correct, since behavioural factors 
are involved in their stock return estimations. Therefore, in the presence of 
information asymmetry, information contents and investor sentiment work  
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simultaneously in determining bidding or target firms‘ announcement returns. Figure 
1.1 explicates this hypothesized value effects-determination process subject to the 
information environment. Key elements of it, including misvaluation, investor 
sentiment and information contents are addressed respectively in three empirical 
chapters. 
1.2 Contributions and Issues 
This research contributes to corporate takeover literature in three aspects and 
further enables an understanding of the relationship between information environment 
and the wealth effects of takeovers. The paragraphs below contain a brief outline of 
the motivations, the objectives and the empirical evidence of the three empirical 
chapters upon which contributions to relevant literature are drawn. 
Extant research on the relation between misvaluation and the takeover market 
tends to have a greater stock merger focus. Additionally, by assuming that in making 
cash payments no equity issue is involved, cash mergers are naturally associated with 
undervaluation, while equity deals correspond to overvaluation. For example, the 
Shleifer and Vishny (2003) model predicts that ―overvaluation could be the motive for 
most stock acquisition, which increase the buyer ‘s willingness–to-pay in stock 
mergers, though it has no effect in cash acquisition‖ (Friedman, 2004, p.1). 
Nevertheless, this assumption and the conclusion based on it are debatable, since the 
use of cash as a payment mechanism does not necessarily mean that the actual source 
of the cash payment comes purely from a firm‘s internal cash flow. Instead, external 
equity flow and debt flow serve as two financing alternatives (Schlingemann, 2004). 
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Therefore, after distinguishing the fundamental difference between payment methods 
and transaction financing, the necessity of re-examining the potential misvaluation 
effects on cash deals arises.  
Motivated by these under-researched and mis- interpreted misvaluation effects on 
cash deals, Chapter 3 examines the potential influence of misvaluation, conditional on 
payment methods and transaction financing, by deconstructing it into market-, 
industry- and firm-level components while establishing an approximate relation 
between a transaction and its financing source (as in Schlingemann, 2004). The results 
show that a high frequency and announcement returns of cash deals can be seen 
during high market- and high industry-valuation periods. These effects are attributable 
to the hyped synergy-estimation bred by information asymmetry and high valuation. 
Since estimated synergies of the resultant unit, together with the revaluation effects of 
a takeover announcement, determine a bidder‘s announcement return, this hyped 
synergy-estimation thus has the potential to drive up a bidder‘s gain. Moreover, if an 
acquirer were previously undervalued, releasing good news to the market (i.e. 
announcing non-equity financed cash deals) would attract the attention of investors 
and further reveal the firm‘s true potential to investors. Consequently, an upward 
revaluation effect following the takeover announcement is likely to drive up the firm‘s 
short-run return. However, an acquirer‘s undervaluation does not give rise to this 
upward revaluation when bad news is released, i.e. when equity financed cash deals 
and share deals are announced. 
These findings make three contributions to mergers and acquisitions literature in 
relation to market condition (misvaluation) and information content (a hybrid of 
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payment methods and transaction financing). Firstly, the findings clarify the 
fundamental difference between ‗methods of payment‘ and ‗transaction financing‘, 
which are assumed to be the same in the majority of existing literature. Further, it 
suggests that the documented positive value effects of cash payment (e.g., Franks et 
al., 1991; Andrade et al., 2001; Bouwman et al., 2003) may not be generalizable due 
to different signaling implications of the financing sources of cash payment. Secondly, 
the findings suggest that cash deals are affected by overvaluation, which was 
previously not thought to be the case. This thus corrects the previously mis- interpreted 
misvaluation effects on cash deals, which assume there is no equity involved in cash 
payment and thus associate undervaluation with cash deals (as in Shleifer and Vishny, 
2003). Thirdly, the different components (firm-, industry- and market- level 
components) of misvaluation are recognized, and thus a wider-ranging understanding 
of their effects in the corporate control market is provided. This understanding furthers 
the existing knowledge on the relevance of misvaluation to corporate takeovers. This 
misvaluation was previously examined in isolation by most existing literature, at 
either a market level or firm level, rather than being considered as a three-tiered 
system (for market valuation, see Tebourbi (2005) and Bouwman (2006) for example; 
for firm misvaluation, see Dong et al. (2006) and Ang and Cheng (2006) for 
example).5  
Following on from this conclusion, concerning stock market reacting to takeover 
announcements, the valuation effects of other factors contained within these reactions 
also require addressing. In particular, there are potential effects the recipients of 
information may have on the manner and outcomes of information processing. 
                                                 
5 Most existing literature examines misvaluation in isolation with the exceptions being Bouwman et al. (2006) and 
Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005). Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005) deconstructed misvaluation into firm specific error, time 
series sector error and long-run value to book. 
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Therefore, market reactions to the arrival of new information via takeover 
announcements should not only incorporate the message itself (as examined in 
Chapter 3), but also include the effects of investors‘ behaviour and their sentiment 
reactions towards the information released.  
Although it has been recognized that sentiment may drive asset prices away from 
their intrinsic values (e.g., Shiller, 1981; Fama and French 1988; De long et al., 1991), 
only a few researchers have directly or indirectly applied this link between investor 
sentiment and asset valuation in the context of mergers and acquisitions (e.g., Rosen, 
2006; Zhu et al., 2008). The role of sentiment, in these attempts, is either 
un-quantified (e.g., Rosen, 2006), or confined to an aggregate market level (e.g., Zhu 
et al., 2008). This market level research implies that sentiment- laden investors‘ 
reactions to one stock (or company) can be equally applied to another stock (or 
company). However, counter-views, like those held by Qiu and Welch (2006) and 
Baker and Wurgler (2006 & 2007), suggest that sentiment may have cross-sectional 
differences. Mergers and acquisitions, as individual corporate activities, are more 
likely to be exposed to these firm-specific, rather than market-aggregate, sentiment 
factors. 
Motivated by the un-quantified role of investor sentiment in existing literature 
and the restricted research focus on sentiment at an aggregate market level, Chapter 4 
addresses the sensitivities of both announcement returns and takeover premiums to 
sentiment at an individual firm, and aggregate market, level. This, to the best of the 
author‘s knowledge, has not previously been fully considered. The market level 
sentiment is measured by an indicator which is the first principal component of a 
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number of factors hypothesized to represent investor sentiment. This aggregate market 
sentiment, as shown by the results, influences target firms‘ announcement returns in 
the same direction as this sentiment, which further drives takeover premiums. 
However, contrary to the documented cross-sectional differences in the effects of 
sentiment on individual stock returns (Baker and Wurgler, 2006 & 2007), neither the 
announcement returns nor the premiums of speculative targets are more vulnerable to 
shifts in investor sentiment.6 
These findings suggest three contributions to mergers and acquisitions literature 
in relation to information recipient (investor sentiment). Firstly, developed on the 
widely acknowledged Baker and Wurgler (2007) sentiment index, a similar indicator 
is made available for the UK market, which can be used to explore new research areas 
around UK investor sentiment. Secondly, the results improve the understanding of the 
role of investor sentiment in the market for corporate control by extending the relation 
between sentiment and takeovers to allow for individual differences. Thirdly, the 
results contribute to the ongoing debate concerning managerialism7  in takeover 
overpayments by updating the knowledge about premium determination with investor 
sentiment. Accordingly, it suggests that the takeover premium determination process is 
not flooded with managerialism motives; instead, investor sentiment enters into this 
process and influences managerial decisions.   
In the first two empirical chapters (Chapters 3 and 4), takeover deals are regarded 
as a static information dissemination process which corrects existing information 
                                                 
6
 For an extensive exp lanation of the inconsistency between this work and existing literature, see 
chapter 5. 
7
 Managerialis m refers to managers of a firm being concerned with their own interests, above those of 
their shareholders, when making takeover decisions. For literature rev iew specific on this issue, see 
section 2.2.3. 
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asymmetry surrounding takeover firms. This static process can be extended into a 
dynamic one, where serial takeover announcements are treated as a process of 
decreasing information dissemination. It is referred to as a decreasing information 
dissemination process, because, as more information becomes readily available to the 
market, less information remains to be released with subsequent acquisitions.  
Although research efforts have been made towards serial acquisitions, few of 
them can adequately provide a thorough understanding of frequent acquirers‘ gains. 
For instance, managerial hubris hypothesis (Malmendier and Tate, 2004) and 
indigestion hypothesis (Conn et al., 2004) cannot explain the long-run outperformance 
of frequent bidders, as they predict the opposite outcome. Similarly, capitalization 
hypothesis suggests that no significant returns should be observed in subsequent 
acquisitions and, in doing so, fails to rationalize why frequent bidders‘ announcement 
returns remain positive to the fourth bid (Ismail, 2008). Given that the great majority 
of takeover deals are announced by frequent bidders, the inadequacy of these existing 
theories highlights the research need of applying a theory which sufficiently 
rationalizes the performance of frequent bidders and provides a more coherent 
description of the value effects of serial acquisitions.  
Moeller et al. (2006) point out that for a given distribution of returns, the 
expected returns conditional on good news increase as asymmetric information 
increases, while those conditional on bad news decrease as asymmetric information 
increases. These changes in information asymmetry can be explicitly quantified in a 
serial acquisition framework. Accordingly, developed upon the research of Moeller et 
al. (2006), Chapter 5 fills the aforementioned literature gap existing in serial 
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acquisitions by examining the relevance of dynamic information asymmetry to 
frequent bidders‘ gains. The results show that information asymmetry surrounding a 
frequent bidder, in general, decreases with subsequent bids. This implies that a greater 
value correction surrounds the announcement of the initial bid than those of following 
bids. Consequently, due to the decreasing scale of revaluations, inherent in serial 
acquisitions, serial non-equity financed cash deals, in general, generate declining 
announcement returns since the scale of their upward revaluations continually 
decrease with subsequent announcements. However, the non-upward revaluations of 
share deals and equity financed cash deals do not lead to declining returns of frequent 
bidders. 
These findings hold two contributions to mergers and acquisitions literature in 
relation to information sender (information asymmetry surrounding acquiring firms). 
Firstly, they further the theoretical implications of the information asymmetry 
hypothesis on corporate takeovers by introducing a relation between takeovers and a 
dynamic information asymmetry. This relation goes beyond the current setting of 
takeovers and static information asymmetry. Secondly, they add to the knowledge of 
the rationale underlying frequent bidders‘ performance by comparing the empirical 
results against several predictions suggested by other theories and hypotheses. These 
comparisons reveal the deficiencies of existing theories in providing a coherent 
description of the value effects of serial acquisitions. It further highlights the 
significant role that asymmetric information plays in rationalizing the performance of 
frequent bidders.    
To summarize, the findings of these three empirical chapters, together with the 
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related theoretical rationale, implicate several information-related factors inherent in 
the information dissemination process of takeover announcements. The value effects 
of these factors, as well as the mechanisms under which these value effects work, 
expand the limited focus offered by existing research, which examines the relationship 
between corporate takeovers and the information environment, into a broad and 
dynamic context. These factors will be addressed in chapters 3, 4 and 5.  
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2.1 Introduction 
Intrigued by the value creation objective of takeovers and the controversies 
surrounding takeover outcomes, financial economists have engaged in accumulating 
considerable knowledge concerning the occurrences and the value effects of corporate 
takeovers. Among these research efforts, the building-blocks of some traditional and 
fundamental theories have simultaneously highlighted the role of information 
environment and its implications. Given the importance of information environment in 
a theoretical framework, growing economics of unevenly distributed information 
underlies extensive recent work.  
The theoretical implications of information environment, particularly information 
asymmetry, on corporate takeovers primarily surround the payment methods of 
transactions. More specifically, the payment mechanism is regarded as an information 
carrier which determines the value effects of acquisitions (e.g., Myers and Majluf, 
1984; Eckbo et al., 1990). Nevertheless, this focus, on methods of payment as an 
information carrier, tends to be inadequate in providing a comprehensive description 
of the mechanism under which the value effects of information work. Announcing 
takeovers contains a process of disseminating firm information which involves the 
interaction of several factors, including information sender, information content and 
information recipient. These factors and their interactions cannot be captured by an 
information carrier alone. Therefore, here arises the necessity of extending takeovers 
to a broader, dynamic information environment and further examining the relevance of 
several information elements within this environment to the occurrence and value 
effects of takeovers. Existing literature that has identified a series of factors shaping 
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takeover activities is reviewed in this chapter. Their relation to this research context is 
then discussed.  
This chapter begins by reviewing fundamental theories which rationalize the 
occurrence of mergers and acquisitions. Meanwhile, the relation between the 
mechanics, of these theories, and the information environment is then highlighted in 
order to show information environment as an indispensable element in a thorough 
understanding of the takeover market. Having provided an overview of the rationale 
underlying the occurrence of mergers and acquisitions, this chapter then presents a 
review of the documented value effects of mergers and acquisitions by synopsizing 
the measurements and the suggested determinants of these value effects. At the same 
time, information environment, in relation to these determinants, is addressed so as to 
propose that a research on the relevance of information environment to both acquiring 
and acquired firms‘ announcement returns can further the knowledge on the value 
effects of corporate takeovers. 
2.2 Information Environment and Theories on the Occurrence of Corporate 
Takeovers 
2.2.1 The Efficiency Theory 
A major group of hypothesized takeover motives are based on the efficiency 
theory, which regards improvements in a combined firm‘s operation as the 
determinant of takeover activities. These improvements are brought about by 
economies of scale, combinations of complementary resources and risk-spreading 
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opportunities (Bradley et al., 1983 & 1988). Specifically, these three benefits can 
generate cost-reducing synergies for resultant units in the following ways.  
Firstly, when economies of scale in production exists, a horizontal merger can be 
the source of cost reductions for firms of less than minimum efficient size. Secondly, 
when a production process requires closely integrated steps in the production chain, a 
vertical integration can reduce production costs by reducing the  uncertainties involved 
in successive stages of the production. Thirdly, a reduction in costs can also be 
achieved, irrelevant of the form of the organization structure a firm takes. More 
specifically, size and diversification via takeovers can reduce risks, increase the 
capability of raising capital in the financial market and thereby bring about a reduction 
in costs (Mueller, 1980).  
In addition to the cost-reducing synergies, the efficiency created by the combined 
entity also exists at a managerial level. Manne (1965) and Alchian and Demsetz (1972) 
suggest that the takeover market can facilitate competition among management teams 
for the right to control corporate assets. If the executives of a firm are responsible for 
that firm‘s poor performance, another management team can remove the existing one 
through a takeover. Hence, an improvement in the performance of the acquired firm is 
expected (Weston et al., 2004).  
This operational efficiency is ensured by the following stock market selection 
process, suggested by Fairburn and Kay (1989). A low stock price reflects a firm‘s 
poor performance caused by inefficiency. This opportunity is taken by potential 
raiders. Their improved management of the acquired firm‘s assets is then reflected in 
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the stock market, which in turn generates capital gains. The assumption underlying 
this stock market selection process is that the share price should reflect the relative 
expected profitability of a firm. It is only when the market pricing mechanism can 
incorporate this firm performance related information, and can further respond to 
changes in this information, such a stock market selection process, and thus mergers 
and acquisitions, will take place.  
2.2.2 The Neoclassical Theory 
Even without the intention to improve operational efficiency, takeovers, as 
suggested by the neoclassical theory, can still occur as a consequence of economic 
shocks (e.g., Gort, 1969; Mitchell and Mulherin, 1996; Harford, 2005). Specifically, 
neoclassical theory suggests that economic disturbances, as well as technological and 
regulatory shocks, lead to industry reorganizations. In this reorganization process, 
industry assets are reallocated through mergers and acquisitions. Such asset 
reallocation follows the mechanism of Gort‘s (1969) economic disturbance theory.  
Information asymmetry, different evaluations of information and different 
behaviors acting upon information released are three of the assumptions underlying 
this economic disturbance theory of takeovers (Gort, 1969). More specifically, if a 
firm‘s present and potential shareholders have homogenous expectations about the 
firm‘s future, any change in expectations, given by economic disturbances, will result 
in an immediate change in the firm‘s share price and further lead to a similar 
adjustment of intentions towards portfolio holdings of the firm‘s stock. Therefore, 
these homogenous expectations, and hence the absence of exchanging portfolio 
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holdings between present and potential shareholders, can rule out the opportunity of 
mergers and acquisitions. If, on the other hand, a firm‘s present and potential 
shareholders have different expectations about the firm‘s future, takeovers can take 
place in the disturbance of the firm‘s share price via exchanging portfolio holdings 
between these two groups of shareholders. Their different expectations arise from 
them having differing access to information or evaluating the hold information 
differently. 
In light of the Gort‘s (1969) economic disturbance theory, Mueller (1980) 
explicates the occurrence of mergers and acquisitions in the presence of economic 
disturbances. Economic disturbances bring about a dramatic increase in a firm‘s share 
price, which cause the firm‘s potential shareholders to immediately update their 
expectations. If their expected share value is not only above the present market price,  
but also above the share price that will have to be offered to present shareholders, a 
change in corporate control will be accomplished.   
Neoclassical theory has related fundamental shocks to takeover activities at an 
industry- level. It has successfully explained the movements of the US takeover market 
in the 1980s within its respective economic climate (Jensen, 1988). However, 
counterviews suggest that shocks, whether economic, technological or regulatory,  
should have different directional implications across stocks within an industry 
(Harford, 2005). Thus, the neoclassical theory fails to unite these fundamental shocks 
to takeover activities at a firm-specific level.  
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2.2.3 The Managerialism and Hubris Theories 
The firm-specific focus of the managerialism and hubris theories, fills the area 
left unaccounted for by the neoclassical theory. It relaxes the assumption of rational 
management which underlies both efficiency and neoclassical theories. It further 
suggests managerial motivations as the driving force of merger and acquisition 
activities (e.g., Roll, 1986; Morck et al., 1990; Jensen, 2005; Song, 2007).8   
Hubris Hypothesis (Roll, 1986) forms the foundation of this strand of research. 
Roll (1986) suggests a takeover model, based on managerial hubris, where individual 
managers are prone to excessive self-confidence. For example, in explaining why 
managers would like to pay a premium for a firm which has already been correctly 
valued by the market, he suggests that the pure economic gains available to acquiring 
firms are not the sole, or even the primary, motivation in acquisitions. Instead, 
personal factors (for example, managerial overconfidence as in the study of 
Malmendier and Tate (2008)), drive managers to acquire firms. However, this does 
not necessarily imply that managers aim to maximize their private benefits and 
consciously act against their shareholders‘ interests. These managerial decisions may 
not be intended to sacrifice the interests of shareholders, although the results of these 
actions may not always be beneficial for shareholders. 
Nevertheless, as suggested by the managerialism theory, there are some cases 
where managers consciously seek personal interest-maximization at the cost of their 
                                                 
8
 Managerialis m motives and managerial hubris are regarded as primary factors in  explaining  takeover 
premium, in part icular the overpayments to target firms (e.g., Hayward and Hambrick, 1997). Takeover 
premium forms the research focus of chapter 4, where the empirical findings are compared against the 
predictions of these factors as well as investor sentiment.  
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shareholders (e.g., Seyhun, 1990; Berkovitch and Narayan, 1993). As managers and 
shareholders have different access to information, the information asymmetry between 
them can result in a principal-agent conflict.9 This conflict can be magnified by high 
free cash flow in a firm (Jensen, 1986 & 2005). When internal funds are in excess of 
the investments required to fund positive net present value projects, mangers may 
engage in value reducing takeovers. Developed upon these agency costs of free cash 
flow, Shleifer and Vishny (1989) introduce a managerial entrenchment model. 
According to this model, managers are hesitant to pay out cash to shareholders; 
instead, they make investments, such as acquisitions, which increase the likelihood of 
receiving a high payment and reduce the chance that they will be replaced.  
2.2.4 The Misvaluation Theory 
The magnitude of these managerialism motives does not remain constant. Instead, 
as suggested by the agency costs of overvalued equity (Jensen, 2005), it varies with 
changes in misvaluation. Managers, from a firm with substantially overvalued equities, 
have the ability to correct any overvaluation; yet this will consequently disappoint the 
optimistic market expectation. Therefore, they are prone to meet this market 
expectation by creating a high growth illusion. This is achieved by engaging in value 
destroying acquisitions. This managerialism incentive, magnified by overvaluation, 
suggests that misvaluation could be an indispensable driving force in the takeover 
market.10 
                                                 
9
 The principal-agent conflict refers to the conflicts between a firm‘s managers (agent) and its 
shareholders (princip le) over the choice of the company strategy. This conflict can give rise to agency 
costs. Such costs are incurred in the process of monitoring managerial behaviour and from efficiency 
losses. 
10
 Misvaluation forms the research focus of Chapter 3, where effects of misvaluation on the intensity 
and the value effects of takeovers are examined. For an intensive discussion specific to misvaluation 
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Misvaluation theory explicitly examines the relevance of misvaluation to the 
occurrence of mergers and acquisitions (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny, 2003; 
Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan, 2004; Ang and Cheng, 2006; Rosen, 2006). The 
misvaluation hypothesis predicts that overvalued firms will use their overpriced equity 
to acquire undervalued targets. Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) provide 
supporting evidence for this hypothesis. They claim that, in general, overvalued firms 
win takeover battles and undervalued targets are purchased. Moreover, companies 
from overvalued sectors purchase firms which are in relatively undervalued sectors. 
The valuation difference between acquiring firms and their targets is roughly 20% of 
the targets‘ market to book ratio.  
Various motives underlie this driving force of misvaluation in the takeover 
market. Both the use of overpriced stocks as cheap currency (Shleifer and Vishny, 
2003) and the agency costs of overvalued equity (Jensen, 2005) can prompt acquirers‘ 
involvements in takeovers. Targets, on the other hand, are likely to accept the 
overvalued offers due to their synergy-estimation errors, which can be intensified by 
high market-valuation (Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan, 2004), or the relatively short 
managerial time-horizons exhibited by their managers (Shleifer and Vishny, 2003). 
These motives from both a bidder‘s and a target‘s perspective suggest an active 
takeover market in the presence of overvaluation. 
In summary, by extrapolating upon traditional theories, extant literature has 
developed several schools of thought in theorizing and rationalizing the occurrence of 
mergers and acquisitions, including the efficiency theory, neoclassical theory, 
                                                                                                                                            
related literature, see sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.3. 
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managerialism theory, hubris theory and the misvaluation theory. Although these 
theories expose takeovers to the influence of different factors such as, operational 
efficiency, economic disturbance, hubris, managerialism motives and misvaluation, 
the building-blocks of these theories simultaneously highlight the role of information 
and its implications. In particular, the market mechanism underlying neoclassical 
theory, managerialism theory and misvaluation theory is one where information is not 
freely available and investors disagree on its implications. Therefore, a research 
focused on information environment in the market for corporate control will reveal a 
better understanding of mergers and acquisitions.  
The information environment addressed in this thesis concerns four aspects. 
These aspects are information (information content signalled by takeover 
announcements), information sender (information asymmetry surrounding acquiring 
firms and information uncertainty regarding target firms), information recipient 
(investor sentiment involved in interpreting the information) and market condition 
(misvaluation). The use of these four information elements is intended to 
comprehensively represent the information dissemination process inherent in takeover 
announcements. Literature relating to these factors is reviewed in each empirical 
chapter. 
2.3 Gains from Corporate Takeovers 
Having reviewed the causes of corporate takeovers, the related consequences are 
summarized in this subsection. The rationale underlying the occurrence of takeovers 
can further shed light on the value creation of this corporate activity. In general, the 
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empirical evidence provided indicates that takeovers generate substantial gains for the 
created combination, yet such gains are not distributed evenly between both parties. 
Shareholders of the bidding firms suffer from wealth loss, while target firms receive 
large wealth gains (e.g., Dodd, 1980 and Franks et al., 1991; Andrade et al., 2001). 
Determinants of these value effects are suggested in light of the rationale underlying 
the occurrence of takeovers. In order to provide a comprehensive review on this issue, 
measurements of these value effects and factors influencing these value effects are 
outlined in the paragraphs below. 
2.3.1 Measuring Gains from Corporate Takeovers 
Gains from corporate takeovers can be presented in different forms, for example 
reduced operational costs, improved profitability or wealth created to shareholders.    
Since shareholders are the residual owners of the combined entities, evaluating 
shareholders‘ wealth effects forms the primary approach of measuring takeover gains 
among existing research (Martynova and Renneboog, 2008).  
 In assessing these wealth effects, event study is the methodology primarily 
employed in mergers and acquisitions literature. Based on the proposition that, around 
a takeover announcement period, investors‘ assessments of the present value of a 
takeover‘s benefits can be immediately reflected by the firm‘s share price, a short-run 
approach of measuring takeover gains is developed (e.g., Dodd, 1980; Eckbo, 1983). 
This stock market reaction is measured over a short event period surrounding the 
initial public announcement of a deal. To quantify such market reaction, abnormal 
returns are used. These are the actual returns in excess of a benchmark return. This 
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benchmark return is what shareholders would expect to receive if the takeover event 
had not taken place. Firms‘ abnormal stock returns during a three- or five-day event 
window surrounding their takeover announcements are the most commonly used 
approach in measuring short-run gains from corporate takeovers. For example, a 
three-day event window has been used in the studies of Moeller et al. (2004 & 2005) 
and Bouwman et al. (2006); a five-day event window has been used in the research of 
Walker (2000), Fuller et al. (2002), Bradley and Sundaram (2004) and Faccio et al. 
(2006). 
As mentioned above, this short-run measurement assumes stock market 
efficiency (Datta et al., 1992). However, counter-arguments suggest that markets 
require time to evaluate the implications of takeovers (Martynova and Renneboog, 
2008). Moreover, information about the progress of the takeover, and the integration 
of two firms, is gradually incorporated into the market expectation. Therefore, the 
value effects should be measured over a long-run post-acquisition period. Accordingly, 
acquiring firms‘ abnormal returns have been measured over a long-run event window, 
which ranges from 24 months to 70 months, based on several benchmark return 
models. For instance, using a size and beta adjusted model, Agrawal et al. (1992) 
examine US bidders‘ cumulative abnormal returns over a 60-month window after their 
announcements. A 24-month event window is used by Gregory (1977), who measures 
UK bidders‘ abnormal returns based on both CAPM and Fama-French three-factor 
model. An average two-year post-announcement return of -10.99% is reported by 
Bradley and Sundaram (2004), which is obtained by applying the market-adjusted 
model. 
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After discussing and comparing the developed approaches in measuring takeover 
gains, one measurement is selected for this thesis based on the discussed research 
focus. Specifically, takeover activities contain a process of disseminating firm 
information. The relevance of factors along this process to the gains from corporate 
takeovers, constitutes the research objective of this study. Given this research focus, 
the stock market‘s reactions to a transaction should be measured along this 
information disseminating process. Therefore, a short-run approach is used in this 
study which can precisely examine the stock price sensitivity to these information 
related factors.  
Having reviewed the developed approaches of measuring gains from corporate 
takeovers, and having further related them to the research needs of this thesis, factors 
influencing these gains are then discussed in the following subsections. Since this 
thesis examines the stock market reaction, from both a bidder‘s and target‘s 
perspective, to a takeover announcement along its information disseminating process, 
existing literature in relation to bidders‘ and targets‘ announcement returns is then 
reviewed in 2.3.2 and 2.3.3 respectively.  
2.3.2  Bidders’ Gains from Corporate Takeovers 
Bidders‘ gains from takeovers have been extensively researched by financial 
scholars, and a considerable divergence in bidders‘ announcement returns has been 
documented. For the US takeover market, Eckbo (1983) finds that, during the period 
of 1963 to 1978, the average return to shareholders of acquiring firms is 
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insignificantly different from zero (0.07%). On the other hand, Frank et al. (1991) and 
Graham et al. (2002) report significantly negative returns of -1.02% (covering the 
period 1975-1984) and -0.78% (covering the period 1980-1995) respectively. For the 
UK takeover market, Sudarsanam et al. (1996) find a significant return of -4.04% 
generated by acquirers over the period 1980-1990. Conversely, using a sample of 830 
deals announced during the 1975-1990 period, an insignificantly positive return of 
0.43% is reported by Higson and Elliott (1998). This empirical evidence suggests that, 
in general, returns to shareholders of acquiring firms are either insignificantly 
different from zero or significantly negative.  
Despite this unsuccessful value creation for shareholders of acquiring firms in 
general, empirical findings in existing literature also reveal that, when the sample is 
partitioned into different subsamples according to several deal characteristics, some 
bidders can actually capture significant benefits from takeovers. Therefore, several 
deal and firm characteristics are suggested to account for bidders‘ announcement 
returns. Primary among these are methods of payment and target status.    
In making an offer, public listed bidders can pay target firms with different 
methods, for example cash, stock or a combination of the two. The actual mode of 
payment is chosen through negotiations between the two parties, as it has some 
bearing on their shareholders‘ wealth. There is a largely unanimous agreement in 
literature that, from a bidder‘s perspective, equity acquisitions are associated with 
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significantly negative abnormal returns which substantially underperform cash bids.11 
For instance, Frank et al. (1991), using a sample of 156 cash deals, 128 equity deals 
and 114 mixed deals announced between 1975 and 1984, provide evidence that cash 
deals generate an average return of 0.83% which is 3.98% higher than share deals‘ 
announcement returns. This negative return, and further the underperformance, are 
consistent with the findings in the later research of Andrade et al. (2001) and 
Bouwman et al. (2003). 
 Signaling implications in the presence of information asymmetry are suggested 
as the primary factor underlying the stock performances of cash and equity bidders  
(Myers and Majluf, 1984). Acquiring firms may have private information which is 
unknown to the market. The unevenly distributed information gives rise to the 
possibility that mangers, who possess the private information that their firm‘s shares 
are overvalued, will use these inflated shares to acquire a target firm. Investors then 
interpret the signals conveyed by this equity payment, and further evaluate the 
prospects of the acquirer, based on their interpreted information. After recognizing the 
adverse selection problem, they will consequently evaluate the acquiring firm 
downwardly. Therefore, negative returns are associated with bidders making equity 
payments.        
                                                 
11
 Equity acquisitions are not always associated with significantly negative abnormal returns. For 
example, in the study of Moeller et al. (2004), the average return generated by 2958 equity deals is 
significantly positive (0.15%). However, the underperformance of share deals, compared with cash 
deals, is persistent, as this positive return is still 1.23% lower than cash bidders‘ gains. 
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In addition to payment methods, a large number of studies report that bidders‘ 
gains also depend on the status of target firms (i.e. private or public firms), with 
acquisitions of private targets generating substantially higher returns to the acquiring 
firms. Fuller et al. (2002) examine bidders‘ announcement returns of 456 public target 
acquisitions and 2060 private target acquisitions during the period of 1990 to 2000. 
They find that acquiring a private (public) target generates an average return of 2.08% 
(-1%) for biding firms. This outperformance of private target acquisitions is also 
reported by Moeller et al. (2004). They show that US bidders, on average, earn 
positive announcement returns (1.49%) in acquiring private targets and negative 
announcement returns (-1.02%) in acquiring public targets. Similar results are 
documented by the UK takeover market based studies of Conn et al. (2005), Draper 
and Paudyal (2006) and the European takeover market based study of Faccio et al. 
(2006).   
Having found that the relevance of target status to bidders‘ gains is widespread 
and persistent, several explanations are then offered, for example shareholder 
overlapping and market liquidity. Hansen and Lott (1996) posit that shares of a listed 
target can be part of the diversified portfolios owned by shareholders of the acquiring 
company. They are less inclined to monitor whether the listed target is overpaid, 
because the overpayment will eventually be recaptured through ownership of the 
target‘s shares. This overpayment lowers bidders‘ gains from acquiring a public target. 
Besides shareholder overlapping, the market liquidity of public targets‘ shares can 
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also give rise to overpayment and further reduce bidders‘ gains. Information 
surrounding public firms is more widely available and hence potential bidders may 
compete for the control of these firms. This increased possibility of competitive bids 
can give rise to an overpayment by bidding firms (Conn et al., 2005; Draper and 
Paudyal, 2006).  
In addition to the influence of payment methods and target status on bidders‘ 
gains, discussed in isolation from each other, a growing amount of research has 
examined the value effects of payment methods conditional on target status. For 
example, Faccio  et al. (2006) examine European bidders‘ announcement returns (over 
a 5-day event window) from acquiring 735 pubic targets and 3694 privately held firms 
during the period 1996-2001. According to their empirical findings, cash deals 
generate positive returns to acquiring firms, regardless of target status. On the other 
hand, where share bids are concerned, announcement returns to bidders for public 
targets are significantly negative (-1.81%). Bidders for private targets capture, on 
average, a significant return of 3.90%. Similar results are document by Chang (1998) 
and Bradley and Sundaram (2004) concerning a sample of US mergers and 
acquisitions.12  
These findings show that value implications of payment methods, in particular 
share deals, are likely to differ across acquisitions for public and private targets. The 
                                                 
12
 For example, Chang (1998) report an insignificant average return of -0.02% for public-cash deals, an 
insignificant average return of 0.09% for private-cash deals, a significant average return of -2.46% for 
public-stock offers and an significant return of 2.64% for private-stock offers. 
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differing value implications are then rationalized with the information asymmetry 
hypothesis and monitoring hypothesis.  
The ownership of privately held firms is often concentrated within a small group. 
Target firms with such concentrated ownership have a strong incentive to examine 
acquiring firms and the bids they offer (Draper and Paudyal, 2006). Therefore, their 
acceptance of a share deal is a decision made after discreet consideration and suggests 
that they expect the deal to create value or at least that the bidder‘s share is not 
overvalued. This information, when conveyed to the market, is favorable for the 
acquiring firm. Therefore, bidders for private targets paying with shares should 
capture positive announcement returns.  
The concentrated ownership of private targets can not only reduce the 
information asymmetry surrounding the acquiring firms but can also create 
blockholders. If a bidder for a private target uses equity payment in the transaction, a 
substantial portion of the combined firm‘s shares will be attributed to a small group of 
shareholders who are the prior owners of the target firm. This creation of outside 
blockholders can serve as an efficient monitor of managerial performance and can 
further reduce agency costs. Thus, it will result in an increase in firm value (Chang, 
1998). Given this monitoring effect, bidders for private targets paying with shares 
should capture positive announcement returns. 
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In addition to the primary effects of payment methods and target status on 
acquiring firms‘ announcement returns, other firm or deal characteristics have also 
been identified as factors which can explain the difference in short-run gains to 
acquiring firms, for example target domicile, bidders‘ size and relative size. Literature 
in relation to these factors is reviewed in the paragraphs below.  
Firstly, bidders‘ gains from cross-border acquisitions are expected to be higher 
than those from domestic acquisitions, if acquirers can capture the diversification 
benefits associated with cross-border acquisitions (Baldwin and Caves, 1991). 
However, inconsistencies exist between literature. For instance, in the study of Conne 
et al. (2005), cross-border acquisitions result in lower announcement returns than 
domestic acquisitions. This underperformance of cross-border acquisitions can be 
attributed to the imperfect information in valuing overseas targets and the difficulties 
in post-merger integrations on an international scale. 
Secondly, a large firm size generally causes negative effects on bidders‘ 
announcement returns, irrespective of other deal characteristics (Higson and Elliott, 
1998). In the study of Moeller et al. (2004), small acquirers in the US takeover market 
outperform large bidders by at least 2% in terms of abnormal returns. In addition, 
shareholders‘ wealth loss is more pertinent for acquisitions announced by large firms. 
Since large firms usually enter deals that require a high premium and generate 
negative synergies, overpayment has been suggested as the factor underlying the 
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underperformance of such firms (Loderer and Martin, 1990; Moeller et al., 2004). The 
cause of this overpayment is related to managerial hubris. More specifically, 
according to hubris hypothesis, managerial decisions are driven by managers‘ 
personal factors, for example self-confidence. Mangers of large acquiring firms are 
likely to be exposed to such hubris due to the size and the prestige of the firm they 
manage (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985). Their accumulated managerial confidence will 
lead to overpaying for target firms, and thus give rise to lower abnormal returns for 
acquirers.      
Thirdly, the relative size of target to bidder is another determinant of bidders‘ 
gains. Generally, a larger relative size leads to greater takeover gains to acquiring 
firms (e.g., Asquith et al., 1983; Kang, 1993). Chatterjee (1986) attribute this positive 
relation to financial synergies. These synergies generated by mergers, which are 
represented by the reduced costs of capital captured by the combined units, are limited 
by the targets‘ size. In general, the larger the relative size, the greater the financial 
synergy that can be achieved, and in turn the more the bidders‘ gains.  
To summarise, the above review of theoretical and empirical research on mergers 
and acquisitions suggests several factors which affect or determine short-run gains to 
acquiring firms. Primary among these are methods of payment and target status. It is 
important to note that, in rationalizing the value effects of these two factors, 
information environment (in particular information asymmetry) has offered substantial 
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explanatory value. This suggests the necessity of explicitly examining the relation 
between information environment and bidders‘ gains from takeovers. Such a relation 
forms the main research focus of this thesis. Moreover, in uncovering whether this 
relation exists, the identified series of characteristics that account for bidders‘ 
announcement-period returns (as mentioned in the paragraphs above) are included as 
control variables.  
2.3.3 Targets’ Gains from Corporate Takeovers 
The contrast between the takeover returns to target firms and those to bidding 
firms is striking. More specifically, as discussed above, returns to shareholders of 
acquiring firms are, in general, either insignificantly different from zero or 
significantly negative. Conversely, share prices of target firms significantly increase 
around takeover announcement periods. For example, Asquith et al. (1983), 
concerning a US sample covering the period of 1962-1976, measure targets‘ returns 
over a 20-day window prior to the announcement date and report an average return of 
16.8%. A 16.8% abnormal return to target firms is also found by Malatesta (1983), 
who uses a 20-day window following the announcement date and examines 
acquisitions announced from 1969-1974. Andrade et al. (2001) divide their sample 
into three chronological subsamples. For the period of 1973-1979, the average return 
to shareholders of target firms, measured over a 3-day window, is 16%. For the 1980s, 
the same average return is obtained. For the period of 1990-1998, targets‘ 
announcement returns drop slightly to 15.9% but are still statistically significant.  
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In general, the short-run gains to target firms are significantly positive. 
Furthermore, once target firms are partitioned by firm and deal characteristics, 
including deal attitude, methods of payment and managerial ownership, these 
short-run gains can be characterized differently.    
Firstly, Franks et al. (1991) document that hostile bids generate an average return 
of 39.39% for US target firms, which is 14.92% higher than the gains created by 
friendly bids. Similar results are reported by Servaes (1991) and Frank and Mayer 
(1996) who find that targets‘ gains from hostile offers outperform those from friendly 
offers by 9.88% and 11.32% respectively. Martynova and Renneboog (2008) then 
provide the rationale underlying these findings. They argue that a hostile bid gives rise 
to resistance from the acquired firm, which poses the potential of revising the offer 
price upwardly. Hence, hostile but successful deals are expected to be associated with 
higher premiums, compared with friendly deals. At the announcement of a hostile bid, 
the share of the acquired firm will immediately reflect this expectation. Therefore, 
targets‘ short-run returns are affected by deal attitude. 
Secondly, in addition to deal attitude, method of payment is another factor in 
relation to targets‘ gains. For the US market, Franks et al. (1991) find an average 
announcement return of 22.88% for share deals versus 33.78% for cash deals. In a 
more recent research, Andrade et al. (2001) provide empirical evidence that short-run 
gains to acquired firms are on average 13%, if the bids are paid with equity; 
non-equity deals, meanwhile, generate an average return of 20.1% for target firms. 
Similar findings are reported by European takeover market based studies. For example, 
in the research of Martynova and Renneboog (2006), targets capture an average return 
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of 20.17% in cash deals, corresponding to an 11.1% in stock deals. 13 
Thirdly, Song and Walking (1993) examine the relationship between target 
shareholder returns and managerial ownership. The results from their cross-sectional 
regression analysis suggest that, in contested but successful acquisitions, targets‘ gains 
are positively and significantly related to managerial ownership. This finding is 
consistent with the early research of Stulz (1988). In explaining why this relation 
exists, they introduce the supply-side push and bargaining power. ―Bidders face an 
upward sloping supply curve for shares of the target firm‖ (P. 452). If mangers show 
resistance towards an offer, their ownership will force a supply-side push, which 
moves up the supply curve and gives rise to a higher offer price. Even without this 
resistance, managerial ownership can still create significant bargaining power. Such 
power, once being properly used in negotiating with the acquiring firms, can increase 
the offer price and thus shareholders‘ gains. 
In summary, compared with the identified series of deals and firm characteristics 
which affect or determine short-run gains to acquiring firms, fewer attempts have been 
made to suggest factors that can account for targets‘ announcement returns. Therefore, 
here arises the need for the researching of identifiable additional factors that may also 
impact the value effects of acquired firms. In this thesis, the sentiment shown by 
investors (information recipients of takeover announcements) is suggested as a new 
determinant to further the understanding of this issue.  
                                                 
13
 The higher targets‘ gains from cash deals, relative to share deals, can be a consequen ce of tax, on 
capital gains, incurred from cash payment. Tax burdens of target firms are offset by high takeover 
premiums offered by acquirers (Wansley et al., 1983). These high premiums further lead to higher 
targets‘ returns. 
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2.4 Conclusions 
By extrapolating upon traditional theories, extant literature has developed several 
schools of thought in theorizing and rationalizing the occurrence of mergers and 
acquisitions. In light of this, several theories have been proposed as explanations for 
the gains from mergers and acquisitions. Although these theories expose the activity 
(occurrence) and the performance (gains) of mergers and acquisitions to the influences 
of many different factors, the role of information and its implications remain 
fundamental to most of these theories. Given this, it would be of crucial research value 
to provide a thorough understanding of the relationship between information 
environment and corporate takeovers.  
In this thesis, takeover announcements are primarily regarded as a process of 
disseminating firm information. The relevance of factors along this process to 
takeover gains constitutes the main research objective. These information related 
factors include information (information content signalled by takeover 
announcements), information sender (information asymmetry surrounding acquiring 
firms and information uncertainty regarding target firms), information recipient 
(investor sentiment involved in interpreting the information) and market condition 
(misvaluation). The examined hypotheses, and the associated importance in relation to 
these specific factors, are discussed in chapters 3, 4 and 5.  
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3.1 Introduction 
Neoclassical theory, pertaining to the market for corporate control, has suggested 
a relation between corporate takeovers and macroeconomic factors (e.g., Gort, 1969; 
Harford, 2005). It proposes that economic disturbances, as well as technological and 
regulatory shocks, lead to industry reorganizations. Such an asset reallocation process 
can be achieved by mergers and acquisitions. Although this theory has successfully 
explained the movements of the US takeover market in the 1980s against its 
respective economic climate (Jensen, 1988), controversial views suggest that 
economic changes are not a necessary condition for the occurrence of merger waves. 
Instead, other factors, for example misvaluation, contribute to fluctuations in total 
takeover and reorganization activities (Shleifer and Vishny, 2003; Rhodes-Kropf and 
Viswanathan, 2004).  
This misvaluation hypothesis is developed by recognizing abundant anecdotal 
evidence which suggest that an active takeover market coexists with a booming stock 
market. 14  Research efforts towards examining and further rationalizing the 
relationship between takeover activities and misvaluation, have provided empirical 
results that are consistent with anecdotal evidence. These results further indicated that 
misvaluation driven takeovers exist at a firm, industry, and market level (e.g., Shleifer 
and Vishny, 2003; Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan, 2004; Dong et al., 2006).15      
                                                 
14
 For example, the mega-merger of American Online-Time Warner created the world's first 
internet-age media and communication company. This transaction leads worldwide M&A deals, in  
terms of deal value, since 2000. The striking $164.747 b illion transaction value was paid with AOL‘s 
then hype-inflated stocks. This deal, as the seminal t ransaction, contributed to the over $1.5 trillion 
deals announced in that year. However, with the presence of stock market correction, this number 
dramat ically declined to half the year after (Institute of Mergers, Acquisitions and Alliances Research).  
15
 The great majority of literature on this issue concentrates on either market valuation (Tebourbi, 2005; 
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Existing research on the relation between misvaluation and the takeover market 
has mainly a stock merger focus. Additionally, by assuming that in making cash 
payments no equity issue is involved, cash mergers are naturally associated with 
undervaluation, while equity deals correspond to overvaluation. For example, the 
Shleifer and Vishny (2003) model predicts that ―overvaluation can be the motive for 
most stock acquisition, which increase the buyer‘s willingness–to-pay in stock 
mergers, though it has no effect in cash acquisition‖ (Friedman, 2004, p.1).  
Nevertheless, this assumption and the conclusion based on it are debatable, since 
the use of cash as a payment mechanism does not necessarily mean that the actual 
source of the cash payment comes solely from a firm‘s internal cash flow. Instead, 
external equity flow and debt flow serve as two financing alternatives (Schlingemann, 
2004). Therefore, given the different financing sources of cash payment, the 
documented irrelevance of overvaluation to cash deals, which is based on the flawed 
assumption that no equity is involved in cash payment, is unlikely to be generalizable. 
Accordingly, there arises the necessity of re-examining the under-researched and 
mis- interpreted misvaluation effects on cash deals.  
This research objective is expected to be achieved by applying the information 
asymmetry hypothesis. This is due to the information asymmetry hypothesis being 
formalized to rationalize both the misvaluation effects (e.g., Draper and Paudyal, 2008) 
and the value effects of payment financing (e.g., Myers and Majluf, 1984; Eckbo et al., 
1990), as outlined in the following paragraphs. Thus, this hypothesis is used to bridge 
                                                                                                                                            
Bouwman, 2006; Rosen, 2006) or firm misvaluation (Dong et al., 2006; Ang and Cheng, 2006). A 
comprehensive view of misvaluation is provided by Rhodes -Kropf et al. (2005) who deconstructs 
misvaluation into three factors: firm specific error, time series sector error and long-run value to book, 
and examines the relations between merger activit ies and each of the components.  
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the identified literature gap.  
Firstly, the theoretical implications of information asymmetry hypothesis shed 
light on both the intensity and the value effects of corporate takeovers in the presence 
of misvaluation. In terms of takeover intensity, Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) 
claim that misvaluation has an effect on merger activities via the mechanism of 
synergy-estimating errors. The estimation of the market-, sector- and firm-components 
of a bidder‘s misvaluation depends on the availability of relevant information. As 
information at the market level is more transparent and accessible, managers from 
target firms naturally overestimate the market-component of misvaluation, especially 
when the market valuation is high. This overestimated market valuation further 
intensifies the synergy-estimation errors shown by these managers. Consequently, 
such hyped synergy-estimation increases the possibility of target managers accepting  
an offer. Therefore, in general, frequent takeovers are expected during a high market 
valuation period. 
As for the value effects, misvaluation influences takeover synergies and 
revaluation effects, which are two components of a bidder‘s announcement returns. As 
mentioned in the paragraph above, high market valuation breeds overestimated 
synergies due to information asymmetry. These overestimated synergies can 
temporarily enhance bidders‘ gains. In addition to this synergies component of bidders‘ 
announcement returns, the revaluation component has the potential of driving bidders‘ 
gains. In line with information dissemination hypothesis (Draper and Paudyal, 2008), 
a corporate takeover releases information to the market and consequently attracts 
investors and analysts to reappraise the bidder‘s value. If information asymmetry 
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impedes a bidding firm from revealing its potential to the investment community, this 
firm is likely to be undervalued by the market. Announcing takeovers disseminates 
firm information to the market and thus gives rise to an upward revaluation. 
Consequently, the acquirer‘s share price can be bidded up through this revaluation 
process.  
Secondly, the theoretical implications of information asymmetry hypothesis shed 
light on the relevance of a transaction‘s payment method and financing source to 
bidders‘ gains. Signalling implications in the presence of information asymmetry is 
suggested as the primary factor underlying the stock performance of cash and equity 
bidders (Myers and Majluf, 1984). More specifically, the payment mechanism of a 
takeover is regarded as an information carrier which signals the bidder‘s private 
information to the market. Stock offers, in general, are interpreted as a s ign of a 
bidder‘s overvaluation and thus raise adverse selection problems. Cash deals, on the 
other hand, tend to alleviate the information asymmetry concerning a bidder‘s value.  
This value effect of the payment mechanism is later modified by Schlingemann 
(2004) and Martynova and Renneboog (2007) who introduce the notion of 
‗transaction financing‘.16 They report that a negative market reaction follows the 
announcement of a corporate takeover wherever equity financing is involved in the 
transaction. This suggests that, in evaluating takeover announcements, investors not 
only consider the information signalled by a transaction‘s payment method but also 
extract information from its financing source. For example, although cash deals, in 
general, send out positive signals and hence give rise to positive stock market 
                                                 
16
 The ‗transaction financing‘, different from ‗payment method‘, refers to the actual financing sources 
of the payment made to an acquired firm.  
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reactions, the negative information contents of equity financed cash deals can cause a 
stock price revision. 
Given these two groups of rationalizations of the information asymmetry 
hypothesis, in relation to misvaluation and payment financing methods, the 
information asymmetry hypothesis is expected to theorize the relevance of 
misvaluation to corporate takeovers conditional on payment financing methods. 
Thereby, the identified literature gap, discussed above, can be filled by examining the 
following two research questions and exploiting the information asymmetry 
hypothesis. These research questions concern the intensity and the value effects of 
takeovers respectively. Firstly, „how does misvaluation influence the intensity and the 
valuation of transactions in the UK takeover market‟? Secondly, if misvaluation 
shapes UK takeover activities, „does it have the same effects on transactions with 
different payment financing methods‟?  
An insight into these questions can contribute to the ongoing debate on value 
effects of misvaluation, which is presented with mixed and ambiguous empirical 
results.17 Moreover, the introduction of the ‗methods of payment‘ and ‗financing 
sources‘ combination clarifies the difference between these two factors, which has 
been disregarded to some extent among extant literature.  
By introducing the interaction between takeovers, as an investment decision, and 
its financing sources, this study bears important insights and implications for 
corporate organizations. This will be done by suggesting some financial management 
                                                 
17
 For extensive discussion on the documented value effects of misvaluation, see literature review 
section 3.2.2.2. 
Chapter 3                The Activity and the Value Effects of UK Takeovers in the Presence of Misvaluation  
- 47 - 
practices which can maximise the synergies between investment and financing 
decisions. 
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides 
comprehensive literature review on the relation between misvaluation and takeovers 
and further presents hypotheses developments. Section 3 contains data descriptions 
and the methodologies of measuring misvaluation and transaction financing. Results 
from univariate tests and cross-sectional regression analyses are given in Section 5. 
Section 6 concludes the chapter and points out how it relates to the following 
empirical chapter. 
3.2 Literature Review    
3.2.1 Misvaluation Related Takeover Motives  
In theorizing and rationalizing the relationship between takeovers and 
misvaluation, it is of primary importance to examine why such a relationship occurs. 
This relationship does not appear accidentally. It should be driven by the motives, of 
utilizing such misvaluation, shown by both parties involved in takeover transactions 
(i.e. bidders and targets). Accordingly, literature, on both why a bidder considers 
misvaluation in making takeover decisions and why a target would like ly accept such 
a misvaluation-driven-offer, is reviewed in this section. 
In examining why bidders would likely engage in takeovers in the presence of 
misvaluation, three explanations have been provided: i) exploiting the benefits of 
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overvaluation, ii) agency costs of overvalued equity, and iii) the opportunity of 
revaluation via information dissemination.  
Firstly, the potential benefits of overvaluation can encourage a firm to engage in 
takeovers in the presence of misvaluation. The ‗Tobin‘s Q Theory‘ suggests that a high 
stock price is a reflection of a firm‘s strong growth opportunities (Tobin, 1969). In line 
with this, it is predicted that overvaluation should correspond to more corporate 
investments. More specifically, firms exploit the advantage of overvaluation by 
issuing equities (Baker et al., 2003). These inflated equities are then invested either 
under the ‗passive financing mechanism‘, which is purchasing fairly priced securities, 
or under the ‗active financing mechanism‘, which is proceeding with projects that 
would have negative NPV without overvaluation (Chirinko and Schaller, 2006) 18. 
Accordingly, takeovers, being a corporate investment activity, should be exposed to 
these overvaluation effects.  
As indicated by the ‗passive financing mechanism‘, stock overvaluation suggests 
a low cost of equity finance. The overpriced shares are used as cheap currency to buy 
less overvalued real securities and assets, for example target firms in the context of 
corporate takeovers, to preserve some of the inflated value.  
Developed upon this, the Shleifer and Vishny (2003) model is introduced to 
explain why, in investing the proceeds from new equity issue in the presence of 
overvaluation, takeovers are preferred. They suggest that takeover synergies being 
                                                 
18
 The rat ionale underlying the ‗active financing mechanis m‘ is that overvaluations lower the costs of 
equity financing, and in turn WACC. Since WACC is generally used as the discount rate of future cash 
flow in assessing the NPV of an investment, the lowered discount rate increases the possibility that the 
NPV of the investment will be evaluated positively.    
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positively perceived by the market19, as well as the potential earning growth, which 
can justify high valuations, make takeovers a favorable choice for rational 
managements. Accordingly, this model proposes that the likelihood of merger and 
acquisition transactions is positively related with overvaluation. Moreover, this 
rational managerial decision to merge brings positive long-run incremental returns to 
acquirers‘ shareholders and thus serves their best interests.   
Exploiting this line of research, Ang and Cheng (2006) further examine this 
takeover motivation, in relation to misvaluation, by testing the hypothesis that stock 
bidders‘ shareholders are at least as well off as the shareholders of similarly overvalued 
non-acquiring firms. They report that when the rationality condition20 is satisfied, 
acquiring firms outperform their counterparts on the same misvaluation scale, 
regardless of whether their stock abnormal returns are measured around 
announcement periods or over the long-run. In line with Shleifer and Vishny (2003), 
this empirical result suggests that exploiting the benefits of overvaluations is a 
possible incentive underlying bidders‘ takeover decisions. Takeovers driven by this 
motivation generate beneficial outcomes for acquiring firms.      
Secondly, agency costs of overvalued equity can encourage a firm‘s engagement 
in takeovers in the presence of misvaluation. Although, under both the ‗passive 
financing mechanism‘ and the ‗active financing mechanism‘, firms issue new equities 
by timing the stock market and further finance their investments with the proceeds, the 
                                                 
19 .
 The synergies estimation is under the influences of market valuation. Synergies tend to be 
overestimated when the market valuation is high (Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan, 2004). For extensive 
discussion on this issue, see section 2.1.2.   
20. 
The rationality condition is when ―an opportunistic stock acquirer gains only if its overvaluation 
exceeds the target‘s overvaluation  and the merger premium. That is: Acquirer‘s overvaluation > target‘s 
premium−adjusted overvaluation‖ (Ang and Cheng, 2006, p.200).  
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use of inflated equities is not the sole motive of corporate investments in the presence 
of misvaluation. For example, managers may overinvest to stimulate optimistic market 
expectations (Jensen, 2005). Specifically, managers have the ability to correct any 
overvaluation; yet this will consequently disappoint the market. Therefore, eliminating 
overvaluation is likely to cause a substantial loss for existing shareholders and other 
stakeholders. Due to this pressure, they are prone to meet the market expectation and 
further to manipulate a high growth and value-creating illusion. This is achieved by 
engaging in excessive investments, which may even have negative net present value. 
An expansion in takeover activity, and the high possibility of engaging in value 
destroying acquisitions, is a likely outcome of this overinvestment.  
Accordingly, contrary to the value maximization view of mergers and acquisitions 
suggested by the Shleifer and Vishny (2003) model, Jensen (2005) argues that 
acquisitions, motivated by the agency costs of overvalued equity, tend to be detrimental 
to shareholders of bidding firms. Moeller et al. (2003) and Song (2007) support this 
argument by providing empirical evidence of overvalued bidders exhibiting poor 
long-term stock returns and operating performances. They rationalize this finding by 
appealing to the market realizing the created illusion. More specifically, since the 
created growth illusion by an overvalued bidder cannot constantly convince the market, 
not only will the overvaluation disappear but it will also prove detrimental to the value 
of the bidder‘s shareholders. This further leads to a violent drop in the firm‘s value.  
Thirdly, revaluation via information dissemination can encourage a firm to 
engage in takeovers in the presence of misvaluation. Both the ‗passive financing 
mechanism‘ and agency costs of overvalued equity associate takeover motives with 
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overvaluation. Conversely, information dissemination hypothesis suggests 
undervaluation as a driving force of takeover activities. If information asymmetry 
impedes a firm from revealing its potential to the market, this firm is likely to have 
undervalued securities. Managers of this firm, once recognizing the undervaluation, 
have strong motives to release good news to the market and thus attract the attention 
of the investment community. Investors then reappraise the firm‘s value based on the 
arrival of new information. This revaluation process will eventually drive up the firm‘s 
share price. Applying this information dissemination hypothesis in a takeover context, 
Draper and Paudyal (2008) suggest that corporate takeover announcements, compared 
with additional information release, can guarantee a wide coverage and secure the  
occurrence of such a revaluation process. Accordingly, managers from a bidding firm, 
with undervalued equities, will take this opportunity of revaluation to announce 
takeovers and disseminate firm information to the market.  
As already mentioned, both the low cost of equity finance and the agency costs 
of overvalued equities stimulate overvalued firms to take part in the takeover market. 
But why would a target likely accept the overvalued offer? Two explanations, based 
on correlated misinformation and different managerial horizons respectively, have 
been proposed. 
The managerial decisions, on whether to accept an offer or not, are partly based 
on their estimated synergies from available information. Accordingly, the willingness 
of managers from a target firm to accept an overpriced offer may stem from their 
mis-estimated synergies of the combined unit. This synergy-estimating error, as 
suggested by Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004), can be magnified by a high 
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market valuation. Mangers from a target firm, although fully aware whether the bidder 
is overvalued, are not able to deconstruct the market-, sector- and firm-components of 
misvaluation. As information at a market level is more transparent and accessible, they 
naturally overestimate the market-component of misvaluation and hence the created 
synergies, especially when the market valuation is high. Therefore, these overrated 
synergies increase the possibility of accepting a bid.   
Even if managers from a target firm can successfully weigh each component of 
misvaluation, there is still a chance that they will accept the inflated offers. This is 
because, managers, who are self- interested and concern themselves with short-term 
gains, may hope that the overpriced equity can be cashed out quickly (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 2003). In this case, shareholders from the target firm may not suffer a loss 
from holding these overvalued shares during the takeover announcement period, yet 
almost no gain can be seen in the long-run.  
In addition to the relatively shorter managerial horizon, managers from target 
firms are likely to accept the overvalued offers if there are extra benefits for them to 
capture. Acquirers may pay them for agreeing to the deals in the forms of stock options, 
severance pay, reservations of top positions (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny, 2003), or 
personal wealth increase (e.g., Hartzell et al., 2004).  
In summary, literature on misvaluation in the takeover market consistently 
suggests that acquiring firms are inclined to engage in takeovers in the presence of a 
high market valuation or an overvaluation, although such an inclination comes from 
different motivations. On the other hand, acquired firms are prone to accept the offers 
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announced by overvaluation motivated bidders, although their willingness to accept 
these offers stems from different considerations.  
3.2.2 Relevance of Misvaluation to the Intensity and the Value Effects of 
Takeovers 
As discussed in the above section, misvaluation related takeover motives can 
explain why the relationship between takeovers and misvaluation occurs. These 
motives can further quantify such a relationship by shedding light on the activity and 
the value creation of corporate takeovers in the presence of misvaluation. Related 
literature is reviewed in this section, including research towards examining the 
relevance of misvaluation to both the intensity and the value effects of takeovers.  
Transaction intensity refers to the fluctuations in total takeover activities. Such 
fluctuations, presented by takeover waves, have persisted in the market for corporate 
control over the past several decades. The trend of mergers clustering during high 
stock market valuation periods has been rationalized by the theoretical models 
formalized by Shleifer and Vishny (2003) and Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004).  
The Shleifer and Vishny (2003) model, as previously mentioned, regards 
positively perceived synergies and potential earning growth during high valuation 
periods as the motives driving a firm to engage in the takeover market. Furthermore, 
targets are willing to accept these overvalued offers due to their managers‘ 
self-concerns. These two motives, from both a bidder‘s and a target‘s perspective, 
suggest a relation between high takeover intensity and high valuation. This model 
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elucidates the acquisition experiences in the US market, particularly the conglomerate 
merger wave in 1960s and the merger surge in the second half of the 1990s. Both of 
these takeover movements took place during a period of rising stock market 
valuations.  
This relation is later confirmed by the Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) 
model. As above discussed, it regards hyped synergy-estimates as the driving force of 
a firm‘s involvement in the takeover market. According to it, the mis-estimated 
synergies, which increase with market valuation, lead to active merger activities  
during high market valuation periods. 
More systematic empirical evidence is provided by Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005). 
They deconstruct misvaluation into three components: the firm-specific pricing 
deviation from short-run industry pricing (firm-specific error), sector-wide, short-run 
deviation from long-run pricing (time series sector error), and long-run sector pricing 
to book (long-run value to book). Concerning a sample of US mergers and acquisitions 
announced from 1978 to 2001, they examine the relevance of misvaluation to the 
intensity of takeovers. Their empirical findings, based on a probit regression analysis, 
indicate that merger intensity is positively correlated with the firm-specific error and 
the time series sector error.  
To summarize, several theoretical models have been applied to explain takeover 
intensity in the presence of misvaluation. Although these theoretical models and the 
takeover motives underlying them are different, they all suggested a relation between 
high takeover intensity and high valuation / overvaluation.   
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Compared with the theoretical implications on transaction intensity, the effects of 
misvaluation on merger performance are presented with more mixed empirical results 
(as shown in Table 3.1). Literature on the value effects of misvaluation is reviewed in 
the paragraphs below.  
Mergers, motivated by the low finance costs in the presence of overvaluation, are 
likely to be associated with high takeover premiums. This is because bidders, once 
overvalued, are capable of offering a higher premium due to their loose capital 
constraints. These high premiums, in turn, lead to low returns for acquiring firms 
(Dong et al., 2006). 
This relationship between overvaluation and low bidders‘ gains can also be 
explained by the information asymmetry surrounding bidding firms. As suggested by 
Ali et al. (2003), a market correction follows the arrival of new public corporate 
information. Therefore, a takeover announcement is expected to alert investors to a 
bidder‘s pre-existing misvaluation and thus cause partial corrections to this 
prior-mispricing. Accordingly, lower bidder announcement-period returns should 
correspond to bidders‘ overvaluation (Dong et al., 2006).  
In line with this research, Draper and Paudyal (2008) report that undervalued 
bidders outperform their overvalued counterparts in the short-run. This is because, 
with the existence of information asymmetry between an undervalued bidding firm 
and investors, a corporate takeover releases information to the market and 
consequently attracts investors to reappraise the bidder‘s previously undervalued 
equity. This, in general, raises the bidder‘s stock price around the announcement 
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period. 
However, this widely documented empirical result, which overvalued bidders 
tend to underperform, is questioned by Ang and Cheng (2006). They point out that 
there are differences between the market price corrections to overvaluation and the 
evidences of underperformance. Accordingly, a methodology of comparing the 
difference in short-run returns between acquirers and non-acquiring firms, which are 
on a similar scale of overvaluation, is employed in their study. In line with the 
prediction of the Shleifer and Vishny (2003) model, they posit that takeovers serve the 
best interests of shareholders from overvalued bidding firms, since their abnormal 
returns are higher than their counterparts from non-acquiring firms. In particular, 
when the rationality condition21 is applied, these acquirers capture positive abnormal 
returns both around the announcement periods and in the long-run.  
In all these aforementioned studies (Ang and Cheng, 2006; Dong et al, 2006; 
Draper and Paudyal, 2008), misvaluation is measured at a firm level. However, when 
this line of research is developed to a market valuation context, different empirical 
results are presented.  
Concerning the Canadian takeover market, Tebourbi (2005) provides evidence 
that acquisitions announced in a booming stock market generate positive 
announcement abnormal returns to bidders. Investors‘ behaviour is then used to 
rationalize this positive effect. More specifically, investors tend to be over-optimistic 
during a high valuation period, which gives rise to a high announcement period return 
                                                 
21
 For exp lanations on the rationality condition, see section 3.2.1.  
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for a bidding firm following high recent returns in the stock market.  
Similar empirical results are documented by Bouwman et al. (2006), who report 
that short-run stock returns, long-run stock returns and long-run operating 
performances of low-market and high-market acquisitions, are fundamentally different. 
More specifically, announcing acquisitions in a high market period generates 
significantly higher announcement returns to acquiring firms than low-market 
acquisitions. However, these bidders‘ gains do not persist beyond the takeover 
announcement period, as they are followed by significantly lower long-run abnormal 
returns and poorer long-run operating performances. ‗Managerial herding‘ is then 
employed to explain the underperformance of high-market acquisitions. It suggests 
that, if a large number of firms are involved in mergers and acquisitions, subsequent 
firms will follow the trend while ignoring their own motives and not fully considering 
the valuations of this investment decision. Therefore, the underperformance of 
high-market acquisitions is primarily driven by the low stock returns to firms 
acquiring later in a high-market merger wave. 
This negative long-run effect of high market valuation is also reported by Rosen 
(2006). He attributes these market reactions to the influences of investor sentiment. 
Specifically, ―when investor expectations are based more on optimistic expectations 
than reality, the short-run boost in price caused by a merger announcement is reversed 
in the long-run as the track record of the merger becomes known‖ (p.1016).  
To summarise, different components of misvaluation shape takeovers in different 
ways. The firm-component of misvaluation is in general inversely related to bidders‘ 
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gains; the industry- and market-components of misvaluation drive up bidder‘s 
announcement returns. Although several theories or hypotheses have been suggested 
to theorize the valuation effects of misvaluation, it is only the information asymmetry 
hypothesis that can comprehensively rationalize the driving force of each compo nent 
of misvaluation. At a market or industry level, a high market valuation breeds 
overestimated synergies due to information asymmetry (Rhodes-Kropf and 
Viswanathan, 2004). These overestimated synergies can temporarily enhance bidders‘ 
gains. At a firm-specific level, corporate takeovers release information to the market 
and consequently attract investors and analysts to reappraise bidders‘ values. If a 
bidding firm is previously undervalued, its share price can be bidded up through this 
revaluation process (Draper and Paudyal, 2008).  
3.2.3 Value effects of Payment Financing Methods  
The above mentioned theoretical implications of the information asymmetry 
hypothesis can rationalize the relevance of misvaluation to the intensity and the value 
effects of takeovers. Given the research objective of this chapter, this relevance is then 
examined conditional on payment financing methods. This examination starts by 
reviewing the documented value effects of payment financing methods in light of the 
information asymmetry hypothesis. 
There is a largely unanimous agreement in literature that, from a bidder‘s 
perspective, equity acquisitions are associated with significantly negative abnormal 
returns which substantially underperform cash bids (e.g., Franks et al., 1991; Andrade 
et al., 2001; Bouwman et al., 2003).  
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Signalling implications, in the presence of information asymmetry, are suggested 
as the primary factor underlying the stock performance of cash and equity bidders 
(Myers and Majluf, 1984). Acquiring firms may have private information which is 
unknown to the market. The unevenly distributed information gives rise to the 
possibility that mangers, who possess the private information that their firm‘s shares 
are overvalued, will use these inflated shares to acquire a target firm. Investors then 
interpret the signals conveyed by this equity payment and further evaluate the 
prospects of the acquirer based on their interpreted information. After recognizing the 
adverse selection problem, they will consequently evaluate the acquiring firm 
downwardly. Therefore, negative returns are associated with bidders making equity 
deals. Cash deals, on the other hand, assure investors and target firms that the bidder‘s 
equity is not overvalued. This, thus, clarifies the information asymmetries concerning 
the bidder‘s value. As a consequence, the stock market reacts positively to cash deals.  
Counter-arguments arise with more recent research developments on this issue. 
They suggest that the documented positive value effects of cash payment may not be 
generalizable due to the fundamental difference between the payment mechanism of a 
transaction and its financing sources. More specifically, cash deals can be financed by 
a firm‘s internal cash flow, debt flow or equity flow (Schlingemann, 2004). If 
investors can recognize the different financing sources of a cash deal, the information 
signalled by this transaction financing is also expected to be reflected by the bidder‘s 
share price, and in turn influences the bidder‘s gains.   
Further attempts have been made to examine this effect. After associating each 
offer with its own financing source, Martynova and Renneboog (2007) claim that 
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returns generated by cash deals with different financing sources are dissimilar. The 
results, from their OLS regression analyses, show that a negative market reaction 
follows announcements of any corporate takeover which involves equity financing. 
This is because, in evaluating a takeover announcement, investors interpret the 
information signalled by both the payment method and the financing sources of the 
transaction. Even though the positive information embodied in cash deals gives rise to 
positive stock market reactions, the negative information contents of equity financed 
cash deals lead to a stock price revision. 
3.2.4 Misvaluation Effects conditional on Payment Financing Methods; 
Hypotheses Development 
The theoretical implications of information asymmetry hypothesis on both the 
value effects of misvaluation and the payment financing methods have been discussed 
in the previous subsections. In light of these implications, the identified literature 
gap22 is then filled by examining the effects of misvaluation conditional on payment 
financing methods. In this process, hypotheses related to the intensity and the va lue 
effects of takeovers are developed.  
Along the line exploited by Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004), misvaluation 
sets effects on merger activities via the mechanism of synergy-estimating errors. The 
estimation of the market-, industry- and firm-components of a bidder‘s misvaluation 
depends on the availability of relevant information. As information at a macro- level is 
more transparent and accessible, managers from the target firms will naturally 
                                                 
22
 The literature gap identified  is where the relevance of misvaluation to takeovers, conditional on 
payment financing methods, has been either misinterpreted or under-researched. For intensive 
discussion on this issue, see section 3.1.  
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overestimate the market- or industry-component of misvaluation, especially when the 
market or industry valuation is high. This overestimated market or industry valuation 
further leads to a hyped synergy-estimation, which increases the possibility of 
completing a bid. Therefore, a high market or industry valuation breeds overestimated 
synergies and, in turn, boosts merger activities. This over-estimated synergy should 
equally be applied to transactions with different payment financing methods. 
Accordingly, it is logical to expect that: 
Hypothesis (1): Merger intensity, in general, is high during a period when market or 
industry valuation is high.  
In addition to takeover intensity, misvaluation is hypothesized to influence 
bidders‘ gains via information asymmetry. Specifically, the estimated synergies 
created by the resultant entities, and the revaluation effects of takeover 
announcements, are two components of bidders‘ announcement returns (Draper and 
Paudyal, 2008). In the presence of information asymmetry, misvaluation influences 
both of these components.  
Firstly, as already mentioned, high market valuation breeds overestimated 
synergies due to information asymmetry (Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan, 2004). 
These overestimated synergies can temporarily enhance bidders‘ gains around the 
announcement period. The driving force of these overestimated synergies suggests 
that: 
Hypothesis (2): Transactions announced during high market or industry periods are 
associated with higher announcement period returns, compared with 
low-market or - industry acquisitions.  
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Secondly, a corporate takeover releases information to the market and 
consequently attracts investors and analysts to reappraise the bidder‘s value. If 
information asymmetry impedes a bidder from revealing its potential to the 
investment community, the equity of this bidder is likely to be undervalued due to the 
lack of information. Announcing takeovers can disseminate the firm‘s information to 
the market. Investors, once attracted to the newly released information, will reappraise 
the value and the growth opportunities of the bidder (Draper and Paudyal, 2008). The 
direction of this revaluation depends on both the potential of the bidder and the signals 
sent out by the takeover announcement. If the acquirer has true potential, releasing 
good news can bid up its share price via revaluation. On the other hand, bad news 
released will struggle to drive up the firm‘s share price through revaluation.  
As widely acknowledged, cash deals, in general, are interpreted by investors as a 
positive signal; equity bids are regarded as a negative sign (Myers and Majluf, 1984). 
Meanwhile, in evaluating takeover announcements, investors are able to interpret the 
information signalled by the financing sources of a transaction (Schlingemann, 2004; 
Martynova and Renneboog, 2007). Hence, with regard to cash deals, investors extract 
negative information from equity financed cash deals and positive information from 
non-equity financed cash deals.   
Given the different nature of information that can possibly be signalled by 
takeover transactions, revaluation effects should lead bidders‘ gains into different 
directions depending on different payment financing methods. More specifically, the 
following hypotheses are expected.  
Hypothesis (3): For non-equity financed cash deals, undervalued bidders outperform 
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their overvalued counterparts.  
Hypothesis (4): For both share deals and equity financed cash deals, undervalued 
bidders do not outperform their overvalued counterparts. 
3.3 Data and Methodology 
3.3.1 Sample Selection and Descriptions 
In order to test the raised hypotheses, merger and acquisition data is collected 
from Thomson Financial. 50,760 bids were announced by UK companies during the 
period of 01/01/1989 to 31/12/2007. The following sample selection criteria are then 
applied to these observations.  
(1) Acquirers are listed for trading on the UK stock market, namely LSE, AIM, USM 
and London Tech, which reduces the sample size to 22,208 observations.  
(2) The deal value of a transaction is no less than £1 mil, and information regarding 
transactions‘ payment methods must be available. 10,388 bids survive these 
criteria. 
(3) A minimum size criterion that a bidder‘s market value is more than £1 mil 
excludes 1940 bids. 
(4) Acquirers‘ stock return index and balance sheet items must be available from 
DataStream, for the purpose of transaction financing identification and value 
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effects analysis.  
A final sample consisting of 6086 transactions is generated through this sample 
selection process. In addition, data regarding new equity issue during the period of 
1988-2006 are obtained from the SDC database to help identify a transaction‘s 
financing sources.23  
Table 3.2 shows that 2936 out of 6036 (48.24%) UK takeovers are cash deals; 
share deals only make up 6.15% of the total transactions. 24 According to studies 
based on the US takeover market, the proportion of equity deals is generally above 
70%. The fact that UK acquirers exhibit a greater inclination to use cash as a payment 
mechanism than their US counterparts is consistent with extant research (e.g., Faccio 
and Masulis, 2005). In terms of transaction financing, over 1/8 of the 6086 bids are 
financed with pre-acquisition equity issue. The difference in the amount of share deals 
(374) and equity issue financed deals (786) reveals the fundamental difference 
between payment methods and financing sources of takeover transactions. This thus 
addresses the necessity and the importance of differentiating these two concepts, 
which are assumed to be the same in most of the existing literature. A clarification of 
these fundamental differences will be made in this chapter by examining the effects of 
misvaluation conditional on a hybrid of a transaction‘s payment method and financing 
                                                 
23
 For exp lanations on the rationale of using equity issue data to identify a transaction‘s financing 
source, see section 3.3.3. 
24
 According to the UK Takeover Code, cash consideration is made mandatory in acquiring a public 
target if a b idder holds over 10% interests of the acquired firm over the offer period or 12 months 
before the announcement. In this case, the offer should be in cash or acco mpanied  by a cash alternative  
not less than the highest price paid by the bidder or any competitor during the offer period and within  
the 12 months prior to the announcement. Out of the 6086 observations of this study, there are 429 ca sh 
deals in acquiring public targets, of which 29 (92) bidders have less (more) than 10% interests of the 
targets before announcements and 308 with unavailable informat ion. Due to the data availab ility, 
distinguishing legally- or spontaneously-made cash deals become infeasible, therefore all of these 429 
observations are included as cash deals.  
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source.25   
Takeover activities classified by both payment mechanism and transaction 
financing are reported in Table 3.3 on an annual basis. Market and firm misvaluation 
in the corresponding years are also included. It is evident from the table that there are 
substantial variations in both the takeover intensity and the misvaluation during the 
sample period. Moreover, UK takeover activities cluster when the stock market is 
booming (1999-2000) and become inactive during sluggish stock market periods 
(2002-2004), although some exceptions exist. Such fluctuations in the UK takeover 
market are preliminary findings lending support to Hypothesis (1) which suggest that 
market valuation shapes takeover intensity in the UK market. More rigorous analysis 
on testing this hypothesis will be provided in subsection 3.4.1.  
3.3.2 Measurements of Valuation 
Researchers have been engaged in developing appropriate measurements of 
misvaluation. In most cases, they concern themselves solely with misvaluation at 
either a firm or a market level. This one-tiered misvaluation, as suggested by 
Bouwman et al. (2006), is inadequate to provide a coherent description of the value 
effects of misvaluation.  
Bouwman et al. (2006) report that, in the long-run, bidders of high market 
acquisitions underperform those of low market acquisitions. Nevertheless, when firm 
                                                 
25
 Table 3.2 also shows that acquisitions of unlisted companies dominate the UK takeover market. 
Moreover, domestic transactions overweigh cross-border deals. In addition, UK acquirers, on average, 
hold a market capitalization of £1581 mil, which is 15 t imes of their transaction value. 
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misvaluation is introduced, the outperformance of low market acquisition is no longer 
constant. Overvalued bidders, who announce their acquisitions in low market months, 
do not significantly outperform undervalued bidders who make transactions in high 
market periods. These empirical results highlight that the value effects of the firm- and 
the market-components of misvaluation are dissimilar. Hence, here emerges the need 
of deconstructing misvaluation in finance research. Therefore, similar to the 
deconstruction of misvaluation into firm specific error, time series sector error and 
long-run value to book by Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005), misvaluation is measured at a 
market-, industry- and firm-level in this study. This three-tiered system can help to 
present a comprehensive view of misvaluation effects.  
3.3.2.1 Market and Industry Valuation 
Proxies of market and industry valuations have been offered in abundant 
literature, out of which PE and PB ratios are the most frequently employed 
measurements. PB ratio is regarded as a less noisy measure, as it reflects mispricing, 
risk and differential in unconditional expected cash flow (Daniel et al., 2001). 
However, it is exposed to the influence of firm or industrial accounting differences. In 
particular, the PB ratio is less meaningful for firms and industries with a high 
proportion of intangible assets, as intangible assets cannot be reflected by book value. 
Moreover, the book value is likely to be associated with manipulations and 
backward- looking information (Lee et al., 1999). 
The PE ration, on the other hand, has been heavily relied on in both academia 
and industry. Although there are some arguments around the use of PE ratio, for 
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example it implies that expected growth is affected by current profitability (Penman, 
1996), the exception from the influences of industrial and firm accounting difference 
still makes it a reliable indicator of market-and industry-level valuation.  
However, the simple use of raw PE ratios to examine variations in market and 
industry valuation may not be appropriate. This is because the upward trend of PE 
ratios may naturally associate more recent periods with high market- or 
industry-valuations (Bouwman et al., 2006). Consequently, detrending the PE time 
series becomes necessary.  
Following Bouwman et al. (2006), monthly P/Es of 10 industries26 and FTSE 
ALL share are detrended by removing the best-straight- line from these time series. 
Each of these detrended PE ratios is then compared with its past 5-year average value. 
Accordingly, the ‗Above (Below) Average‘ group is categorized. The top (bottom) half 
of the ‗Above (Below) Average‘ observations falls into the ‗High 
(Low)-Market/Industry‘ group and the rest constitute the ‗Neutral-Market/Industry‘ 
group. This market/industry valuation measurement generates 41 ‗High Market‘ and 
‗72 ‗Low Market‘ valuation months during the sample period; and categorizes 433 
‗High Industry‘ and 681 ‗Low Industry‘ valuation months on a 10-industry basis, 
according to the ICBN Industry Classification.  
                                                 
26
 These 10 industries are identified according to ICBN Industry Classification, including Oil&Gas, 
Industrial, Financials, Health Care, Consumer Services, Consumer Goods, Materials, Technology, 
Telecom and Ut ility. 
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3.3.2.2 Firm Misvaluation 
Various firm misvaluation measurements based on financial ratio analysis and 
dividend discount model have been introduced. Among all of the alternatives, the 
residual income model seems to be a comprehensive misvaluation proxy 27  
Compared with PE and PB ratios, it is invariant to accounting treatments (Ohlson, 
1995) and better predicts future earnings (Lee et al., 1999). However, the consensus 
analysts‘ earning forecasts, as a component of this residual income model, can give 
rise to a severely biased earning forecast and hence impede the accuracy of this proxy 
(Ang and Cheng, 2006).   
Given this, the widely used PB ratio differential is then employed to measure 
firm misvaluation in this study.28 A primary component of this PB ratio differential is 
the firm-industry difference, which represents the valuation of a particular firm 
relative to its industry average. As previously mentioned, PB ratio is sensitive to 
industrial difference; therefore a control for cross-sectional difference is required. 
Taking this into consideration, Ang and Cheng (2006) measure firm misvaluation as 
(PBit-PBjt) / PBit, where i stands for stock i and j stands for the industry j to which i 
belongs in the month prior to bid announcement.  
However, according to this calculation, there is the possibility that a firm with 
negative PB ratio will be classified as overvalued, so long as the industry PB ratio is 
                                                 
27
 The residual income model (RIM) measures misvaluation as the standardized percentage difference 
between stock market price and its rational price or fair value. Th is fair value is the sum of the book 
value of equity and the discounted future earnings in excess of the returns required by its capital 
providers (residual incomes). For the use of this RIM, see for example Ang and Cheng (2006), Dong et 
al. (2006) and Lee et al. (1999).  
28
 For the use of PB rat io in measuring misvaluation, see for example Ang and Cheng (2006), Daniel et 
al. (2001) and Dong et al. (2006). 
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positive. In order to eliminate the likelihood of this mis-measurement, the firm P/B 
should be substituted with the industry P/B to scale the firm-industry P/B difference. 
The industry-adjusted P/B differential, as in equation (3.1), is then employed as the 
firm misvaluation proxy in this study.  
Firm Misvaluation = (PBit-PBjt) / PBjt                                             (3.1) 
In line with the methodology employed in categorizing market and industry 
valuation, the top (bottom) half of the ‗Positive (Negative) Industry-adjusted P/B 
Difference‘ is classified as the ‗Over-(Under-) valuation‘ group. The rest of the firms 
are categorized as ‗Around Equilibrium‘. This gives 1291 ‗Overvalued Firms‘, 1752 
‗Undervalued Firms‘ and 3043 ‗Around Equilibrium Firms‘.  
3.3.3 Measurements of Pre-acquisition Financing  
The inability to link a pound raised to a pound spent in takeovers is 
acknowledged. Although it is almost impossible to establish a one-to-one relationship 
between transaction value and transaction financing, an approximate relation between 
a transaction and its financing source can still be created by measuring transaction 
financing with pre-takeover equity issues or changes in the balance sheet (Baker and 
Wurgler, 2002; Schlingemann, 2004).   
In line with Schlingemann (2004), acquirers‘ new equity issues, held in SDC 
New Issue database, 1 year prior to acquisitions are employed as a proxy of equity 
financing. Alternatively, based on balance sheet items, equity flow is calculated as:  
Equity Flow= (△  book value of equity -△ retained earnings) / assets    (3.2) 
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where retained earnings are:  
Retained Earnings= Net Income before Extraordinary Items and Preferred 
Dividends - Extraordinary Items - Common and Preferred Dividends      (3.3) 
Similarly, in order to measure cash financing and debt financing, cash flow and 
debt flow are calculated based on balance sheet items as: 
Cash Flow=△retained earnings / assets                            (3.4) 
Debt Flow=△( assets - book value of equity) / assets                  (3.5) 
3.3.4 Measurements of Bidders’ Gains  
Market-adjusted model, CAPM and Fama-French three-factor model have been 
used as the benchmark return model in the short-run approach of measuring bidders 
gains.29 Although, compared with the simple market-adjusted model, CAPM and 
Fama-French three-factor model can account for systematic risks, they may not 
necessarily provide more precise measurements. More specifically, for both of these 
models, their parameters need to be estimated over a pre-acquisition period. Given 
that the UK takeover market is dominated by moderately acquisitive bidders, 30 who 
announce more than one transaction, there is a high probability that previous takeover 
attempts will be included in the estimation period. Hence, this will make beta 
estimation less meaningful. Therefore, following Fuller et al. (2002), Sudarsanam and 
Mahate (2003) and Conn et al. (2005), this study estimates abnormal return based on a 
market-adjusted model by subtracting the value-weighted market return from the 
                                                 
29
 For intensive discussion regarding the use of this short-run approach, rather than a long-run approach, 
of measuring bidders gains, see section 2.3.1. For the use of market -adjusted model, see Franck and 
Harris (1989), Chang (1998), Fuller et al. (2002) and Conn et al. (2005). For the use of Fama -French 
three-factor model, see Draper and Paudyal (2004). For the use of CAPM, see Gregory (1997).  
30
 For empirical ev idence on the acquisitiveness of UK acquirers, see section 5.3.1.  
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firm‘s stock return, as in the following equation:  
ARi=Ri-Rm                                                    (3.6) 
3.4 Empirical Results 
3.4.1 Merger Intensity and Misvaluation 
This research, on the relevance of misvaluation to the intensity and the value 
effects of takeovers conditional on payment financing methods, starts by testing the 
first hypothesis, which examines the relationship between merger intensity and 
misvaluation. In line with the preliminary findings based on sample descriptive data 
(as in section 3.3.1), Figure 3.1 demonstrates that market valuation and takeover 
volume generally move in a similar trend. As illustrated by the tendency lines, the 
takeover market and the stock market experience the same recovery and contraction 
periods, although the prosperity in the UK takeover market (during the period of 
1994-1998) corresponds to the stock market‘s fluctuations around a low valuation 
level. Moreover, such a co-movement is also presented by cash deals and market 
valuation, which suggests market valuation as the driving force of UK cash deals.  
In addition to examining the tendency of takeover activities and misvaluation 
fluctuations, a univariate test for merger frequency is included by comparing takeover 
frequencies during different valuation periods. The methodology in relation to 
measuring misvaluation, as mentioned in section 3.3.3.2, assigns each month in the 
sample period with a valuation classification (High, Neutral or Low Market) 
according to the detrended market PE ratio in that month. Similarly, on an industrial 
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basis, each month is assigned with a High, Neutral or Low Industry Valuation 
classification, corresponding to the detrended PE ratio of that industry in that month. 
The number of these market and industry valuation months is then used to calculate 
merger frequency. Number of transactions per valuation month is then measured as the 
number of deals announced in one particular valuation period divided by the total 
months of this valuation period. For example, the number of transactions per high 
market valuation month is calculated as the number of deals announced during high 
market valuation periods scaled by the total number of high market valuation months 
in the sample.  
This takeover frequency, conditional on misvaluation, is presented in Table 3.4. It 
shows that more transactions take place during high valuation periods than in low 
valuation periods, which is significant at both market and industry levels. For example, 
each high market month has 41.37 transactions on average, which is more than double 
the frequency in low market months. When the sample is portioned by deal 
characteristics, this driving force of high valuation exists among almost all payment 
financing categories.31 
In general, these findings based on univariate tests show that misvaluation shapes 
the UK takeover market in terms of transaction tendency and frequency. More 
specifically, as posited by Hypothesis (1),  acquisition activities move together with 
market and industry valuations and cluster during the periods of high market or 
                                                 
31
 Table 3.4 shows that takeovers are generally more frequent during high market - and industry 
valuation months, although an inconsistency exists. With regard to equity issue financed cash deals, the 
number of transaction per month is 1.61 (0.13) during low and 1.27 (0.11) during high market (industry) 
valuation months. However, this difference in takeover frequency is too marg inal to suggest a general 
conclusion that there are more equity financed cash deals during low market  or industry valuation 
period. 
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industry valuation. These results are consistent with the empirical findings concerning 
the US market (e.g., Rhodes-Kropf et al., 2005; Ang and Cheng; 2006) and the 
Canadian market (e.g., Tebourbi, 2005). However, the reported high valuation driven 
cash transactions are inconsistent with literature which associates cash deals with 
undervaluation (Shleifer and Vishny, 2003). This inconsistency is attributable to the 
three-tiered system of misvaluation examined in this study. The relation between 
undervaluation and cash deals might exist at a firm-specific level.32 However, once 
the market- and industry-components of misvaluation are addressed, cash deals are 
exposed to the influences of a high valuation.  
Moreover, this inconsistency, together with the reported comovement between 
the market- and industry-valuation and takeover intensity, can be rationalized by 
information asymmetry. Information asymmetry surrounding an acquiring firm 
impedes the target firm‘s and investors‘ synergy-estimating. As indicated by 
Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004), the synergy-estimating errors are magnified 
by high valuations. 33  Accordingly, a high market- or industry-valuation breeds 
overestimated synergies which, in turn, boost takeover activities. Therefore, these 
overestimated synergies lead to a comovement between transaction frequency and the 
market- or industry-valuation. Furthermore, such effects are applicable to transactions 
with different payment financing methods.  
                                                 
32
 The relation between firm-specific undervaluation and cash deals is not generalizable. For intensive 
discussion on this issue, see section 3.4.3. 
33
 For exp lanations on why the synergy-estimat ing erro rs are magnified by h igh valuations, see section 
3.2.1. 
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3.4.2 Bidders’ Gains and Market- & Industry-Valuation  
Having examined the relevance of misvaluation to takeover intensity (Hypothesis 
(1)), results from testing the second hypothesis are then presented in this subsection. 
Specifically, the influences of the market- and industry-valuation on bidders‘ 
announcement returns are examined. As illustrated in panel A-C of Table 3.5, all 
acquisitions have an average announcement return of 1.091%. This pos itive return is 
likely to be driven by transactions announced during high market and industry 
valuation periods. At an aggregate level, stock returns generated by acquisitions 
during a high market period are 0.423% higher than those in a low market period.34 
Moreover, high industry acquisitions generate an average announcement return of 
1.225%; while a lower return (0.668%) is reported for low industry acquisitions. There 
is a monotonic increase in bidders‘ gains with an increase in industry valuation. 
Moreover, the outperformance of acquisitions announced during high industry 
valuation periods, relative to those announced during low industry periods, is at a 
significant level of 5%.  
The value effects of misvaluation are then examined conditional on payment 
financing methods. As shown in Table 3.5, both cash deals and non-equity financed 
cash deals generate significantly higher returns during high-market and high- industry 
valuation periods.35   
                                                 
34
 This difference in bidders‘ gains is not significant between high - and low-market acquisitions. The 
insignificance may due to the industrial differences which  acquiring firms are exposed to. Stock returns 
of acquiring firms are more sensitive to the valuation condition of the industry to which they belong.  
35
 Contrary to the findings on cash deals and non-equity financed cash deals, equity acquisitions and 
equity financed cash bids announced during high market - or industry-valuation periods do not 
significantly outperform those announced in low market- o r industry-valuation periods. This can be 
attributed, during high market - or industry-valuation periods, to targets being just as overvalued as 
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Consistent with Hypothesis (2), the empirical results suggest that the stock 
market, in general, reacts more favorably upon acquisitions announced during high 
valuation periods than those announced during low valuation periods. This finding is 
similar to the empirical evidence reported for the US and the Canadian markets (e.g., 
Tebourbi, 2005; Bouwman et al., 2006). In line with the aforementioned theoretical 
implications of information asymmetry in rationalizing the intensity of UK takeovers, 
this positive reaction can be attributed to the synergy-estimating errors caused by 
asymmetric information surrounding acquiring firms. A high valuation can further 
amplify these synergy-estimating errors. In particular, a high market valuation breeds 
overestimated synergies, which in turn bid up acquirers‘ announcement period 
returns.36 
3.4.3 Bidders’ Gains and Firm Misvaluation  
Having found the influence of the market- and industry-components of 
misvaluation on bidders‘ gains, Hypothesis (3) is then tested in this subsection which 
examines the effects of firm-specific misvaluation on bidders‘ announcement returns. 
As shown in panel D of Table 3.5, bidders‘ gains increase monotonically with the 
decrease in firms‘ misvaluation. Undervalued bidders, on average, experience a 
significant short-run gain of 1.675%. This abnormal return, over a 5-day event 
                                                                                                                                            
those bidders who offer equity or equity financed cash payment. Acquirers‘ private information about 
their equities‘ overvaluations is embodied in equity deals and equity financed cash deals. Aware of the 
use of this inflated payment, the reason why a target would  still likely accept the offer is that this 
target‘s asset is just as overvalued as the bidder‘s. Therefore, announcing equity or equity financed cash 
bids during high valuation periods does not generate superior returns to acquiring firms, compared with  
low valuation period-acquisitions.  
36
 In addit ion to information asymmetry, investor sentiment (optimistic investors) can bid up bidders‘ 
gains during high valuation periods. Although the explanation stemming from investment sentiments 
(Tebourbi, 2005; Rosen, 2006) sheds lights on the relations between market valuation and the value 
effects of takeovers, it fails to rationalize the performance of takeovers when misvaluation is at a 
firm-specific level. Instead, information asymmetry, in the presence of misvaluation, provides a 
consistent picture of the value effects under each components of misvaluation. 
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window, is 1.062% higher than the average returns generated by their overvalued 
counterparts; the difference is at a significant level of 1%.    
The valuation effects of firm misvaluation conditional on both payment 
mechanism and transaction financing are further presented in the last four columns of 
Table 3.5. Cash bids generate an average announcement return of 1.537% to 
undervalued bidders and an average announcement return of 0.495% to overvalued 
bidders. The difference in bidders‘ gains between the overvalued and the undervalued 
groups is more evident for non-equity financed cash deals, where the returns to 
undervalued bidders are 1.174% higher than overvalued bidders‘ gains. However, with 
regard to equity deals and equity financed cash deals, overvalued acquirers do not 
significantly underperform compared to undervalued acquirers. 
These value effects of firm specific overvaluation, conditional on payment 
financing methods, are in line with the predications of information asymmetry 
hypothesis. Takeover announcements disseminate firm information to the market and 
hence reduce the information asymmetry surrounding bidding firms. Investors are 
then attracted to the newly released information and further reappraise acquiring firms 
with the arrival of new information (Draper and Paudyal, 2008). The direction of this 
revaluation depends on the true potential of the firms and the signals sent out by their 
takeover announcements. If a firm has true potential, releasing good news can bid up 
its share price via revaluation. On the other hand, bad news released can rarely drive 
up its share price through revaluation. Cash payments, especially non-equity financed 
cash payments, are, in general, interpreted by investors as a positive signal; while 
investors tend to extract negative information contents from equity transactions and 
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equity financed cash deals. Accordingly, an upward revaluation effect can only be 
applied to cash deals, in particular non-equity financed cash deals, which are 
perceived as good news by investors. 
Therefore, given the differing information content that can possibly be signalled 
by different payment financing methods, revaluation effects should lead bidders‘ gains 
in different directions. More specifically, as predicated by Hypotheses (3) and (4), for 
non-equity financed cash deals, undervalued bidders outperform their overvalued 
counterparts. However, this outperformance is not exhibited by share deals and equity 
financed cash deals. 
3.4.4. Cross-sectional Regression Analysis 
The reported univariate test results on the valuation effects of misvaluation 
(Hypothesis (2), (3) and (4)) are then re-examined with cross-sectional regression 
analysis. This analysis is based on estimating the following regression equation:  
Ri-Rm = α+β1Vi+β2Xi+β2ControlVariablei +εi                               (3.7) 
In equation (3.6), the regressand is the bidders‘ 5-day accumulative abnormal 
returns based on a market-adjusted model. Constant α captures everything after the 
effects of all independent variables have been accounted for. The vector of 
explanatory variable V includes three misvaluation components, namely Firm 
Misvaluation, Industry Valuation and Market Valuation 
(undervalued/equilibrium/overvalued bidders=1/2/3, low/neutral/high industry 
valuation=1/2/3, low/neutral/high market valuation=1/2/3). Interacting terms between 
payment financing and firm misvaluation (cash deal dummy×equity flow×overvalued 
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bidder, cash deal dummy×debt flow×overvalued bidder, cash deal dummy×cash 
flow×overvalued bidder and equity deal dummy×overvalued bidder) are included in 
vector X. Control variables are Size, Relative Size, Cross Border Dummy (foreign 
targets=1), Target Public Status Dummy (unlisted targets=1) and Financial Bidders 
Dummy (financial bidders=1).  
The regression analysis starts with regressing bidders‘ 5-day announcement 
returns on individual misvaluation component. As shown in Table 3.6 column 2, the 
coefficient of the high industry dummy is significantly positive (0.002). However, 
once the announcement returns are regressed on all components of misvaluation, 
Industry Valuation loses its explanatory power (model (4)). This can be attributed to 
the high correlation between these three misvaluation components, where the Pearson 
correlation coefficient between market valuation and industry valuation is 0.395. 37 
The results from examining the estimated coefficients of Market and Industry 
Valuation show that high industry valuation significantly drives up bidders‘ gains.  38 
These results further support Hypothesis (2) and are in line with the predictions of 
information asymmetry hypothesis. Investors evaluate the synergies of the combined 
entities based on available information. Their estimation errors are closely related to 
market or industry valuation. More specifically, given that information at a market or 
                                                 
37 Low R-squares have been reported in the regression analysis. The low R2 values indicate that the 
regression models may not exp lain  the variations of independent variables adequately. However, they 
do not necessarily suggest that there is no significant relation between the dependent variables and the 
explanatory variables, as more than one of the regressors have statistically significant coefficients. Such 
a relationship (i.e, low R-squares corresponding to significant t  values) may exist, when a large amount 
of noise present in the estimation framework.  
38
 With regard to market  valuation, its estimated coefficient is not significant. As previously mentioned 
in 3.4.2, the insignificance can be attributed to acquiring firms‘ exposure to industrial difference. Stock 
returns of acquiring firms are more sensitive to the valuation condition of the industry which they 
belong to. 
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industry level is more accessible and transparent, they naturally allocate more weight 
to the market- or industry-component of misvaluation during high market or industry 
periods. The overestimated valuation further gives rise to a hyped synergy-estimation. 
Since estimated synergies of the resultant unit, together with the revaluation effects of 
a takeover announcement, determine a bidder‘s announcement return (Draper and 
Paudyal, 2008), this hyped synergy-estimation thus leads to a positive stock market 
reaction to a takeover announcement.  
Having examined the value effects of the market- and industry-components of 
misvaluation, the influence of the firm-specific misvaluation on bidders‘ gains is then 
examined. The relevant results are outlined in the paragraphs below.  
Table 3.6 column 1 reports that a 0.006 decrease in firm misvaluation causes a 
unit increase in bidders‘ announcement returns. However, once the effects are 
analyzed based on subsamples, partitioned by different payment financing methods, 
different results are presented. The last 4 columns of Table 3.6 indicate that firm 
misvaluation shapes takeover performance in a dissimilar manner, which is 
conditional on a transaction‘s payment method and financing source. More 
specifically, the coefficient of the interacting term presenting overvalued bidders with 
equity financed cash deals is insignificant, as is the coefficient of the interacting term 
presenting overvalued bidders with share deals. These insignificant coefficients 
indicate that firm misvaluation has no effect on bidders‘ gains when equity financed 
cash deals or share deals are announced; while the coefficient of the interacting term 
presenting overvalued bidders with debt financed cash deals is significantly negative 
at -0.031. This significant negative coefficient indicates that undervaluation has the 
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potential of driving up bidder‘s returns when non-equity financed cash deals are 
announced.39 
These reported misvaluation effects conditional on payment financing methods 
lend support to the rationale underlying the study of Dong et al. (2006) and Draper 
and Paudyal (2008). Takeovers, similar to any other corporate events, release firm 
information to the market around the announcement periods. This newly released firm 
information attracts investors‘ attention. They then revaluate the firm and its stock 
with the arrival of new information. If the firm has potential and is previously 
undervalued, this reappraising process will correct the prior misvaluation. Moreover, 
the direction of this correction depends on the contents of information disseminated. 
Releasing good news will boost the share price though this revaluation. However, this 
driving up force, of revaluation, can rarely be said to apply to announcements of bad 
news. Cash payments, especially non-equity financed cash payments, are in general 
interpreted by investors as a positive signal; while investors tend to extract negative 
information contents from equity financed cash deals. Therefore, given the different 
information contents that can possibly be signalled by different payment financing 
methods, revaluation effects should lead bidders‘ gains in different directions.   
3.5 Conclusions 
Misvaluation has been recognized as a factor that shapes the US takeover market 
(e.g., Shleifer and Vishny, 2003; Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan, 2004; Dong et al., 
                                                 
39
 The estimated coefficient of the interacting term presenting overvalued bidders with internal cash 
financed cash deals is not significant. Th is insignificance can be attributed to the revalua tion effect 
being offset by the negative value effects of cash-richness. Harford (1999) documents that 
cash-richness is inversely related with bidders‘ announcement abnormal returns. 
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2006). This study provides evidence that misvaluation as a driving force is not 
exclusive to US mergers and acquisitions activities. Instead, it appears to be a more 
generalized effect which crosses international borders. For example, during the period 
of 1989-2006, the UK witnessed a comovement of merger activities with market 
valuation. In particular, as shown by the univariate test on takeover frequency, the UK 
takeover market is more active during high market- or industry-valuation periods.  
Moreover, acquisitions driven by this high industry valuation, in general, 
generate higher short-run stock returns to UK bidders compared with the transactions 
announced during the periods when the industry valuation is low. However, bidders of 
high market acquisitions, in general, do not capture significantly higher gains than 
those of low industry acquisitions. This can be attributed to the industrial difference 
which acquiring firms are exposed to. Stock returns of acquiring firms are more 
sensitive to the valuation condition of the industry to which they belong, compared 
with the aggregate market valuation. In addition to the market- and 
industry-component of misvaluation, bidders‘ gains are closely related to their 
firm-specific misvaluation. Undervalued bidders, in general, outperform their 
overvalued counterparts.  
These effects of firm misvaluation on takeovers are conditional on payment 
financing methods. More specifically, undervaluation, at a firm-specific level, does 
not have significant positive effects on either share deals or equity financed cash deals. 
However, undervalued acquirers outperform overvalued acquirers when non-equity 
financed cash deals are announced.  
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These findings, regarding the intensity and the performance of UK takeovers, are 
in line with the theoretical predictions of the information asymmetry hypothesis. 
Specifically, based on available information, investors evaluate bidding firms and the 
synergies of the combined units. Even if they can successfully recognize the 
misvaluation associated with a bidder, they can seldom value each component of this 
misvaluation correctly due to their limited access to information. In particular, they 
naturally allocate more weight to the industry component of misvaluation during high 
industry valuation periods, as information at an industrial level is more transparent 
and accessible (Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan, 2004). This biased industry valuation 
impedes investors‘ synergy-estimations and further gives rise to a hyped 
synergy-estimation. Since estimated synergies of the resultant firm, as well as 
revaluation effects of a takeover announcement, determine a bidder‘s announcement 
return (Draper and Paudyal, 2008), this overestimated synergy thus can lead to a 
positive stock market reaction to a takeover announcement.  
Meanwhile, in the presence of information asymmetry between bidding firms and 
investors, mergers and acquisitions release firm information to the market and 
consequently attract investors to reappraise the bidders‘ value and growth 
opportunities (Paudyal and Draper, 2008). The direction of this revaluation depends 
on the true potential of the bidders and the signals sent out by the ir takeover 
announcements. If an acquirer is previously undervalued but has true potential, 
releasing good news can bid up its share price via revaluations. On the other hand, bad 
news released has little effect in driving up its share price through revaluations. Cash 
payments, especially non-equity financed cash payments, are in general interpreted by 
investors as a positive signal; investors tend to extract negative information contents 
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from equity transactions and equity financed cash deals. Therefore, given the different 
information contents that can possibly be signalled by differing payment financing 
methods, revaluation effects should lead bidders‘ gains in different directions.  
The reported empirical evidence, together with the related theoretical 
implications, contribute to the ongoing debate on the rationale underlying 
misvaluation effects which is presented with mixed and ambiguous results. Although 
the significant positive relation between market valuation and bidders‘ gains around 
the announcement period can be explained by managerial herding (e.g., Bouwman et  
al., 2006) or investment sentiments (e.g., Tebourbi, 2005; Rosen, 2006), both fail to 
rationalize merger performance when the misvaluation is at a firm-specific level. 
Instead, information asymmetry, as discussed above, provides a coherent description 
of this issue which covers the effects of each component (firm, industry and market) 
of misvaluation. 
The empirical findings of this study can facilitate acquirers, especially cash 
bidders, in coordinating their financing and investment decisions. The reported results 
show that a hybrid of a transaction‘s payment method and its financing sources 
influences bidders‘ gains. Since mergers and acquisitions are among some of the main 
investment decisions made by corporate organizations, this documented relevance of 
payment financing to the value effects of takeovers highlights the interdependence of 
investment and financing decisions. Such interdependence suggests that the value 
creation of a firm not only depends on the pattern of resource allocation but also relies 
on how to finance the resource allocation. Therefore, in enhancing firms‘ values, the 
need for a closer integration between the strategic planning and the financial function 
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of raising funds is required. From the perspective of cash bidders, and given the 
negative market responses, that follow equity financed cash deals, funds from other 
sources, for example debt or cash, are presented as better transaction financing choices 
so long as they have a sufficient cash reserve or debt capability.  
Following on from this conclusion, regarding the stock market reactions to 
takeover announcements in the presence of misvaluation, the valuation effects of other 
factors inherent in these reactions also require addressing. Specifically, fluctuations in 
the stock market have been addressed as a factor which could explain the variations in 
takeover gains. High market/industry valuation months, in general, experience high 
takeover gains. These stock market cycles have been rationalized with investor 
sentiment in behavioural finance literature (e.g., Brown and Cliff, 2005). Therefore, 
this reveals the possibility of explaining takeover gains with investor sentiment.  
Moreover, this potential relationship between takeover gains and investor 
sentiment, together with the reported relationship between information contents (i.e., 
information signalled by payment financing methods of takeovers) and takeover 
announcement returns, form two indispensible elements along the firm information 
dissemination process. More specifically, in the presence of misvaluation, the market 
reaction to the arrival of new information around a takeover announcement period is 
presented in this chapter. As suggested by the empirical findings, this market reaction 
reflects the firm information signalled by the takeover announcement, in particular the 
payment financing methods of the takeover. In addition to this information signalled, 
the market reaction should also include the effects of inves tors‘ behaviour acting upon 
the information released. Accordingly, systematic patterns in the announcement-period 
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abnormal returns, reflecting investors‘ behaviour in interpreting the newly-released 
information, will be examined in the next chapter.  
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Figure 3.1. Tendency of Takeover Activity and Market Valuation 
This graph illustrates acquisition activity and market valuation during the 1989-2006 sample period. 
Monthly FTSE ALL share PE ratios are detrended by removing the best-straight-line from the time 
series. A detrended PE ratio is then compared with its past 5-year average value, the difference of which  
is used as a proxy of market valuation in that month. The means of these monthly market valuations are 
plotted on an annual basis. The number of all acquisitions and cash deals is demonstrated by the bar 
chart on an annual basis respectively. 
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Table 3.1. Value Effect of Misvaluation 
This table summarizes the documented effects of misvaluation components on bidders‘ performances. The ‗-‗symbolizes the negative linkage between these two factors, while 
‗+‘ represents a positive correlation. The theoretical exp lanations underlying these empirical findings are given in the last column.   
 Misvaluation Announcement 
Return 
Long-run 
Return 
Long-run 
Performance 
 Causes of value effects 
Dong et al. (2006) Firm-specific - / / Overpayment & Information asymmetry 
      
Draper and Paudyal (2007) Firm-specific - / / Information asymmetry 
      
Ang and Cheng (2006) Firm-specific + + / Synergies & Earning growth 
      
Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) Market level + / / Mis-estimated Synergy 
      
Tebourbi  (2005) Market-level +   Investor sentiment  
      
Bouwman et al. (2006) Market-level + - - Managerial herding 
      
Rosen (2006) Market-level + - / Investor sentiment 
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Table 3.2. Sample Descriptions 
The descriptive statistics in this table are based on the sample of 6,086 acquisitions. Acquisitions 
announced during the period of 1989-2006 are included in  this sample, if the b idder is a UK firm listed 
in LSE, AIM, USM or London Tech with more than £1 mil market value and with sufficient 
DataStream data. Moreover, the deal value is also required to be over £1 mil. The deal category-equity 
issue financed cash deals refers to cash deals with new equity issues, held in SDC New Issue Database, 
1 year prior to the announcement dates. Both the transaction value and MV of bidders are presented in 
£mil. CAR (-2, 2) is the 5-day  window abnormal returns to bidders and is presented in %. Superscripts 
*, **, and *** indicate a significant level of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
Deal Categories   Number 
Transaction 
Value  
MV of 
Bidder CAR(-2,2) 
      ALL 
 
6086 105.371 1581.124 1.091*** 
Cash deals 
 
2936 62.596 2284.13 0.962*** 
Share deals 
 
374 374.883 1136.035 0.817*  
Mixed offers 
 
2776 114.285 897.817 1.263*** 
Equity Issue Financed Offers  786 162.423 2052.482 0.535** 
Non-equity financed Offers 5300 96.908 1511.207 1.173*** 
Unlisted targets 
 
5245 41.532 1248.628 1.308*** 
Listed targets 
 
841 503.432 3654.379 -0.266 
Foreign targets 
 
2234 140.103 2810.326 1.052*** 
Domestic targets 3851 85.222 868.052 1.113*** 
Financial bidders 657 336.482 4026.89 0.763*** 
Non-financial bidders 5429 77.445 1285.596 1.130*** 
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Table 3.3. Tendency of Takeover Activity and Misvaluation 
This table shows acquisition activity and misvaluation during the 1989-2006 sample period. The total 
number o f mergers and acquisitions, conditional on transactions ‘ payment methods and financing 
sources, are presented on an annual basis. The deal category-equity issue financed cash deals refers to 
cash deals with new equity issues, held in SDC New Issue Database, 1 year prior to the announcement 
dates. Firm misvaluation is measured as: 
Firm Misvaluation = (PBit-PBjt) / PBjt                                                                           (3.1) 
where i stands for stock i and j stands for the industry j to which i belongs, in the month prior to the 
announcement date. The mean of bidders‘ misvaluation are presented on an annual basis. Monthly 
FTSE ALL share PE rat ios are detrended by removing the bes t-straight-line from the time series. A 
detrended PE rat io is then compared with its past 5-year average value, the difference of which is used 
as a proxy of market valuation in that month. The mean of these monthly market valuations are 
presented on an annual basis. 
  All 
Cash 
deals 
Share 
deals 
Mixed 
Offers 
 Equity 
Issue 
Financed 
Offers 
Non-equity 
financed 
Offers 
 Firm 
Misvaluation 
 Market 
Valuation 
         
1989 274 161 16 97 20 254 1.02  -1.1 
1990 200 106 12 82 0 200 0.52  -2.33 
1991 185 80 25 80 1 184 0.35  0.13 
1992 230 98 25 107 3 227 0.30  2.67 
1993 286 142 15 129 4 282 0.44  3.64 
1994 374 174 32 168 11 363 1.62  1.06 
1995 387 175 33 179 70 317 0.60  -1.38 
1996 400 182 30 188 63 337 0.39  -1.46 
1997 467 211 32 224 78 389 0.34  -0.12 
1998 482 258 27 197 60 422 0.59  -2.38 
1999 486 252 20 214 40 446 0.22  5.64 
2000 448 203 32 213 62 386 0.28  2.68 
2001 348 139 16 193 97 251 0.20  -1.53 
2002 271 151 9 111 65 206 0.01  -4.08 
2003 241 133 9 99 42 199 -0.01  -5.48 
2004 290 139 10 141 49 241 0.38  -4.77 
2005 354 171 19 164 72 282 -0.40  -3.69 
2006 363 162 12 189 49 314 0.06  -2.59 
Total  6086 2937 374 2775 786 5300 0.38  -0.84 
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Table 3.4. Takeover Frequency and Misvaluation 
This table shows the frequency of takeover activities, conditional on transactions ‘ payment methods and 
financing sources, during high and low market/Industry valuation periods. Using monthly FTSE All 
share/industry PE rat io, each month during the sample period is classified as a high-, low- or neutral- 
market/industry valuation month by comparing the detrended PE rat io of a month with its past 5-year 
average. If the detrended PE rat io of that month falls into to the top (bottom) half of the ‗above (below) 
the past 5-year average‘ group, it is classified as a high (low) valuation month. The numbers of these 
high- (low-) valuation market/industry months during the sample period are presented in Panel A. The 
deal frequency listed in Panel B is calcu lated as the number of deals announced during one p articular 
valuation period divided by the total months of that valuation period. The number of takeover act ivities, 
conditional on deal categories and misvaluation, is shown in parenthesis in Panel B.  
 
Panel A: No. of Valuation Months             
    
Market Valuation 
Classification   
Industry Valuation 
Classification   
  
High Low 
 
High Low 
 No.  41 72  433 681  
        Panel B: No. of Acquisitions per Valuation Month      
    
Market Valuation 
Classification   
Industry Valuation 
Classification   
  
High Low 
 
High Low 
 All Frequency 41.37  18.69   3.19  1.99   
 
N (1346) (1696) 
 
(1381) (1352) 
 100%  Share deals Frequency 2.02  1.00  
 
0.22  0.10  
 
 
N (83) (72) 
 
(97) (68) 
 
100%  Cash deals Frequency 16.22  11.78  
 
1.48  1.04  
 
 
N (665) (848) 
 
(641) (705) 
 
Cash deals without 
pre-acquisition equity issue 
Frequency 14.95  10.17  
 
1.37  0.91  
 
N (613) (732) 
 
(594) (619) 
 
Cash deals with pre-acquisition 
equity issue 
Frequency 1.27 1.61 
 
0.11  0.13  
 
N (52) (116)   (47) (86)   
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Table 3.5. Method of Payment, Financing Sources and Misvaluation 
This table provides bidders‘ 5-day cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) conditional on deal categories 
and misvaluation. Using monthly FTSE All share/industry PE ratio, each month during the sample 
period is classified as a high-, low- or neutral- market/industry valuation month by comparing the 
detrended PE ratio  of a month with its past 5-year average. If the detrended PE ratio  of that month falls 
into to the top (bottom) half of the ‗above (below) the past 5-year average‘ group, it is classified as a 
high (low) valuation month. The rest are classified as neutral valuation months. HML is the difference 
in CARs between the high and the low valuation groups. Firm misvaluation is measured as: 
Firm Misvaluation = (PBit-PBjt) / PBjt                                                                           (3.1) 
where i stands for stock i and j stands for the industry j to which i belongs, in the month prior to the 
announcement date. Using this firm misvaluation proxy, an acquirer is classified as an overvalued 
(undervalued) firm, if it misvaluation proxy belongs to the top (bottom) half of the ‗positive (negative) 
misvaluation‘ group. CARs for all acquirers are calculated over the 5-day (-2, 2) window, where day 0 
is the announcement date. They are presented in %. No. of observations is provided in parenthesis and 
the t-statistics are provided in italics. Superscripts *, **, and *** indicate a significant level o f 10%, 5% 
and 1% respectively. 
Valuation 
Groups 
  
All 
100% Share 
deals 
100% Cash 
deals 
Cash deals with 
pre-acquisition 
equity issue 
Cash deals without 
pre-acquisition 
equity issue 
Panel A: All            
 
Mean 1.091*** 0.817*  0.962*** 0.422 1.028*** 
 
t-value 12.49 1.66 9.06 1.35 9.11 
 
N (6086) (374) (2936) (316) (2620) 
Panel B: Market Valuation         
 
Mean 1.766*** 0.862 1.741*** 0.138 1.877*** 
High t-value 7.45 0.76 5.89 0.18 5.99 
 
N (1346) (83) (665) (52) (613) 
 
Mean 0.651*** 0.315 0.582*** -0.013 0.651*** 
Neutral  t-value 6.16 0.63 4.35 -0.03 4.63 
 
N (3043) (219) (1422) (148) (1274) 
 
Mean 1.343*** 2.289 0.989** 1.105** 0.970** 
Low t-value 8.27 1.44 5.66 1.99 5.32 
 
N (1696) (72) (848) (116) (732) 
HML 
Mean 0.423  -1.427  0.752** -0.967  0.907*** 
t-value 1.47 -0.73 2.19 -0.99 2.50 
Panel C: Industry Valuation         
 
Mean 1.225*** 1.348 1.177*** -0.470 1.307*** 
High t-value 6.15 1.04 5.13 -0.57 5.49 
 
N (1381) (97) (641) (47) (594) 
 
Mean 1.205*** 0.666 1.078*** 0.355 1.172*** 
Neutral  t-value 10.56 1.25 7.50 0.98 7.54 
 
N (3353) (209) (1590) (183) (1407) 
 
Mean 0.668*** 0.521 0.507** 1.052 0.432*  
Low t-value 3.69 0.47 2.34 1.45 1.92 
 
N (1352) (68) (705) (86) (619) 
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Table 3.5 continued 
HML 
Mean 0.557** 0.827 0.670** -1.522 0.875*** 
t-value 2.07 0.48 2.12 -1.31 2.67 
Panel D: Firm Valuation         
 
Mean 0.613*** -0.333 0.495** 0.384 0.514** 
High t-value 3.83 -0.46 2.28 0.91 2.11 
 
N (1291) (91) (574) (82) (492) 
 
Mean 0.956*** 0.881 0.815*** 0.616 0.837*** 
Neutral  t-value 8.21 1.41 5.54 1.18 5.48 
 
N (3043) (171) (1508) (153) (1355) 
 
Mean 1.675*** 1.653 1.537*** 0.095 1.688*** 
Low t-value 8.73 1.38 7.31 0.16 7.56 
 
N (1752) (112) (854) (81) (773) 
HML 
Mean -1.062*** -1.986 -1.042*** 0.289 -1.174*** 
t-value -4.25 -1.42 -3.45 0.4 -3.55 
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Table 3.6. Misvaluation and Bidders’ Gain 
This table provides the results of a cross-sectional regression analysis based on the regression equation: 
Ri-Rm= α+β1Vi+β2Xi+β2ControlVariablei +εi                                                                                              (3.7) 
where the regressor is a b idder‘s 5-day accumulative abnormal return. The vector of exp lanatory variable V includes three misvaluation components , namely Firm 
Misvaluation, Industry Valuation and Market Valuation (undervalued/equilibrium/overvalued bidders=1/2/3, low/neutral/high industry valuation=1/2/3, 
low/neutral/high market valuation=1/2/3). Interacting terms between payment financing and firm misvaluation (cash deal dummy ×equity flow×overvalued bidder, cash 
deal dummy×debt flow×overvalued bidder, cash deal dummy×cash flow×overvalued bidder and equity payment× overvalued bidder) are included in vector X. Control 
variables are Size, Relat ive Size, Cross Border Dummy (foreign targets=1), Target Public Status Dummy (unlisted targets=1) and Financial Bidders Dummy (financial 
bidders=1). T statistics are provided in parenthesis. Superscripts *, **, and *** indicate a significant level of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
           Model 
Variable   (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8) 
               
  Constant 
 
0.008*** 
 
-0.007*  
 
-0.006 
 
0.002 
 
-0.001 
 
-0.002 
 
-0.002 
 
-0.002 
  
2.46 
 
-1.83  
 
-1.56  
 
0.50  
 
-0.54  
 
-0.71  
 
-0.67  
 
-0.70  
Firm Misvaluation -0.006*** 
     
-0.006*** 
      
  
  
-4.43  
     
-4.41  
      
  Industry Valuation 
  
0.002*  
   
0.002 
      
  
    
1.85  
   
1.24  
      
  Market Valuation 
    
0.002 
 
0.001 
      
  
      
1.50  
 
0.92  
      
  Equity Deal dummy×Overvalued Bidder 
     
-0.012 
    
  
          
-1.63  
    
  Equity Flow×Cash Deal dummy×Overvalued Bidder 
     
-0.013 
  
  
            
-0.98  
  
  Debt Flow×Cash Deal dummy×Overvalued Bidder 
       
-0.031**  
  
              
-2.20  
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  Table 3.6 continued 
Cash Flow×Cash Deal  dummy×Overvalued Bidder 
        
 
-0.012 
               
 
-0.49 
Size 
 
-1.32E-07 
 
-1.56E-07 
 
-1.48E-07 
 
-1.22E-07 
 
-1.65E-07 
 
-1.61E-07 
 
-1.57E-07 
 
-1.60E-07 
  
-0.99  
 
-1.17  
 
-1.11  
 
-0.91  
 
-1.23  
 
-1.20  
 
-1.17  
 
-1.20  
Relative Size 4.53E-04 
 
0.001 
 
0.001 
 
4.80E-04 
 
0.001 
 
0.001 
 
4.96E-04 
 
0.001 
  
0.96  
 
1.11  
 
1.11  
 
1.02  
 
1.07  
 
1.07  
 
1.05  
 
1.07 
Target Public Status Dummy 0.016*** 
 
0.015*** 
 
0.016*** 
 
0.016*** 
 
0.015*** 
 
0.015*** 
 
0.016*** 
 
0.015*** 
  
6.11  
 
5.98  
 
5.98  
 
6.11  
 
5.92  
 
6.05  
 
6.08  
 
6.03 
Cross-Border Dummy 2.99E-04 
 
-3.46E-04 
 
-0.001 
 
3.63E-04 
 
-0.001 
 
-4.60E-04 
 
-3.57E-04 
 
-0.001 
  
0.16  
 
-0.19  
 
-0.19  
 
0.20  
 
-0.32  
 
-0.25  
 
-0.19  
 
-0.27  
Financial Bidders Dummy -0.002 
 
-0.002 
 
-0.002 
 
-0.002 
 
-0.002 
 
-0.002 
 
-0.002 
 
-0.002 
  
-0.84  
 
-0.60  
 
-0.60  
 
-0.76  
 
-0.67  
 
-0.73  
 
-0.75  
 
-0.74  
               
  
  
 
            
  Adj R-S quared (% ) 0.92 
 
0.65 
 
0.63 
 
0.95 
 
0.64 
 
0.61  
 
0.68 
 
0.60  
F 
 
10.38*** 
 
7.66*** 
 
7.46*** 
 
8.28*** 
 
7.53*** 
 
7.24*** 
 
7.89*** 
 
7.12*** 
N   6086   6086   6086   6086   6086   6086   6086  6086 
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4.1 Introduction 
“Appearances to the mind are of four kinds. Things either are what they 
appear to be; or they neither are, nor appear to be; or they are and do not  
appear to be; or they are not, and yet appear to be. Rightly to aim in all these 
cases is the wise man‟s task.” 
— Epictetus.  
In an inefficient financial market, not every participant can be regarded as a 
―wise man‖. Investors can mis-perceive ―appearances‖ (market information), and tend 
to interpret information in a sentiment- influenced manner, rather than a 
rational-analytic one.  
Stock market reactions to the arrival of new information around takeover 
announcement periods have been reported in the previous chapter. Given the potential 
effects the recipients of this information may have on the manner and the outcomes of 
information processing, these market reactions should not only incorporate the 
message itself, but should also include the effects of investors‘ behaviour acting upon 
the released information. Moreover, the previous chapter has also addressed the 
importance of market/industry valuation in explaining takeover gains. The stock 
market valuation, especially fluctuations in the stock market, has been attributed to 
investor sentiment by behavioural finance scholars (e.g., Brown and Cliff, 2005). 
Therefore, the value effects of mergers and acquisitions are expected to reflect 
investor sentiment towards the transactions and the firms involved.  
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The sentiment of noise traders which can persist in the financial market was 
reported several decades ago (e.g., Shiller, 1981). Furthermore, it has been recognized 
that sentiment can drive asset prices away from their intrinsic values (e.g., Delong et  
al., 1991). Developed upon this, financial scholars have entered into on-going 
research concerning how best to quantify the link between investor sentiment and 
asset valuation. Abundant sentiment related explanations have been given to 
rationalize the cycles of the stock market (Brown and Cliff, 2005) and the fluctuations 
of transaction volume in the Initial Public Offering (IPO) market (Helwege and Liang, 
2004). In both cases a positive relation between sentiment and market activity has 
been documented.   
However, most of the existing research exclusively focuses on sentiment at an 
aggregate market level. Until recently, the cross-sectional difference in the role of 
sentiment (sentiment at firm specific level) has not been recognized. Research into the 
sensitivity of individual stock to shifts in investor sentiment shows that firms, which 
are more difficult to value and harder to arbitrage, are more vulnerable to the 
valuation effects of investor sentiment. These firms often possess strong speculative 
characteristics, which are presented by young age, small size, extreme growth and 
high return volatility (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Qiu and Welch, 2006; Baker 
and Wurgler, 2006 & 2007).  
Although the understanding of investor sentiment, at both an aggregate market 
and a firm-specific level, has been accumulating on over time, few researchers have 
directly or indirectly applied it in the context of mergers and acquisitions. Rosen 
(2006) claims that market-wide investor sentiment affects aggregate merger 
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momentum. However, a great deficiency of his study is that investor sentiment is 
regarded as a factor implicated in the announcement returns generated by recent 
mergers, rather than being measured with a proxy.  
A recent development upon this issue is made by Zhu et al. (2008), who quantify 
this investor sentiment by using the Baker and Wurgler (2006) sentiment index. They 
report a significant relationship between begin-of-period sentiment and takeover 
premium. Nevertheless, this finding fails to provide a thorough understanding of the 
relevance of investor sentiment to mergers and acquisitions. More specifically, the 
investor sentiment concerned in their research is measured at a general market level. 
This aggregate market level measurement assumes that investor sentiment towards a 
stock or firm can equally be applied to other stocks or firms. However, mergers and 
acquisitions, as an individual corporate activity, can cause cross-sectional differences 
in investor sentiment and thus are more likely to be exposed to a firm-specific 
sentiment.  
The inadequate research on this issue, as discussed above,  reveals several 
research areas which have not been fully accounted for; such as how to q uantify 
investor sentiment in the takeover market and how to examine the value effects of this 
sentiment at both an aggregate market and a firm-specific level. Filling these literature 
gaps forms one of the research incentives of this chapter, which is achieved by 
examining the first research question, „how does investor sentiment influence the way 
in which the stock market interprets and responds to takeover announcements‟.  
If the sentiment- laden reaction of investors towards takeover announcements is 
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reflected by target firms‘ short-run stock returns, given that target firms‘ stock returns 
influence bidders‘ premium estimations, then there is the potential of investor 
sentiment bearing upon takeover premium. In terms of takeover premium, 
managerialism hypothesis (Berkovitch and Narayanan, 1993), hubris hypothesis (Roll, 
1986; Varaiya, 1988; Hayward and Hambrick 1997) and synergy pursuing (Gaughan, 
2002) have attempted to theorize the premium determination process. 40 Accordingly, 
different theoretical implications have been proposed. For example, under 
managerialism hypothesis, a manager‘s high premium estimation is a conscious 
process, which means managers from bidding firms knowingly overpay in takeovers 
to maximize their own utility at the expense of their shareholders. On the other hand, 
if the hubris hypothesis stands, managers only inadvertently overpay for target firms. 
This unsettled debate among literature gives rise to the second research question, ‗do 
acquirer‟s managers knowingly overpay in acquiring targets‟. An expected answer to 
this question stems from the potential mispricing of targets‘ shares driven by investor 
sentiment.  
Examination of these two research questions can yield new perspectives on 
several key issues in financial economics. Firstly, it can complement the findings of 
extant studies on investor sentiment by showing that the relevance of aggregate and 
cross-sectional sentiment to stock prices extends beyond its original settings, within 
asset pricing, to the context of mergers and acquisitions. Specifically, investor 
sentiment can have some bearing on both target firm‘s gains and takeover premiums. 
                                                 
40
 For a literature review specific on these hypotheses, see section 2.2.  
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Secondly, it can update the understanding of how takeover premiums are determined 
by introducing an investor sentiment factor, rather than relying on traditional 
explanations regarding acquirer-, target- and transaction-characteristics. This 
sentiment factor, once proven as a premium determinant, can further the debate 
surrounding overpayments in takeovers, which questions whether these overpayments 
are results of managerialism motives.   
The reminder of this chapter is organized into five sections: Section 2 provides a 
comprehensive literature review on investor sentiment and takeover premium, and 
further presents hypotheses developments. Section 3 contains the sample selection and 
description, and introduces the methodology of measuring investor sentiment and 
takeover premiums. Results from both univariate tests and cross-sectional regression 
analyses are discussed in Section 4. Section 5 concludes the chapter and points out 
potential contributions to literature.  
4. 2 Literature Review  
4.2.1 Investor Sentiment 
In order to hypothesize the relevance of investor sentiment to targets‘ gains and 
takeover premium, existing literature on investor sentiment is reviewed in this section. 
This review starts with discussing the influence of aggregate investment sentiment on 
asset pricing. This setting is then extended to a corporate finance, and further to a 
takeover, context. In addition to the research on aggregate investor sentiment, the 
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recent developments towards cross-sectional difference in investment sentiment are 
reviewed in the last subsection. Upon these existing studies, the hypotheses of this 
research are developed. 
4.2.1.1 Investor Sentiment and Asset Pricing  
It has been an on-going debate as to whether the financial market is rational or 
not. According to market efficiency theory (Fama, 1970), unemotional investors can 
always keep capital market prices at the rational present value of expected future cash 
flow, and any asset return volatility simply reflects fluctuations in fundamentals. 
However, the existence of systematic mispricing, for example the dramatic stock price 
run-up followed by the financial market collapse in 1929, does not always fit into the 
theoretical framework suggested by market efficiency theory (Delong and Shleifer, 
1991). Instead, behavioural finance researchers suggest investor sentiment as an 
irrational exuberance that drives asset prices away from their fundamental values 
(Shleifer, 1981)  
 Early studies on investor sentiment can date back to the 1980s, when the 
potential effects of sentiment on asset valuation were examined (e.g., Shiller, 1981). 
As summarised by Baker and Wurgler (2007), these pioneering researches ―…were 
largely theoretical testing… the tendency of aggregate returns to mean revert, 
volatility in aggregate stock index returns that could not be justified by volatility in 
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fundamentals…or predictability of aggregate returns using simple valuation ratios like 
the ratio of aggregate dividends to stock market value‖ (p.133). However, none of 
these studies quantified the role of sentiment in aggregate stock returns. 
 Following these original attempts, more behaviour based models were 
formalized in the 1990s to theorize the source of investors‘ irrationality. For example, 
‗biased self-attribution‘ was raised by Daniel et al. (1998), which stated that investors 
are overconfident about their own abilities and underestimate bad outcomes; 
‗conservatism‘ of Barberis et al. (1998) indicated that investor are slow to update their 
beliefs about the regime in the face of new evidence. No matter what behaviour 
investors show, the general predictions of these behavioural models, based on 
psychology theory, are similar. Specifically, they predict that a market overvaluation is 
expected when investor sentiment is high. Consequently, as market prices will 
eventually revert to their intrinsic values, stock returns following the high sentiment 
period should be extremely low (e.g., Barberis et al., 1998; Daniel et al., 1998). The 
assumption underlying these stock return performances, predicted by the behavioural 
models, is that both rational arbitrageurs, who are sentiment- free, and irrational traders, 
who are prone to exogenous sentiment, participate in the financial market. Further, the 
changes in sentiment shown by irrational traders as well as the limits to arbitrage 
faced by the rational investors lead to asset mispricing (DeLong et al., 1990).  
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 Developed upon these behavioural models, more recent studies have shifted 
the research focus from ‗whether investor sentiment affects stock prices‘ to ‗how to 
measure investor sentiment and quantify its effects ‘. Direct investor sentiment 
measurements are introduced to quantify the influence of sentiment on aggregate 
stock returns. For example, Brown and Cliff (2005) provide evidence that, when a 
survey-based sentiment proxy is used (bull-bear spread), market pricing errors are 
positively related to sentiment, whereas future returns over multiyear horizons are 
negatively related.  
To summarize, literature on asset pricing and behaviour finance has recognized 
the influence of investor sentiment as an irrational exuberance that drives asset prices 
away from their fundamental values (e.g., Shleifer, 1981). This influence has further 
been rationalized by some behaviour based models (e.g., Barberis et al., 1998; Daniel 
et al., 1998), and has been quantified with developed sentiment measurement (e.g., 
Brown and Cliff, 2005). These research developments have enabled a comprehensive 
understanding on the relevance of investor sentiment to stock returns within an asset 
pricing setting.  
4.2.1.2 Investor Sentiment and Corporate Finance including Takeovers  
As discussed above, the market-level stock valuation is under the influence of 
investor sentiment. If investor sentiment can result in periodic mispricing relative to 
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fundamentals, here poses the potential for managers to exploit this mispricing in 
corporate practice. Given this, financial scholars have been investigating the 
implications of investor sentiment on corporate activities.  
Equity issue, in relation to investor sentiment, is one of the most discussed 
corporate financing activities. Various attempts have been made to quantify the extent 
to which equity issue activity is explained by prevailing investor sentiment beyond 
economic fundamentals (e.g., Lowry, 2003; Helwege and Liang, 2004; Derrien and 
Kecskes, 2007). Given the aforementioned valuation effects of investor sentiment, a 
firm should be more likely to issue equity when its stock price is driven up by investor 
optimism. Helwege and Liang (2004) claim that the volatility of the Initial Public 
Offerings (IPO) volume in the US cannot be explained by technological innovations, 
suggested by the neoclassical theory, as the former has greater frequency than the 
latter. Instead, fluctuations of the IPO market are more in line with the variations in 
investor optimism. 
Using Canada market data, Derrien and Kecskes (2007) compare the effects of 
fundamentals and investor sentiment in explaining the IPO activities within the 
petroleum industry. Sentiment, measured by MCSI confidence Index, Barker and 
Wurgler 2006 Index, or TSE Oil and GAS Index, does have certain explanatory power 
in capturing IPO volume, although this power is lessened once fundamentals are 
controlled.  
Chapter 4                                      Investor Sentiment, Targets‘ Gains and Takeover Premium  
105 
In addition to security issues, IPO particularly, dividend policy is also under the 
influences of investor sentiment. One of the recently documented corporate dividend 
behaviours is the decline in the percentage of dividend payers (e.g., Baker and 
Wurgler, 2004a & 2004b; DeAngelo et al., 2004; Fama and French, 2001).41  
Early explanations, given to these disappearing dividends, focused on changes in 
firm characteristics which are suggested by traditional corporate finance theory. For 
example, Fama and French (2001) claim that US firms, driven by new listings, have 
tended towards the characteristics which distinguish non-dividend payers, including 
small size, low profitability and high investment opportunity.  
However, more recent studies, presented by Baker and Wurgler (2004a), indicate 
that investor sentiment, rather than company attributes, are more likely to explain the 
disappearing dividends. More specifically, Baker and Wurgler (2004b) regard 
investors‘ demands for dividend-paying stocks as the driving force of a firm‘s 
dividend policy. It is hypothesized that companies tend to cater to investors by paying 
dividends when investors place a premium42 on stocks with dividends. Similarly, 
investors‘ preferences for stocks without dividend payouts are followed by dividend 
terminations. Their empirical results show that the dividend trend documented by 
                                                 
41
 A significant drop from 67% to 21% in the percentage of US firms paying dividends from 1978 to 
1999 is documented by Fama and French (2001). Following this intriguing study, Baker and Wurg ler 
(2004a), DeAngelo et al. (2004) investigate this issue and find a similar div idend pattern shown by US 
firms. This phenomenon is not exclusive to the US, as the radical transformation in corporate dividend 
practice is shared by UK and Indian markets (e.g., Benito and Young, 2003;  Reddy and Rath, 2005). 
42
 Baker and Wurgler (2004b) define the premium as the difference between the logs of the 
market-to-book ratios for d ividend payers and non-payers. 
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Fama and French (2001) lines up with fluctuations in catering incentives. In turn, the 
reduction in the percentage of dividend-paying firms can be attributed to catering 
effects. 
The literature, reviewed above, suggests that, after extending the research context 
from asset pricing to corporate finance, investor sentiment also has some bearing on 
corporate practices. More specifically, it influences the volume of a firm‘s equity issue 
or payout policy. Having discussed the relevance of investor sentiment to the quantity 
(volume) of corporate activities, the effects of investor sentiment to the quality of 
corporate activities (corporate announcement returns) are then examined. The 
paragraphs below contain a review of related literature.    
Literature on asset pricing and behaviour finance has recognized and quantified 
the influence of investor sentiment as an irrational exuberance that drives asset prices 
away from their fundamental values (e.g., Shleifer, 1981). Since investors tend to 
trade heavily when corporate news is released, such an irrational exuberance may be 
presented on an even larger scale around corporate news announcement per iods. 
Accordingly, investor sentiment may have significant effects on corporate 
announcement returns. 
  Recent research efforts have been made concerning this issue, in which a 
significant amount of sentiment-driven mispricing around the arrival of new firm 
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information has been reported (e.g., Baker and Wurgler, 2006; Mian and 
Sankaraguruswamy; 2007). Using a relatively comprehensive investor sentiment 
indicator, constructed with the first principal component analysis, Baker and Wurgler 
(2006) find that earning announcement effects are in general lower following high 
sentiment periods. Similarly, concerning earning announcements, stock splits and 
dividends payouts, Mian and Sankaraguruswamy (2007) suggest that the stock price 
sensitivity to good news is greater during high sentiment periods.  
Despite the recent research development on the relevance of investor sentiment 
to corporate announcement returns, only a few studies have indirectly applied it in the 
context of mergers and acquisitions (Coakley and Thomas, 2004; Rosen, 2006).  
‗Merger momentum‘, as dubbed by Rosen (2006), represents ―a correlation 
between the market reaction to a merger announcement and recent market conditions‖ 
(p.989). In this study, the empirical findings on merger momentum are compared with 
the theoretical implications of the three most commonly discussed theories, including 
neoclassical theory, managerial motivations and investor sentiment. If investor 
sentiment, in particular over-optimism, influences the market reaction to merger 
announcements, then an autocorrelation in the announcement returns to bidding firms 
is expected. Further, following the announcement returns, there will be a long-run 
price reversal. The results of this study show that the share prices of US bidders 
increase more when the recent mergers have positive responses from the market (hot 
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market). In addition, firms that announce transactions in a hot market have a 
downward drift in their stock prices in the post-announcement period. These empirical 
results of short-run positive abnormal returns in a hot market, and their long-run 
reversals, are in line with the documented relevance of investor sentiment to asset 
pricing (e.g., Barberis et al., 1998; Daniel et al., 1998).  
A similar sentiment driven merger momentum is found in the UK takeover 
market by Coakley and Thomas (2004), which is used to explain the merger waves 
from 1985 to 2000. They define a hot market as a calendar month which has more 
than ten completed acquisitions. In this hot market period, bidders generally captured 
higher announcement returns compared with cold-market acquisitions. These 
announcement effects of hot-market acquisitions further reverse in the long-run.  
However, a deficiency shared by both of these studies is that the role of investor 
sentiment is drawn based on an un-quantified sentiment. Specifically, investor 
sentiment is regarded as a factor implicated either in the announcement returns 
generated by recent mergers or in the activeness of the takeover market, rather than 
being directly measured with a proxy. Therefore, there is the potential that the reported 
merger momentum is actually attributable to factors other than investor sentiment. 
Given this, quantifying investor sentiment and further examining its role on takeovers 
become necessary. This research necessity, which is unaccounted for in existing 
literature, breeds the first hypothesis:  
Hypothesis (1): prevailing investor sentiment influences target firms‘ announcement 
returns in the same direction as the sentiment. 
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A recent development upon this issue is made by Zhu et al. (2008). They use the 
Baker and Wurgler (2006) investor sentiment indicator as the proxy for sentiment and 
examine whether takeover premiums are driven by investor sentiment. Both a 
prevailing and begin-of-period sentiment is related to each observation. A positive 
relation between begin-of-period sentiment and takeover premium is reported. They 
explain these findings through bidding firms being relatively overvalued in the 
presence of optimistic market sentiment. It is this over-pricing that further pushes up 
the premium paid by the acquirers. Conversely, when the sentient is low, bidding firms 
are relatively underpriced and less premium is required. However, this positive 
relationship cannot be applied to premium and prevailing sentiment.  
Nevertheless, these findings are debatable, as the begin-of-period over-pricing 
should be followed by price reversals in the succeeding periods (as in Brown and Cliff, 
2005; Baker and Wurgler, 2006). Therefore, a negative rather than positive correlation 
between premium and begin-of-period sentiment should be expected. Motivated by 
this, here arises the second hypothesis: 
Hypothesis (2): Takeover premium is driven by prevailing investor sentiment.   
In summary, developed upon the original research attempts towards examining 
the effects of market- level investor sentiment on asset pricing, more recent literature 
has identified the relevance of aggregate investor sentiment to corporate financing 
and investment activities. Further, this relevance has added a behavioural factor to 
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the takeover literature by suggesting a sentiment-laden takeover premium (Zhu et al., 
2008) and a sentiment driven merger momentum (Rosen, 2006). Reviewing these 
takeover studies reveals literature gaps existing in the announcement effects of 
takeovers under investor sentiment and the relationship between takeover premium 
and investor sentiment. Upon these two areas, unaccounted for by existing literature, 
two hypotheses have developed which will be tested in section 4.4.1. 
4.2.1.3 Cross-sectional Variations of Investor Sentiment 
All of the previously discussed literature assumes that investor sentiment has an 
identical effect across the financial market, which means sentiment-laden investors‘ 
reactions to one stock (or company) can be equally applied to another stock (or 
company). However, counter-views, like those held by Qiu and Welch (2006) and 
Baker and Wurgler (2006 & 2007), suggest that sentiment may have cross-sectional 
differences.  
Baker and Wurgler (2006) define investor sentiment as ‗the propensity to 
speculate‘. Under this definition, high (low) sentiment corresponds to a pushed-up 
(driven-down) demand for speculative investments. In line with the consumer demand 
theory of Lancaster (1966), investors are expected to ―…demand stocks that have the 
bundle of salient characteristics that is compatible with their sentiment‖ (Baker and 
Wurgler, 2006, p.1649). This means investors, with a higher propensity to speculate, 
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demand investments with more speculative characteristics. Therefore, the 
speculativeness of stocks determines which stock is more susceptible to shifts in 
investor sentiment.  
In addition to this variation in sentiment- laden demands across the stock market, 
a cross-sectional variation in arbitrage also exists. Both idiosyncratic risks and costs 
associated with arbitrage vary among stocks. More specifically, speculative stocks are 
more risky (Wurgler and Zhuravaskaya, 2002) and costly to trade (Amihud and 
Mendelsohn, 1986). The limited arbitrage makes it impossible for sentiment-free 
arbitrageurs to drive back the mispricing of speculative stocks which is caused by 
irrational traders.    
Since both sentiment- laden demand and arbitrage constraints vary among stocks, 
it is likely that investor sentiment has cross-sectional effects on stock returns. By 
using investor sentiment to predict the returns of high-minus- low portfolios, which are 
long on stocks with high speculative characteristics and short on stocks with low 
speculative characteristics 43 , Baker and Wurgler (2006&2007) report a positive 
relationship between sentiment and these portfolios returns.  
This relevance of cross-sectional variation of investor sentiment to asset pricing 
has attracted research development towards examining its implications on corporate 
                                                 
43
 Speculative characteristics are presented by small size, young age, high return volatility, negative 
profitability, no dividends and extreme growth. 
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finance.  
As there are active investor tradings around corporate announcements, a 
significant amount of sentiment-driven mispricing may occur with the arrival of new 
information. Mian and Sankaraguruswamy (2007) investigate the sensitivity of stock 
price to earnings announcements in the presence of investor sentiment, and further 
examine variations in this sensitivity. They predict that, during high (low) sentiment 
periods when speculative demand is high (low), investors are more likely to bid up 
(down) a firm‘s share price around a corporate announcement. This prediction is 
supported by the results that the stock price sensitivity to good news is greater during 
high sentiment periods. Furthermore, this relation is especially pronounced for small, 
young, volatile, non-dividend paying or distressed stocks.44 In line with Baker and 
Wurgler (2006&2007), these stock attributes characterize speculative stocks. 
Therefore, this result shows that the driving force of high investor sentiment, which 
raises a firm‘s announcement returns, is more pronounced for firms with more 
speculative socks. 
The aforementioned literature, on both asset pricing and corporate finance, 
recognize the existence of cross-sectional investor sentiment and further quantify its 
effects on stock returns. Developed upon Hypotheses (1) and (2), this cross-sectional 
variation in the effects of sentiment further yields the third and the fourth hypotheses:  
                                                 
44
 In  the work of Mian  and Sankaraguruswamy (2007), good news is presented by positive unexpected 
earnings. For instance, an increase in div idends paying and stock splits are perceived as good news. 
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Hypothesis (3): More speculative targets are more vulnerable to the effects of investor 
sentiment on announcement returns.  
Hypothesis (4): The effects of investor sentiment on takeover premium are more 
pronounced for more speculative targets.  
4.2.2 Takeover Premium 
The research objective of this study is to examine the effects of investor 
sentiment, in both an aggregate market and a cross-sectional context, on targets‘ gains 
and takeover premium. Existing literature in relation to investor sentiment and targets‘ 
gains has been discussed in section 4.2.1 and 2.3.3 respectively. In order to enable a 
better understanding of takeover premium, relevant literature is reviewed in this 
subsection.  
Most mergers and acquisitions literature focuses on the value effects of takeovers. 
Abundant deal and firm characteristics have been suggested to explain bidders‘ and 
targets‘ gains around and after the announcement period (e.g., size by Moeller et al., 
2004a; target ownership by Faccio et al. 2006, target domicile by Baldwin and Caves, 
1991 and Conn et al., 2005, payment methods by Myers and Majluf, 1984, 
misvaluation by Shleifer and Vishny, 2003 and Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan, 2004). 
Compared with these widely-researched value effects, fewer research efforts have 
been made towards examining takeover premium, which is another crucial element of 
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takeover activity. These studies have suggested several determinants that theorize and 
rationalize the magnitude of takeover premium and the existence of bidders‘ 
overpayment. These explanations largely come from the following three perspectives.  
Firstly, factors, in relation to targets‘ operating and profitability, determine the 
value creation from an acquisition and hence affect the premium a bidder would likely 
pay. A bidder‘s willingness to pay is directly related with the synergies that can be 
generated via takeovers. Accordingly, transferable economic gains, for example 
expected improvements in financial and operating efficiency, can breed high takeover 
premiums (Gaughan, 2002). These transferable economic gains are more likely to be 
generated in acquiring a target that has growth potential, profitability and strategically 
fits with the acquirer. Hence, the acquirer would like to offer a high premium in this 
case.  
Secondly, in addition to these target-related factors, several managerial factors 
from bidders‘ perspectives may also enter the premium determination process.  
The different interests and motives possessed by managers and shareholders can 
give rise to principal-agent conflicts (e.g., Rozeff, 1982; Easterbrook, 1984; Jensen, 
1986). These conflicts exist in the process of determining takeover premium. 
According to managerialism hypothesis, managers are prone to increase their firm size 
by acquiring companies so as to meet their personal desires for greater prestige and 
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public exposure (Berkovitch and Narayanan, 1993). Driven by these managerialism 
motives, they tend to place a high premium on their target firms (Black, 1989). In 
doing so, they discount risks and exaggerate potential gains to persuade shareholders 
to agree with the high premium required.  
Offering hyped premium, as suggested by the managerialism hypothesis, is a 
conscious process. This means managers knowingly overpay in takeovers to maximize 
their own utility at the expense of their shareholders. However, there is the possibility 
that managers may inadvertently overpay for target firms, as suggested by hubris 
hypothesis (Roll, 1986; Varaiya, 1988; Hayward and Hambrick 1997) and the 
‗winner‘s curse‘ (Varaiya and Ferris, 1987).  
Hubris can give rise to managerial optimism. As summarised by Hayward and 
Hambrick (1997), this optimism can come from recent organisational success, media 
praise for the management, management‘s self- importance or weak board vigilance. 
Further, this optimism increases the magnitude of takeover premiums offered by 
managers from acquiring firms.  
Another determinant of high premiums, in relation to the managerial factors, is 
managers‘ ignorance of the ‗winner‘s curse‘. According to Black (1989), in the 
auction of an asset with uncertain value, bidders are vulnerable to ‗winner‘s curse‘. 
More specifically, ―even if they estimate value accurately on average, they win the 
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bidding primarily when they overestimate an asset‘s true value, and thus tend to 
overpay on average‖ (p.625).  
Thirdly, in addition to the factors discussed above relating to targets‘ operational 
conditions and bidders‘ managerial considerations, competitions around a transaction 
form the last determinant of takeover premium. If multiple bidders are involved in 
acquiring a target, then the competition between bidders is prone to bid up the price 
paid to the target. In order to discourage competitors from entering the control contest, 
offering a large premium over the target‘s market value is an effective way to 
pre-empt competition (Fishman, 1988). In line with this research, Jennings and 
Mazzeo (1993) provide empirical evidence that a high premium can successfully deter 
competing offers. This high premium is further associated with a lower likelihood of 
target management‘s resistance in accepting the offer. 
As discussed above, existing literature has suggested several premium 
determinants from three perspectives. These identified determinants can further shed 
light on the post-takeover performances of acquiring firms. Negative long-run stock 
returns of bidders have been widely documented (e.g., Gregory, 1977; Bradley and 
Sundaram, 2004; Conn et al., 2005). There is a growing belief that this poor long-run 
performance of acquirers can be attributed to overpayments. Schwert (2003) suggests 
that overpayment is perhaps the prime suspect behind the long-run underperformance 
puzzle. If the managerialism hypothesis (Berkovitch and Narayanan, 1993) stands, 
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then the premium determination driven by managerialism motives rather than takeover 
synergies may underlie the negative long-run performance. Even if there were 
economic gains from takeovers, paying an excessive merger premium can largely 
cancel these synergies.  
However, different results are reported by Antoniou et al. (2008). Based on a 
sample of 396 successful UK public mergers announced from 1985 to 2004, they find 
that in a 3-year event window following takeover announcements, there is no 
significant difference in bidders‘ long-run abnormal returns between high premium 
paying portfolio and low premium paying portfolio. Meanwhile, short-run cumulative 
abnormal returns tend out to be positively correlated to the magnitude of premium 
paid by acquirers. These results suggest that high takeover premiums are unlikely to 
be responsible for acquirers‘ poor post-merger performances.  
4.2.3 Summary of Hypotheses 
A comprehensive examination of extant studies on investor sentiment reveals 
literature gaps existing in the relevance of investor sentiment to corporate takeovers. 
These gaps exist in: i) inadequate research on extending the value effects of investor 
sentiment from its original setting within asset pricing to a new context of mergers and 
acquisitions, ii) un-quantified investor sentiment in examining its influence on the 
takeover market, and iii) un-examined individual (firm-specific) differences in the 
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relation between investor sentiment and takeovers. Given these areas unaccounted for 
by existing literature, four testable hypotheses, as discussed in previous sections, are 
developed.  
Hypothesis (1): prevailing investor sentiment influences target firms‘ 
announcement returns in the same direction as the sentiment. 
If this hypothesis stands, managers‘ decisions of offering premiums are likely to 
be influenced by this sentiment-driven mispricing. Therefore,  
Hypothesis (2): Takeover premium is driven by prevailing investor sentiment.  
If a cross-sectional variation in the value effects of investor sentiment exists, the 
previous two testable hypotheses can be further developed to both, 
Hypothesis (3): More speculative targets are more vulnerable to the effects of 
sentiment on announcement returns.  
Hypothesis (4): The effects of investor sentiment on takeover premium are more 
pronounced for more speculative targets.  
4.3 Data and Methodology 
4.3.1 Sample Selection 
Mergers and acquisitions data is obtained from the SDC database. There are 
59191 UK takeover observations from 1985 to 2007. A minimum size criterion that 
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deal value is more than £1 mil excludes 28623 transactions. Since takeover premium45 
is one of the major concerns of this study, offer price is obtained from SDC, which 
further reduces the sample to 3196 observations. Only London listed targets (2060 
observations) are then included in the sample.  
In order to estimate investor sentiment, Investment trust discount, FTSE monthly 
turnover, Number of monthly IPO and monthly Consumer Confidence Index are 
collected from DataStream, SDC and Eurostat respectively to construct a sentiment 
indicator.46 In addition, data presenting firms‘ speculative characteristics, including 
Base Date, Market value, DPS, EPS, net sales, net property, plant and equipment (PPE) 
and share price are obtained from DataStream. 47 The availability of this data, on 
investor sentiment and firm characteristics, condenses the sample period to 1987-2007, 
and further reduces the sample size to 1278 observations.48 Control variables for 
takeover premium, such as targets‘ free cash flow and leverage ratio, are then included. 
A final sample consisting of 1148 observations is therefore constructed.  
4.3.2 Stock Speculative Characteristics  
In answering what stocks are more likely to attract sentiment- laden investors, 
                                                 
45
 Takeover premium is measured 4 weeks prior to the announcement date in this study, which is 
calculated as in equation (4.2). For motivations underlying this measurement, see section 4.3.6. 
46
 For an intensive discussion on the sentiment indicator, see section 4.3.5.  
47
 For an intensive discussion on these speculative characteristics , see section 4.3.5. 
48
 1497 observations survived after applying the last criteria regarding data availability; however 
manual verification based on information hold  in  Lexis -Nexis  excludes 213 bids from the final sample. 
There are 23 transactions with unverified  takeover premium data; 185 transactions are actually  share 
buyback instead of takeovers; 5 deals involve suspended targets, whose shares were suspended before 
the announcement date. 
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Baker and Wurgler (2006) suggest that ―investors simply demand stocks that have the 
bundle of salient characteristics that is compatible with their sentiment‖ (p.1649). 
They define sentiment as the propensity to speculate. Accordingly, sentiment- laden 
investors demand speculative stocks.  
These speculative stocks are characterized by uncertainties surrounding the firms 
which these stocks belong to. These uncertainties can be presented by large size, 
young age, non-profitable earnings, no dividends, low tangibility, high return volatility 
and high growth (Baker and Wurgler, 2006 & 2007). Similarly, this study measures 
firm speculative characteristics by firm size, age, profitability, asset tangibility, 
dividends payout, return volatility and growth opportunity.  
Market value of equities is used as a proxy for firm size (SIZE), measured at the 
calendar year end, prior to a takeover announcement date. Firm age (AGE) is the 
number of days from a firm‘s based date to the firm‘s takeover announcement date. 
The commonly used financial ratio earning per share (EPS) is employed to measure a 
firm‘s profitability. Asset tangibility is measured by a firm‘s property, plant and 
equipment. It is then scaled by the firm‘s total assets to control cross-sectional size 
differences (PPE/TA). Dividend per share (DPS) is included, since firms paying 
dividends are associated with less uncertainty. Return volatility (SIGMA) is the 
standard deviation of the market adjusted residuals of a target‘s daily stock returns 
measured during the period (t-205, t-6) where t is the acquisition announcement day. 
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Growth in sales (GS), which is the change in a firm‘s net sales divided by the net sales 
in the prior year, is the proxy for growth opportunity. Apart from SIZE, AGE and 
SIGMA, the other 4 variables are measured at the fiscal year end, prior to a takeover 
announcement. 
4.3.3 Control Variables  
Existing theories and hypotheses have suggested several firm and deal 
characteristics as determinants of takeover premium (as in section 4.2.3). In order to 
distinguish the effects of investor sentiment on takeover premium from the influences 
of these factors, several control variables are included. These control variables fall 
into three groups which represent characteristics of targets, bidders and transactions 
respectively.49  
Gondhalekar et al. (2004) suggest that targets with high levels of free cash flow 
are more attractive to bidders due to the large amount of cash that can be subjected to 
managerial discretion after the transaction. Hence, high premiums are incurred in 
                                                 
49
 These control variables aim to distinguish the effects of investor sentiment on takeover premium 
from the influence of other factors. In  addition to  this, they can also control the effects of suggested 
determinants of targets‘ gains (as discussed in section 2.3.3). For e xample, both payment method and 
deal attitude have some bearing on targets‘ announcement period returns. Apart from these seven 
variables, a proxy for ‗takeover anticipation‘ is included to reflect a recent research development. The 
notion of ‗takeover anticipation‘ was introduced by Bauguess et al. (2007) in exp laining targets‘ 
abnormal returns. The anticipation hypothesis is based on the principal that stock price adjusts to the 
degree of the unanticipated fraction of information. When it is applied to th e merger and acquisition 
context, the abnormal returns of bidding firms are expected to be significantly related to the degree of 
surprise surrounding a bid announcement. A high takeover anticipation gives rise to low target returns. 
This high level of anticipation is represented by a low level of book-to-market ratio of target firms since 
it suggests that the market price incorporates expected takeover premium. Fo llowing this method, 
market to book value (MTBV) is included as another control variab le.  
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acquiring these targets. Given this, free cash flow of targets is included as a control 
variable. It is measured as free cash flow per share (FCF) at the year end, prior to a 
takeover announcement.    
A firm‘s free cash flow is likely to be encumbered, if the firm is highly leveraged. 
Thus, the debt capability of a firm needs also to be taken into account. Walkling and 
Edmister (1985) identify target firms‘ leverage as one of the takeover premium 
determinants. Specifically, a high leverage exerts negative influence on premiums. As 
a general accepted practice, a target‘s leverage level is measured by its debt-to-equity 
ratio (DE) at the year end, prior to its takeover announcement, calculated as total 
debt/common equity. 
As reported by Gondhalekar et al. (2004), a target‘s size is inversely related with 
the magnitude of the premium. They attribute this relation to economic gains from 
acquiring a small target. As smaller firms are relatively easy to integrate into the 
acquiring firms‘ operations, acquirers would likely offer high premiums in this case. 
However, as suggested by the managerialism hypothesis (Berkovitch and Narayanan, 
1993), a positive relation between target size and the magnitude of premium can also 
be seen. This is because managers from acquiring firms are more likely to gain 
additional prestige and other non-pecuniary benefits from managing large targets. 
Driven by these motives, managers are more likely to place a high premium on large 
target. Consistent with the previously mentioned firm size, as a speculative 
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characteristics proxy, a target‘s size is measured by its market value (MV). 
In addition to targets‘ characteristics, factors related to acquiring firms may exert 
effects on takeover premium. Bargeron et al. (2007) introduce the importance of 
private bidder transactions. The ownership of privately held firms is often 
concentrated within a small group. This concentrated ownership can serve as an 
effective monitor of managerial performance (Draper and Paudyal, 2006). Under this 
monitoring mechanism, managers from acquiring firms will carefully evaluate their 
targets and make discreet investment decisions. Thus, they are less likely to overpay 
their acquired firms. Given this, Listed Bidder is included as a dummy variable, which 
equals 1 if the bidder is public and 0 otherwise.     
Besides attributes of targets and bidders, deal characteristics can also influence 
the magnitude of the premium paid. Competitions among multiple bidders are likely 
to bid up the price that the successful bidder must ultimately pay. Concerning the US 
takeover market, Walkling and Edmister (1985) and Gondhalekar et al. (2004) provide 
supportive empirical evidence to this conjecture. They conclude that takeover 
premium increases when bidders compete for ownership of a target‘s assets. Therefore, 
a dummy variable is included, taking the value of 1 if there are multiple bidders and 0 
otherwise.  
Other widely documented deal characteristics, including methods of payment and 
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attitude of transaction, are also included as dummy variables. As reported by Travlos 
(1987) and Moeller (2005), cash payment significantly increases takeover premiums. 
This effect can be the result of the tax on capital gains incurred from receiving cash 
payments. In this case, bidders need to offer high premiums to offset the tax burdens 
of target firms (Wansley et al., 1983). In addition, as suggested by Moeller (2005), 
given the existence of takeover defences in hostile offers, high premiums are required 
to entice target shareholders. Therefore, target firms in hostile deals receive higher 
premiums, compared with those in friendly transactions (Moeller, 2005; Sudarsanam 
and Mahate, 2006).     
4.3.4 Sample Description 
Descriptive statistics of the sample are presented in Table 4.1, where the mean 
value of key factors, including targets‘ announcement returns, takeover premium, 
investor sentiment indicators and targets‘ speculative characteristics, are summarised 
conditional on the methods of payment. As shown, the average premium paid by UK 
bidders in the past couple of decades is 26.465%, which is significantly lower than the 
42% and 45% reported by Abhyankar et al. (2005) and Antoniou et al. (2008) 
respectively.50 The difference can be attributed to observations with negative takeover 
premiums being excluded from their samples.  
                                                 
50
 The sample o f Abhyankar et al. (2005) constitute 305 observations during the 1985-2000 period; 
while a sample of 396 observations from 1985 to 2004 is used in the study of Antoniou et al. (2008). 
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Column 3 of Table 4.1 shows that the average value of targets‘ announcement 
returns is 14.9%. Compared with the average gains that bidders can capture from 
takeovers, the announcement effect is considerably larger for target firms. 51  In 
addition, the magnitude of targets announcement returns varies across the sample, 
depending on the mode of payment. More specifically, targets acquired by cash 
bidders capture higher returns than their counterparts. This can be the result of the 
high premium (28.873%) received by target firms in cash deals. 52  
Table 4.2 presents annual data on investor sentiment, targets‘ gains and takeover 
premium. Column 2 shows that the mean of targets‘ gains on an annual basis ranges 
from a minimum of 6.653% in 1994 to a maximum of 22.827% in 1997. Column 3 
illustrates that the mean of annual premium varies from a minimum of 9.229% in 
1992 to a maximum of 39.032% in 1997. As shown in column 4, movements in 
investor sentiment exhibit a similar pattern to variations in targets‘ gains and takeover 
premium. Targets‘ gains and takeover premium fluctuate during the sample period, 
peaking in the late 1990s when investor sentiment is relatively high.   
Variations in prevailing sentiment and premium are pictured in Figure 4.1, where 
these two factors tend to move together. It is evident from the charts that a general 
recovery (early 1990s)-booming (late 1990s)-decline (2000-2003) cycle is presented 
                                                 
51
 A similar comparison is reported by Martynova and Renneboog (2006). In their study, bidders‘ 
cumulat ive abnormal returns are 0.39% on average, corresponding  to an average value of 15.82% for 
targets. 
52
 As discussed in the last subsection, this effect of cash deals is attributable to the tax, on capital gains, 
incurred from receiv ing cash payment. In this case, bidders need to offer high premiums to offset the 
tax burdens of target firms (Wansley et al., 1983; Moeller, 2005).  
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in both cases, although some inconsistencies exist. This co-movement, as well as the 
annual data of investor sentiment and takeover premium reported in Table 4.2, lends 
preliminary support to Hypothesis (2) that, prevailing investor sentiment drives 
takeover premium in the same direction as this sentiment.  
4.3.5 Measurement of Investor Sentiment 
Like any key concepts in behavioural finance, a major concern o f financial 
scholars has been identifying an ideal proxy which can exemplify abstract conceptions. 
The same is the case with regard to investor sentiment. Both survey- and theory-based 
measurements have been introduced.  
Direct survey measures rely less on the financial theory, while seek to identify 
proxies from direct survey questions. The flexibility in designing questionnaires 
determines that there is no universal standard in this survey-based measurement. 
‗Consumer confidence index‘ is among the most commonly used survey-based 
measurement. It is built on the assumption that investors are likely to be bullish about 
the economy when they are bullish about the stock market and vice-versa (Delong et  
al., 1990). In addition to this ‗consumer confidence index‘, different survey indexes 
have been proposed as experimental attempts towards examining investor sentiment, 
for example ‗happiness index‘, ‗UBS/Gallup index of investor optimism‘ and ‗TSE 
oil&gas index‘(e.g., Qiu and Welch, 2006, Derrien and Kecskes, 2007). A common, 
and probably the biggest, drawback shared by all survey-based proxies is the noise 
included in these measures due to the human factor involved in conducting surveys.  
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Theory-based measurements, on the other hand, are free from this noise and a re 
based on investor sentiment theory and financial indicators. Zweig (1973) suggests 
that mutual fund discount might reflect the expectation of individual investors. 
Developed upon this, Lee et al. (1991) introduce the ‗closed end fund discount‘ as a 
sentiment proxy. The use of this measurement is based on the assumption that a closed 
end fund discount is required to attract retail investors. If investor sentiment is low, 
then a high discount is needed to entice these less-motivated investors. On the other 
hand, offering such a high discount becomes unnecessary when investors are already 
highly-motivated. Therefore, a high closed-end fund discount should reflect a low 
retail investor sentiment. Since it was introduced, this proxy has become one of the 
most widely used measures for investor sentiment (e.g., Swaminathan, 1996; Neal and 
Wheatley, 1998). Other proxies have also been suggested, one of which is ‗bull-bear 
spread‘. It is a common measurement of sentiment in the financial and business press 
(Brown and Cliff, 2005). However, the use of these theory-based measures is not 
indisputable, as they do not correlate well with the survey-based ones, and fail to 
explain the abnormal returns of small firms (Qiu and Welch, 2006).  
As previously mentioned, no matter whether the proxy is directly survey-based or 
indirectly theory-based, none of them are definitive. Therefore, this deficiency reveals 
an area for the development of a more comprehensive measurement. Accordingly, 
Baker and Wurgler (2006) form a composite sentiment indicator, which consists of six 
common proxies for sentiment, including the closed-end fund discount, NYSE share 
turnover, the number and the average first-day returns of IPOs, the equity share in new 
issues, and the dividend premium. This Baker and Wurgler (2006) index extracts the 
common variation of several suggested sentiment proxies and lines up perfectly with 
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anecdotal evidence in the US stock market. Since its development, this index has been 
directly cited and intensively used in subsequent research (e.g., Derrien and Kecskes, 
2007; Zhu et al., 2008; Mian and Sankaraguruswamy, 2007).  
Following Baker and Wurgler (2006), a monthly sentiment indicator is 
constructed in this study to directly capture the prevailing sentiment around takeover 
announcements. Each takeover observation is then associated with a sentiment 
indicator in that announcement month. This indicator is based on a number of series 
hypothesized to represent investor sentiment, namely, investment trust discount, FTSE 
turnover, the number of IPOs and consumer confidence index. 53  The rationale 
underlying the incorporation of investment trust discount and consumer confidence 
index has been previously discussed. FTSE turnover is included, as optimistic 
sentiment shown by investors promotes stock market participation and in turn 
increases stock market liquidity. Hence, this high sentiment can be represented by a 
high stock market turnover (Baker and Stein, 2004). In addition, given the 
sensitiveness of IPO activities to sentiment (Baker and Wurgler, 2006), the number of 
IPOs is incorporated as another component.  
The investment trust discount (ITD) is the monthly weighted average difference 
between the net asset value of investment trust shares and their market prices. FTSE 
                                                 
53
 Compared with the sentiment index of Baker and Wurgler (2006), three index components , including 
IPO first day return, the equity share in new issue and dividend premium, are excluded from the 
monthly indictor due to data availab ility. Moreover, consumer confidence index is included as a new 
component of this indicator. This is because, as discussed above, direct survey-based measurements 
capture investor sentiment in a different manner and have some advantages over the theory -based 
proxies. 
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turnover (TURN) is based on the total number of its constituent shares traded on the 
exchange. Since turnover presents an upward trend during the sample period, the 
natural log of the raw trade volume is then detrended by removing the 5-year moving 
average to generate TURN. Consumer confidence index (CCI) is the difference 
between the confidence index of a month and the average confidence index over the 
sample period. Similarly, the number of IPOs (NIPO) is the difference between the 
IPO volume of a month and the average IPO volume over the sample period 
In order to identify patterns in these sentiment measures and express them in 
such a way which highlights their similarities, principal component analysis is used to 
reduce data dimensionally with minimum information loss. Following Barker and 
Wurgler (2006), both current month sentiment proxies and their lags are included in 
constructing the indicator, as variables may take different time to reflect a given shift 
in sentiment. Having identified the financial rationale underlying the use of first 
principle component analysis, these proxies are then tested against the statistical 
requirements of principal component analysis to examine whether such a analysis is 
applicable in this case. The test results show that the sampling adequacy is more than 
0.50 for all of the 8 variables and the Bartlett test of sphericity is significant. Therefore, 
the first principal component analysis can be used to construct a sentiment indicator.  
A primitive sentiment indicator is obtained by estimating the first principal 
component of the four proxies and their lags. A correlation analysis is then executed to 
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extract each proxy‘s lead or lag, whichever has higher correlation with the primitive 
sentiment indicator.54 The sentiment indicator (SENTIMENT) is then calculated as 
the first principal component of the four selected variables, which is expressed as: 
SENTIMENTt = −0.446ITDt-1+0.064TURNt−1+0.527NIPOt + 0.337CCI t−1  (4.1) 
In equation (4.1), each of the components has been standardized to generate an 
indicator that has unit variance. The first principal component has an eigenvalue of 
1.683 and a communality of 42.07%, which means that it explains 42.07% of the 
sample variance and can present the common patterns of variables well. 55 
Moreover, each individual proxy enters the constructed indicator with the 
expected sign (with a negative coefficient of -0.446 for investment trust discount and 
positive coefficients for others).56 In addition, the lead- lag relationships of these four 
proxies support the assumption of Baker and Wurgler (2006). They predict that 
proxies, involving firm supply responses, lag behind proxies based directly on 
investor demand or investor behavior. This prediction is consistent with the 
constructed sentiment indicator in which price and investor behavior variables (ITD, 
TURN, CCI) lead firm supply variables (NIPO).   
                                                 
54
 In estimat ing the first principal component, all 4 proxies are kept, because the following 
requirements of keeping variables are satisfied: i) the derived components have communality greater 
than 0.5; and ii) none of the variables have loadings of 0.4 or higher fo r more than one component.  
55
 An adjusted sentiment indicator is constructed by Baker and Wurgler (2006), which removes 
business cycle variat ion from each of the proxies prior to the principal components analysis, in order to  
distinguish between a common sentiment component and a common business cycle component. 
However, the results based on this adjusted sentiment indicator show that ―orthogonalizing to macro  
variables is a second-order issue; it does not qualitatively affect any component of the index or the 
overall index‖ (p.1658). Therefore, a raw instead of adjusted sentient indicator is used in this study. 
56
 For discussion on the relations between these proxies and investor sentiment, see pp. 127-129. 
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Table 4.3 summaries the constructed sentiment indicator and its constituents; 
Figure 4.2 plots the constructed monthly sentiment over the sample period. As shown 
in Table 4.3, the sentiment indicator is highly correlated to its four constituents, with 
the prevailing number of IPO per month as the denominating factor in determining 
monthly sentiment. In addition, consistent with expectations, TURN, NIPO and CCI 
are positively associated with sentiment levels, and ITD is negatively related. In 
general, these correlation coefficients show that the constructed indicator through first 
principle components analysis does not arbitrarily elevate individual proxies. Instead,  
it extracts the common movements and irons out idiosyncratic variations.  
4.3.6 Measurement of Takeover Premium 
Commercial mergers and acquisitions databases, for example SDC, measure 
acquisition premium as the percentage difference between the offer price per share 
paid to a target and the target‘s share price prior to the announcement. This approach 
is also generally accepted in academic studies (e.g., Varaiya, 1986; Varaiya and Ferris, 
1987; Barclay and Warner, 1993; Gondhalekar et al., 2004).   
However, a debate has been surrounding this widely accepted practice. As 
suggested by Nielsen and Melicher (1973), one of the problems in measuring 
premium is the selection of an appropriate time period in which to measure the merger 
premium. This selection should aim to choose a time period which is sufficiently far 
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from a firm‘s formal announcement date, so that news leaked pre-announcement do 
not unduly affect the firm‘s stock price. On the other hand, the time period has to be 
close enough to the announcement date, so that the firm‘s market prices can directly 
reflect the information released.  
The time period, which has been used in literature, varies from one week to three 
months prior to the announcement day. The 1-week premium (e.g., Moeller, 2005), is 
likely to incorporate the signalling effects of takeover announcements, since Schwert 
(1996) reports that the price run-up associated with a takeover occurs earlier than 30 
days prior to the announcement. While, the 3 months premium (e.g., Nielsen and 
Melicher, 1973) may bear the influences of other micro- or macro-economic factors 
on a target‘s share price which are irrelevant to the effects of the takeover itself.  
Therefore, following Dodd (1980), Asquith (1983) and Abhyankar et al. (2008), 
in this research, premium is calculated as: 
Takeover Premium=100× (Offer Price-P4w) / P4w                      (4.2) 
In Equation (4.2), P4w is a target‘s share price 4 weeks before the takeover 
announcement date. 
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4.4 Empirical Results 
4.4.1 Impacts of Aggregate Investor Sentiment on Targets’ Announcement 
Returns and Takeover Premium 
The empirical results analysis starts by testing the first hypothesis which 
examines the relevance of aggregate investor sentiment to targets‘ announcement 
returns. 
 Based on the monthly sentiment indictor, each bid is related to a prevailing 
sentiment measurement. Following this process, there are 177 (971) transactions, out 
of the sample of 1148 takeover observations, announced during negative (positive) 
sentiment months. In order to control the negative value, monthly investor sentiment 
indicators during the period 1987-2007 are sorted into 5 groups (highest to lowest) 
according to the value of these sentiment indicators. Each observation is then 
associated with its current month sentiment classification, which leaves the bottom 
sentiment group with 174 observations.  
Targets‘ announcement returns over a 3-day and 5-day event window, conditional 
on prevailing investor sentiment, are presented in Table 4.4. As shown in the table, 
targets‘ announcement returns on the whole increase with investor sentiment 
regardless of the length of the event window, although this increase is 
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non-monotonic. 57  Targets‘ 3-day announcement returns generated by the highest 
sentiment group (group 5) are 3.523% higher than those in the lowest sentiment group 
(group1); the difference in mean is significant at 5%. Similar results are shown by a 
difference of means test on targets‘ 5-day announcement returns, where the difference 
between the highest and lowest sentiment groups is 4.218% and is statistically 
significant.   
The outperformance, of targets‘ announcement returns during high prevailing 
sentiment periods, suggests that investor sentiment influences the way in which the 
stock market responses to takeover announcements. This lends support to Hypothesis 
(1), which predicts that prevailing investor sentiment influences targets‘ 
announcement returns in the same direction as the sentiment. In addition, the findings 
are generally in line with the widely documented prediction that excessive demands 
from optimistic investors during high sentiment periods bid up the prevailing stock 
prices (e.g., Brown and Cliff, 2005; Kumar and Lee, 2005; Baker and Wurgler, 2006 
& 2007; Lemmon and Portniaguina, 2006; Qiu and Welch, 2006).  
Moreover, this sentiment- laden announcement return is consistent with the 
research of Mian and Sankaraguruswamy (2007) who examine the influences of 
investor sentiment on announcement returns around some other corporate events, 
including earning announcements, stock splits and dividend payouts. This consistency 
                                                 
57 An increase in target announcement returns can be seen from the lowest sentiment group to the highest 
sentiment group with the exception being Groups 2 and 3, where a dramatic increase shown by Group 2 is followed 
by an increase in Group 3. 
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suggests that, similar to the findings on other corporate events, takeover 
announcements give rise to active trading made by sentiment- laden investors. Hence, 
a significant amount of sentiment-driven mispricing is expected with the arrival of 
new information. Furthermore, this mispricing is upward when the prevailing 
sentiment is high. 
Having examined the effects of aggregate investor sentiment on targets‘ gains, 
the second hypothesis which predicts the influence of aggregate investor sentiment on 
takeover premium is then tested. Table 4.4 shows takeover premiums conditional on 
prevailing investor sentiment. Although there is no monotonic increase in premium as 
sentiment increases, the difference in premium between lowest and highest sentiment 
groups is significant. On average, bidders pay a premium of 28.355% when the 
prevailing investor sentiment is among the top group (Group5). This is 10.5% more 
than the premium paid during low sentiment months (Group1), and the difference is 
significant at 1%.58 These findings support Hypothesis (2) that prevailing investor 
sentiment exerts an influence on takeover premium.  
This driving force of investor sentiment on takeover premium and targets‘ gains 
can be explained by investors‘ evaluation around the takeover announcement period.   
                                                 
58
 These effects of prevailing sentiment on takeover premium are inconsistent with the empirical results 
of Zhu et al. (2008) concerning the US market. They report that it is begin-of-period sentiment, rather 
than prevailing sentiment, that is positively related with premium paid. This inconsistency can be 
attributable to the different measurements of premium. In their study the difference in market to book 
value between bidders and targets are employed to measure takeover premium;  while the widely  
accepted percentage difference between  offer price and the target‘s share price is used to calculate 
premium in this research (as in equation (4.2)). 
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Takeover announcements release new information to the market. Acting upon the 
arrival of new information, investors valuate acquired firms‘ stocks and make buy/sell 
decisions. During high sentiment periods, sentiment- laden investors trade heavily 
around newly released information and their evaluation process is impeded by 
pricing-errors which are influenced by their sentiment. The high trading volume and 
the mispricing further bid up the share price of target firms. These bidded-up share 
prices, in turn, require high takeover premiums.  
4.4.2 Cross-Sectional Variation in the Role of Investor Sentiment  
As previously mentioned, the prevailing sentiment at an aggregate market level 
can significantly influence the way in which investors respond to new information and 
update their beliefs. Specifically, targets‘ announcement returns and in turn premiums 
paid are positively related to the sentiment level around takeover announcement 
periods. However, the documented cross-sectional variations in sentiment (Baker and 
Wurgler, 2006 & 2007) give rise to the possibility that investors may respond to new 
information, and further update their beliefs, about different target firms in a different 
manner.  
4.4.2.1 Impacts of Cross-sectional Investor Sentiment on Targets’ Announcement 
Returns  
The examination of the relevance of cross-sectional sentiment to corporate 
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takeovers starts with testing the third hypothesis which predicts that more speculative 
targets are more vulnerable to the effects of sentiment on announcement returns. 
Results from this test are contained in this subsection. Table 4.5 compares differences 
in both takeover premium and targets‘ short-run returns when investor sentiment is 
conditional on firm speculative characteristics. Targets are grouped into high (low) 
speculation category if the value of their speculativeness proxies, including SIZE, 
AGE, EPS, DPS, PPE/TA, GS and SIGMA, are among the top (bottom) one thirds of 
the entire sample, and the rest of them are classified into the neutral group. 59  
The first three columns in Table 4.5 examine cross-sectional variations in the 
value effects of sentiment, where targets‘ 5-day announcement returns, generated by 
the top and bottom sentiment groups (Groups 5 and 1), are compared at each firm 
speculativeness level. Similar to the findings discussed in section 4.5.1, targets by and 
large capture higher announcement returns when takeovers are announced during a 
high prevailing sentiment period than those during a low prevailing sentiment period. 
The outperformance of target announcement returns during a high sentiment period is 
likely to be driven by low Sigma, high AGE, high SIZE and high PPE/TA targets.    
However, the difference in targets‘ 5-day announcement returns, between the 
highest and lowest sentiment groups, is not significant for low AGE, low SIZE, low 
                                                 
59
 For EPS and DPS, another classification is applied following Baker and Wurgler (2006), where 
positive (negative) EPS and DPS are included into the high (low) speculation groups, to differentiate 
profitable and div idends paying firms from non-profitable and non-dividends paying firms. The 
relevant univariate results are presented in the robustness test section.    
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EPS, low DPS, low PPE/TA and high SIGMA targets. These firm characteristics, 
including young age, small size, low profitability, few dividends, low tangibility and 
high return volatility, are expected to characterise speculative firms (Baker and 
Wurgler, 2006 & 2007; Mian and Sankaraguruswamy, 2007). Accordingly, these 
findings show that gains to target firms, with speculative stocks, are not more 
sensitive to shifts in investor sentiment, which does not support Hypothesis (3).  
Moreover, the results on cross-sectional variations in the value effects of 
sentiment are not consistent with the findings of Mian and Sankaraguruswamy (2007). 
They document that the stock price sensitivity to corporate news (positive earnings 
announcements, increases in dividend payout and stock splits) is greater during high 
sentiment periods and this relation is especially pronounced for small, young, volatile, 
non-dividend paying or distressed stocks. Since these stocks are regarded as 
speculative stocks, their results therefore suggest that, in the presence of investor 
sentiment, the announcement effects of corporate events are more evident for 
speculative firms. 
The inconsistency with literature can be attributable to large institutional 
holdings in the UK market, compared with the US market. Cross-sectional variations 
of investor sentiment rest on the premise that a speculative demand, combined with 
limits on arbitrage speculative stock, generates the mispricing of speculative stocks 
(Baker and Wurgler, 2006). As noise trading risk and implementation costs are 
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expected to be lower for high institution holdings (Phalippou, 2005), the concentrated 
institutional presence in UK market therefore enables effective arbitrage (Alexandridis 
et al., 2006). Consequently, if speculative targets have high institutional holdings that 
present strong arbitrages forces, then the mispricing influenced by investor speculative 
demands will not be persistent. Hence, speculative targets are not more vulnerable to 
the influence of sentiment on announcement-period returns.  
In addition, in the takeover context, announcement returns are primarily driven 
by takeover bids rather than general market conditions, as in some other asset pricing 
studies. Investors do not evaluate speculative targets more, even if the prevailing 
sentiment is high. Taking over speculative targets is a risky project, regardless of the 
prevailing sentiment. Therefore, fluctuations in investor sentiment do not cause more 
sensitive stock response to speculative target firms.  
4.4.2.2 Impacts of Cross-sectional Investor Sentiment on Takeover Premium  
Having examined the effects of cross-sectional investor sentiment on targets‘ 
announcement returns, the fourth hypotheses is then tested in this subsection which 
suggests that the impacts of sentiment on takeover premium are more pronounced  
for more speculative targets. The last three columns in Table 4.5 examine the 
cross-sectional variations in the relevance of sentiment to takeover premium, where 
premium in the highest and lowest sentiment groups (Groups 5 and 1) are compared at 
Chapter 4                                      Investor Sentiment, Targets‘ Gains and Takeover Premium  
140 
each firm speculativeness level. As shown in the table, acquiring firms generally pay 
higher premiums if the mergers are announced during high sentiment periods then 
those announced during low sentiment periods.  
However, this driving force of sentiment on takeover premium cannot be 
generalizable for the entire sample. Specifically, for some of the more speculative 
targets (low AGE, low PPE/TA and high SIGMA firms), the difference in premium 
between the lowest and highest sentiment groups is not significant. On the other hand, 
the premium required by less speculative targets (high AGE, high EPS, high DPS, 
high PPE/TA and low SIGMA firms) are significantly higher during high sentiment 
months than those during low sentiment months. These results suggest that premiums 
paid to more speculative targets are not more sensitive to shifts in investor sentime nt, 
which is inconsistent with Hypothesis (4). A lack of such sensitiveness is likely to be 
the consequence of the insignificant difference in speculative targets‘ gains between a 
high and low sentiment period. More specifically, there is no sentiment driven 
over-pricing (under-pricing) to push up (pull down) the premium required by more 
speculative targets.  
Moreover, bidders regard more speculative firms as risky targets. Given an 
available pool of potential target firms, they would not pay more for those associated 
with greater uncertainty and risk, even if the transaction is announced during a high 
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sentiment period.60 On the other hand, a target‘s information uncertainty reduces the 
pool of potential buyers due to related information costs in obtaining the firm‘s 
information. This further weakens the target‘s bargaining power in obtaining a high 
premium (Mantecon, 2008).61 Therefore, even a high sentiment rarely drives up the 
premium required by speculative targets because of the loss of their bargaining power 
in the battle for corporate control.  
4.4.3 Cross-sectional Regression Analysis  
Results from the above discussed univariate tests show that investor sentiment, at 
an aggregate market level, exerts an influence on targets‘ gains, and thus takeover 
premium, in the same direction as this sentiment. The sentiment effects further show 
cross-sectional differences. Specifically, more speculative target firms are less 
vulnerable to these sentiment effects. The validity of these results is examined by 
cross-sectional regression analyses in this subsection.   
In order to examine the relevance of aggregate and cross-sectional sentiment to 
targets‘ announcement returns (Hypotheses (1) and (3)), the following cross-section 
                                                 
60
 This rationale further suggests that managers of acquiring firms rat ionally valuate their target firms 
and discreetly decide the takeover premiums that will be paid to these targets. Thus, managerialis m 
motives (Black, 1989) are not the driving force in  this evaluation and decision process. Therefore, 
managers do not knowingly overpay for their acquired firms, which answers the s econd research 
question. 
61
 In addition to the effects of informat ion costs in lowering takeover premium, Mantecon (2008) also 
suggests that if a firm is surrounded by high levels of uncertainty, then it will expect high capital costs 
and severe adverse selection problems. This will limit  its access to external financing and its 
opportunity of operating as a stand alone entity. Once this firm becomes a target in the market for 
corporate control, these disadvantages have detrimental effects on its barging power.    
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regression is estimated: 
Ri-Rm =α+β1SENTIMENTt+β2ControlVariableit                              (4.3) 
In equation (4.3), the regressand is the targets‘ 5-day accumulative abnormal 
returns based on a market-adjusted model. SENTIMENT is a dummy variable for 
prevailing sentiment, which takes the value of 1 (0), if the monthly sentiment indictor 
falls into the top (bottom) 20% of the sample period. ControlVariable includes some 
factors which are suggested to be related with targets‘ short-run returns, including 
Multiple Bidder Dummy, targets‘ debt to equity ratio (DE), targets‘ free cash flow per 
share (FCF), targets‘ market to book value (MTBV), targets‘ market value (MV), 
Transaction Attitude Dummy, Cash Dummy, Listed Bidder Dummy. 62 
In this regression, β1 picks up the value effects of market level investor sentiment. 
If β1 is not significantly different from 0, then sentiment has no valuation effects; if β1 
is significantly positive, then investor sentiment influences targets‘ announcement 
returns in the same direction as the sentiment as expected by Hypothesis (1). When 
this regression is applied to subsamples of targets sorted on their speculative 
characteristics, β1 can capture the influence of cross-sectional variations in investor 
sentiment. More specifically, the estimated β1 for a subsample of more speculative 
targets is compared with the estimated β1 for a subsample of less speculative targets. If 
the explanatory power of investor sentiment (β1) is indifferent between these two 
subsamples, then the valuation effects of sentiment does not present cross-sectional 
                                                 
62
 For a discussion on the rationale of using these control variab les, see section 4.3.3.  
Chapter 4                                      Investor Sentiment, Targets‘ Gains and Takeover Premium  
143 
variations. On the other hand, if β1 has higher explanatory power for speculative 
targets, then the announcement returns of speculative targets are more vulnerable to 
sentiment, as expected by Hypothesis (3).    
The estimation begins by estimating the regression model (Equation (4.3)) for the 
entire sample to test Hypothesis (1). Column 1 of Table 4.6 reports a significantly 
positive coefficient of 0.042 for SENTIEMNT after factors, which have a potential 
influence on targets‘ announcement returns, have been controlled. This positive 
relation suggests that the integrated market- level sentiment influences the response of 
stock market towards a takeover announcement in the same direction as this sentiment. 
Therefore, Hypothesis (1) is supported.63  
Further, equation (4.3) is then estimated separately for sub-samples, of targets 
sorted by their speculative characteristics, to test Hypothesis (3). This hypothesis 
examines the cross-sectional variations in the valuation effects of investor sentiment.  
The coefficient estimation of sentiment (β1) for each sub-sample is presented in 
column 1 Table 4.7. The most striking feature of column 1 is that most of the 
sentiment coefficients are statically insignificant in subsamples of targets falling into 
the low value group, with the only exception being low SIGMA. On the other hand, 
                                                 
63
 In addit ion to the findings on investor sentiment, estimated coefficients of most control variables are 
significant and generally consistent with findings in existing literature (Bauguess et al., 2007). Mult iple 
bidders, small target size, cash payment, hostile offers and listed bidders are all significantly positively 
related to targets‘ announcement returns.  
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the high value subsamples, for example high AGE, high SIZE and high PPE/TA firms, 
generally have a significant sentiment coefficient. This difference reveals that more 
speculative targets, classified into the low AGE, low SIZE, low EPS, low DPS and 
high SIGMA subgroups, are not more susceptive to shifts in investor sentiment around 
takeover announcement periods, which does not supports Hypothesis (3).    
In summary, results from the cross-sectional regression analyses are consistent 
with the findings based on univariate tests. When sentiment is high at an aggregate 
market level, targets on the whole capture high announcement returns. Significant 
bidders‘ gains during these high sentiment months are the result of both sentiment 
driven- mispricing and intensive trading volume around takeover announcement 
periods. More specifically, during a high sentiment period, sentiment-laden investors 
trade heavily around newly released information and their evaluation of a target firm‘s 
asset is impeded by their sentiment involved. These sentiment influenced mispricing 
and intensive trading volume can bid up targets‘ announcement returns.  
Furthermore, the value effects of sentiment around takeover announcements vary 
across acquired firms. However, contrary to the prediction that more speculative stock 
is more vulnerable to investor sentiment (as in the study of Baker and Wurgler, 2006 
and Mian and Sankaraguruswamy, 2007), this sentiment influenced mispricing is not 
evident for more speculative targets. This inconsistency can be explained by large 
institutional holdings in the UK market, which enable effective arbitrage 
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(Alexandridis et al., 2006). Since it is the speculative demand combined with the 
limits on arbitrage speculative stock that generates mispricing on speculative stocks 
(Baker and Wurgler, 2006), this mispricing is not persistent where speculative targets 
have high institutional holdings. Additionally, announcement returns are primarily 
driven by takeover bids rather than general market condition. Taking over speculative 
targets is regarded as a risky project, regardless of the prevailing sentiment. Therefore, 
investors do not evaluate speculative targets more, even if the prevailing sentiment is 
high. Consequently, fluctuations in sentiment do not cause more sensitive stock 
response to speculative target firms.  
Having discussed the relevance of aggregate and cross-sectional sentiment to 
targets‘ announcement returns (Hypotheses (1) and (3)), the predicted effects of 
investor sentiment on takeover premium (Hypotheses (2) and (4)) is then examined. 
This analysis follows a process similar to what has been previously used in this 
subsection, which is based on estimating the following cross-section regression 
equation: 
Premium=α+β1SENTIMENTt+β2ControlVariableit                              (4.4) 
In equation (4.4), the regressand is the takeover premium calculated by equation 
(4.2). SENTIMENT and ControlVariable are identical to those in equation (4.3). In 
this regression, β1 picks up the effects of market level sentiment on takeover premium. 
If β1 is not significantly different from 0, then sentiment is irrelevant to takeover 
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premium; while if β1 is significantly positive, then investor sentiment influences 
premium in the same direction as this sentiment, as expected by Hypothesis (2). 
Comparing the estimated β1s in different subsamples, of targets sorted by their 
speculativeness, can capture cross-sectional variations in the sentiment-driven 
premium. If the explanatory power of investor sentiment (β1) is indifferent across 
subsamples, then there is no cross-sectional variation in the sentiment-driven premium. 
On the other hand, if β1 has higher explanatory power for speculative targets, then 
premiums paid to more speculative targets are more vulnerable to sentiment, as 
expected by Hypothesis (4).   
In order to test Hypothesis (2), the regression model (Equation (4.4)) is estimated 
for the entire sample. As reported in column 2 of Table 4.6, SENTIEMNT has a 
positive coefficient of 9.335 after other suggested premium determinants have been 
controlled. This positive relation suggests that a high aggregate market- level sentiment 
can push up the premiums paid by bidders in acquiring target firms. This supports 
Hypothesis (2).   
It is also important to note that the estimated coefficients of control variable MV 
is -0.001, presenting a significantly negative relation between premiums paid and 
target size. This negative coefficient suggests the importance of economic gains from 
takeovers in deciding how much to pay for a target. More specifically, since a small 
target size tends to suggest a high likelihood of a successful integration after a 
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takeover, acquirers focusing on strategic fit would likely offer relatively high premium 
to small targets (Gondhalekar et al., 2004). This evidence suggests that the decisions 
to merge are not flooded with private managerial gains. Instead, managers from 
acquiring firms may rationally valuate their investment and forecast future operations.   
Further, equation (4.4) is then estimated separately for sub-samples, of targets 
sorted by their speculative characteristics, to test Hypothesis (4). This hypothesis 
examines the influence of cross-sectional sentiment on takeover premium. The 
coefficient estimations of sentiment (β1) are presented in column 2 of Table 4.7. As 
shown, less speculative subsamples are dominated by significant sentiment 
coefficients. More speculative subsamples, on the other hand, are not significantly 
sensitive to fluctuations in sentiment, when a firm‘s speculativeness is measured by 
high SIGMA, low AGE, low DPS and low EPS. Therefore, Hypothesis (4)  does not 
stand. 
In summary, these results from the cross-sectional regression analyses suggest 
that high market level sentiment has the potential of driving up takeover premiums as 
predicted by Hypothesis (2). This effect may take place through the over-pricing of 
target firms, which is under the influence of sentiment. Specifically, a high sentiment 
is likely to give rise to upward pricing errors and intensive trading volume around 
takeover announcement periods, which further bid up target firms‘ share prices. Given 
the bidded up share prices, high takeover premiums are therefore required by these 
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target firms. 
However, contrary to Hypothesis (4), more speculative targets are not exposed to 
more sentiment effects. The lack of such sensitiveness in the takeover premium paid 
to speculative targets can be the consequence of the absence of sentiment-driven 
over-pricing (under-pricing) that pushes up (pulls down) the premium required by 
more speculative targets. Moreover, bidders regard more speculative firms as risky 
targets. Given an available pool of potential target firms, more would not being paid 
for those associated with greater uncertainties and risks, even if the transaction were 
announced during a high sentiment period. On the other hand, a target‘s information 
uncertainty reduces the pool of potential buyers due to the related information costs; 
this further weakens the target‘s bargaining power in obtaining a high premium 
(Mantecon, 2008). Given this loss of bargaining power, even a high sentiment rarely 
drives up the premiums required by speculative targets.  
4.4.4 Robustness Tests 
Results from both univariate tests and cross-sectional regression analyses show 
that high investor sentiment, at an aggregate market level, drives up targets‘ gains and 
hence takeover premium. This is supporting evidence for Hypotheses (1) and (2). 
When the sample is partitioned into subsamples according to the speculativeness 
shown by target firms, these effects of sentiment become less evident for more 
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speculative targets. These findings do not support Hypotheses (3) and (4), and are 
inconsistent with the studies of Baker and Wurgler (2006 & 2007) and Mian and 
Sankaraguruswamy (2007) where stock performance of speculative firms is more 
vulnerable to shifts in investor sentiment. This inconsistency with extant literature, 
existing in the cross-sectional effects of investor sentiment, is re-examined with the 
robustness tests in this section. In these tests, different speculativeness classification 
and cross-sectional regression analysis are used.  
In the previous analyses, speculative targets are firms which fall into the bottom 
1/3 of total observations sorted by their EPS or DPS. However, if it is whether or not 
dividends are paid rather than the amount of dividend payouts that determines the 
speculativeness of a firm (Baker and Wurgler, 2006; Mian and Sankaraguruswamy, 
2007), then more speculative targets should be represented by non-dividend paying 
firms instead of companies whose dividend payout is among the bottom one third of 
all targets. Similarly, non-profitable firms should correspond to more speculative 
targets rather than those whose EPS fall into the bottom one third.   
Table 4.8 reports the effects of investor sentiment on targets‘ announcement 
returns and takeover premium which are conditional on whether a target is a 
dividend-paying or profitable firm. As shown in the table, when dividend paying or 
profitable targets are acquired, high investor sentiment significantly drives up these 
firms‘ announcement returns and in turn the premium required. However, there is no 
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such effect for speculative, i.e. non- dividend-paying and unprofitable, targets.  
Moreover, in section 4.5.4, cross-sectional regressions (equation (4.3) and (4.4)) 
are applied to subsamples with different levels of speculativeness. Accordingly, the 
effects of cross-sectional investor sentiment are examined. For robustness test reasons, 
a different methodology is employed. More specifically, an interacting term between 
market level sentiment and firm‘s speculativeness is included as in the following 
regression equations:  
Ri-Rm=α+β1SENTIt×Speculative+β2SENTIt×NonSpeculative +β3CVit        (4.5) 
Premium=α+β1SENTIt×Speculative+β2SENTIt×NonSpeculative +β3CVit    (4.6) 
In equations (3.5) and (3.6), CV is a vector of control variables and SENTI is 
investor sentiment. Both of them, as well as the regressants, are identical to those in 
previous analyses (see section 4.4.3). The Speculative and NonSpeculative in the 
interaction terms are vectors of dummy variables based on speculativeness proxies 
((non-)dividend-paying and (non-)profitable). The coefficient β1 (β2) of the interacting 
term measures the influence of firm-specific sentiment on speculative 
(non-speculative) targets. More specifically, if β1 (β2) is not significantly different 
from 0, then the effects of investor sentiment have no cross-sectional differences; if β1 
(β2) is non-zero, then the role of sentiment varies across stocks.  
Table 4.9 presents the estimated coefficients of β1 and β2. The interacting term 
between prevailing investor sentiment and less speculative targets has significantly 
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positive effects on both announcement returns and takeover premium, as shown by 
models (2), (4), (6) and (8). On the other hand, as shown by models (1), (3), (5) and 
(7), neither targets‘ announcement returns nor takeover premium are driven by the 
interaction between prevailing investor sentiment and speculative targets.  
These robustness tests report similar findings to those in previous analyses. This 
indicates that the drawn conclusions concerning the cross-sectional effects of investor 
sentiment on targets‘ announcement returns and takeover premium remain unchanged 
after both speculativeness classification and methodology employed have been 
controlled. Announced returns generated by speculative targets are not more 
vulnerable to fluctuations in investor sentiment. Further, this insensitiveness leads to 
unvarying takeover premiums as sentiment level increases.  
4.5 Conclusions 
According to the market efficiency theory (Fama, 1970), stock prices in an 
efficient market should reflect fundamental factors. Fluctuation in a non-fundamental 
factor, for example investor sentiment, should not cause price volatility. Both 
anecdotal evidence and behavioural finance literature, however, present the existence 
of systematic mispricing and thus suggest investor sentiment as an irrational 
exuberance that drives asset prices away from their fundamental values (e.g., Brown 
and Cliff, 2005). The implications of this sentiment influenced-mispricing have 
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previously been applied to research areas such as Initial Public Offerings (Helwege 
and Liang, 2004; Lowry, 2003; Derrien and Kecskes, 2007) and dividend payouts 
(Baker and Wurgler, 2004a & 2004b).  
In the context of mergers and acquisitions, this study examines whether the stock 
market‘s response to takeover announcements is exposed to shifts in investor 
sentiment. Based on a sample of 1148 UK bids announced during the period 
1987-2007, the results from both univariate tests and cross-sectional regression 
analyses suggest that prevailing investor sentiment, in general, influences target firms‘ 
announcement returns in the same direction as the sentiment. More specifically, 
targets‘ cumulative abnormal returns are significantly higher during the highest 
sentiment periods than during the lowest sentiment periods. This effect of prevailing 
sentiment on stock returns is consistent with the finding of Brow and Cliff (2005), 
Lemmon and Portniaguina (2006) and Qiu and Welch (2006).  
Meanwhile, upward sentiment driven mispricing tends to push up premiums 
required, as a co-movement between investor sentiment and takeover premium 
persists during most of the sample period. The position of prevailing sentiment as one 
of the premium determinants is further confirmed by cross-sectional regression 
analyses. The results of these analyses show that takeover premium is significantly 
influenced by the prevailing investor sentiment after the effects of other firm and deal 
characteristics, such as target size, debt ratio, free cash flow, bidder‘s public status, 
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multiple bidders, takeover anticipation, method of payment and deal attitude, have 
been controlled.  
In addition to the analysis on market-wide sentiment, cross-sectional variations in 
the effects of sentiment are also addressed. In doing so, the sensitivities of 
announcement returns and takeover premium to sentiment are attended to at an 
individual- target level. In line with Baker and Wurgler (2007), targets are divided into 
high, neutral and low speculativeness categories according to the value of their 
speculative characteristic proxies, measured by SIZE, AGE, EPS, DPS, PPE/TA, GS, 
MTBV and SIGMA. Stocks falling into the high speculation category are expected to 
be more vulnerable to the effects of shifts in investor sentiment (Baker and Wurgler, 
2006 & 2007; Mian and Sankaraguruswamy, 2007). In this study, however, targets 
with greater speculative stocks are not more sensitive to the effects of investor 
sentiment on announcement returns, as the difference in speculative targets‘ gains 
between high and low sentiment periods is not significant. Similar patterns a re 
presented by empirical results on takeover premium, where the positive effect of high 
sentiment on takeover premium is not more pronounced for speculative targets.  
The inconsistency between this work and existing literature can be attributable to 
large institutional holdings in the UK market compared with the US market. 
Cross-sectional variations in the valuation effects of sentiment rest on the premise that 
a speculative demand, combined with limits on arbitrage speculative stock, generates 
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the mispricing of speculative stocks (Baker and Wurgler, 2006). Since noise trading 
risk and implementation costs are expected to be lower for high institution holdings 
(Phalippou, 2005), the concentrated institutional presence in UK market therefore 
enables effective arbitrage (Alexandridis et al, 2006). Consequently, if speculative 
targets have high institutional holdings, which present strong arbitrage forces, then the 
mispricing driven by investor speculative demands will not be persistent. Hence, the 
value effects of sentiment should not be more evident for speculative targets.  
Additionally, takeover announcement returns should be driven primarily by 
takeover bids rather than general market conditions. Taking over speculative targets is 
regarded as a risky project, regardless of the prevailing sentiment. Investors do not 
evaluate speculative targets more, even if the prevailing sentiment is high. Meanwhile, 
bidders, given an available pool of potential takeover targets, would not pay more for 
those associated with greater uncertainties and risks, even if the transaction were 
announced during a high sentiment period. On the other hand, a target firm‘s 
information uncertainty reduces the pool of potential buyers due to the related 
information costs; this further weakens the target‘s bargaining power in obtaining a 
high premium (Mantecon, 2008). Given this loss of bargaining power, even a high 
sentiment rarely drives up the premium required by speculative targets. Therefore, a 
shift in sentiment does not cause a more sensitive stock response or higher premium to 
be paid to target firms. 
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In general, the aforementioned empirical results suggest that investor sentiment, 
at an aggregate market level, influences the way in which the stock market interprets 
and responds to takeover announcements; namely by influencing the market reaction 
in the same direction as the prevailing sentiment. Takeovers disseminate information 
to the market. Acting upon the newly released information, investors evaluate target 
firms‘ assets and growth opportunities. During a high sentiment period, 
sentiment- laden investors trade heavily around this newly arrived information, and 
their evaluation is likely to be impeded by their sentiment involved. Both the high 
trading volume and the sentiment influenced pricing-errors can bid up the share prices 
of acquired firms. These bidded-up share prices, in turn, require high takeover 
premiums. 
These empirical results, combined with the reported negative relation between a 
target‘s size and takeover premium, 64  suggest that the decision to merge is not 
flooded with private managerial gains. Instead, managers from acquiring firms may 
rationally evaluate their investments and forecast future operations. Hence, it is less 
likely that mangers knowingly overpay in acquiring targets.  
The empirical findings, together with the related theoretical implications, 
complement findings in extant studies on investor sentiment by showing that the 
influence of sentiment on stock returns extends beyond its original setting, within 
asset pricing, to the context of mergers and acquisitions. Both aggregate and 
cross-sectional investor sentiment have a certain bearing on targets‘ announcement 
                                                 
64
 This negative coefficient suggests the importance of economic factors in deciding how much to pay 
for a target. More specifically, since small size tends to suggest a high likelihood of successful 
integration after takeover, acquirers focusing on a strategic fit would likely offer a relatively h igh 
premium to s mall targets (Gondhalekar et al., 2004). 
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returns and takeover premium. Furthermore, the results contribute to the ongoing 
debate concerning the managerialism motives in takeover overpayment. More 
specifically, they add to the understanding of how takeover premium is determined  
with an investor sentiment factor. Therefore, the traditional managerialism 
consideration no longer serves as the main explanation for the overpayment of target 
firms.    
In addition to providing some original insight to existing literature in relation to 
investor sentiment and takeovers, this research also sheds light on the issue of investor 
sentiment by bringing new techniques to this research area. Following Baker and 
Wurgler (2006), a relatively comprehensive investor sentiment indicator, rather than 
other noisy sentiment proxies, is constructed for the UK market for the period of 
1987-2007. The Baker and Wurgler (2006) sentiment index has been extensively used 
by financial economists since it was developed (e.g., Derrien and Kecskes, 2007; Zhu 
et al., 2008; Mian and Sankaraguruswamy, 2007), as it extracts the common variation 
of several suggested sentiment proxies and lines up perfectly with anecdotal evidence 
in the US stock market. However, up until now, to the best of the author‘s knowledge, 
no such sentiment index had been available for the UK market. Therefore, the 
constructed sentiment indicator can assist further research on UK investor sentiment.  
Besides financial economists, who are engaged in the research area of investor 
sentiment, companies in the takeover market form the second group of beneficiaries of 
this research. The results on cross-sectional investor sentiment show that target firms, 
surrounded by great information uncertainty, rarely capture any upward 
sentiment- influenced premiums or short-run abnormal returns. Accordingly, managers 
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from these firms should increase the information transparency of their firms, for 
example, by expanding their firms‘ market presence. This improved transparency can 
yield some sentiment-driven economic gains to these target firms.  
Following on from this conclusion which regards the value effects of investor 
sentiment in interpreting takeover announcements, as well as the conclusion of the 
previous chapter regarding the value effects of information contents signalled by 
takeover announcements under misvaluation, the opposite end of the information 
dissemination process via takeover announcements (i.e., information senders) also 
needs to be considered. This will enable a better and all around understanding of the 
relevance of information environment to takeover gains. Therefore, a focus will be 
given to information sender (information asymmetry surrounding acquiring firms) in 
the next empirical chapter. Addressing information asymmetry is also a natural 
development upon the empirical finings, on the value effects of misvaluation, from 
chapter 3. This misvaluation can be associated with many factors, for example 
investor sentiment and information asymmetry. The influence of investor sentiment on 
takeover gains has been examined in this chapter; the effects of information 
asymmetry will be researched in chapter 5.  
Chapter 4                                      Investor Sentiment, Targets‘ Gains and Takeover Premium  
158 
 
Figure 4.1. Takeover premium and Investor Sentiment 
 
This graph illustrates acquisition activity and investor sentiment during the 1987-2007 sample 
periods. Mean values of premium and SENTIMENT on an annual basis are plotted. The sentiment 
is calculated as: 
SENTIMENTt = −0.446ITDt-1 + 0.064TURNt−1 + 0.527NIPOt + 0.337CCI t−1              (4.1) 
The premium is measured as: 
Premium=100×(offer price –P4w) / P4w                                                                   (4.2) 
where P4w is target share price 4 weeks prior to the announcement date. 
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Figure 4.2. Sentiment Indicator 
 
This graph demonstrates the fluctuations of investor sentiment during the sample period of 1987-2007. Investor sentiment is captured by a 
sentiment indicator, which is calcu lated as: 
SENTIMENTt = −0.446ITDt-1 + 0.064TURNt−1 + 0.527NIPOt + 0.337CCI t−1                                                     (4.1) 
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Table 4.1. Sample Descriptions 
The descriptive statistics in this table are based on the sample of 1,148 acquisitions. Acquisitions announced during the period 1987-2007 are included in this sample, if 
the target is a UK firm listed in  LSE, AIM, USM or London Tech with more than £1 mil market value and with sufficient DataStream data. Moreover, the deal value is 
also required to be over £1 mil. Transaction value is presented in £mil. CAR(-2, 2) is the 5-day window abnormal returns to targets. The premium is measured as: 
Premium=100×(offer price –P4w) / P4w                                                                                                                                                          (4.2) 
where P4w is target share price 4 weeks prior to the announcement date. The sentiment is calculated as: 
SENTIMENTt = −0.446ITDt-1 + 0.064TURNt−1 + 0.527NIPOt + 0.337CCI t−1                                                                      (4.1) 
Market value of equities is used as a proxy of firm size (SIZE), measured at the calendar year end, prior to announcement date. Firm age (AGE) is the number of days 
from a firm‘s based date to the acquisition announcement date. Earning per share (EPS) measures a firm‘s profitability. Asset tangibility is measured as a firm‘s property, 
plant and equipment scaled by its total assets (PPE/TA). Return volatility (SIGMA) is the standard deviation of market adjusted residual of targets ‘ daily stock returns 
measured during the period (t-205, t-6), where t is the acquisition announcement date. Growth in sales (GS), which is the change in net sales of a firm d ivided by its net 
sales in the prior year, is the proxy for growth opportunity. Apart from SIZE, AGE and SIGMA, all of other speculative characteristics variables are measured at the 
fiscal year end, prior to the takeover announcement day.  
 
                Firm Speculative Characteristics 
    Number 
Deal 
Value 
Targets' 
CAR5D (%) 
Premium SENTIMENT AGE Size EPS DPS PPE/TA GS SIGMA 
              
All  
 
1148 434.425 14.891*** 26.465 0.578 5722.287 547.426 1.482 0.081 1.182 0.194 0.024 
Cash Offer 699 262.412 16.673*** 28.873 0.606 5685.607 440.734 0.091 0.071 1.054 0.216 0.025 
Equity Offer  134 962.176 13.645*** 25.246 0.703 5289.410 911.501 0.135 0.055 1.200 0.144 0.026 
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Table 4.2. Annual Premium and Sentiment 
 
This table shows acquisition activity and investor sentiment during the 1987-2007 sample period. 
Mean value of CAR (-2, 2), premium and SENTIMENT are presented on an annual basis. CAR 
(-2, 2) is the 5-day window abnormal returns to targets. The premium is measured as: 
Premium=100×(offer price –P4w) / P4w                                                                   (4.2) 
where P4w is target share price 4 weeks prior to the announcement date. The sentiment is 
calculated as: 
SENTIMENTt = −0.446ITDt-1 + 0.064TURNt−1 + 0.527NIPOt + 0.337CCI t−1              (4.1) 
Superscripts *, **, and *** indicate a significant level of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
Year Number CAR5D Premium SENTIMENT 
1987 6 15.193** 20.29 0.012 
1988 6 13.380* 19.565 -0.009 
1989 39 7.896*** 19.272 -0.055 
1990 62 7.477*** 9.437 -0.06 
1991 39 17.339*** 21.369 -0.02 
1992 24 10.527** 9.229 -0.012 
1993 26 9.888** 29.791 0.017 
1994 24 6.653*  24.881 0.542 
1995 40 14.161*** 35.284 0.308 
1996 50 17.100*** 27.325 0.911 
1997 46 22.827*** 39.032 0.842 
1998 86 22.265*** 34.478 0.287 
1999 146 19.879*** 34.919 0.306 
2000 98 15.238*** 30.501 1.62 
2001 41 14.720*** 22.394 0.987 
2002 51 17.868*** 26.914 0.605 
2003 82 9.506*** 20.188 0.377 
2004 54 15.993*** 23.561 1.069 
2005 69 12.074*** 20.735 0.805 
2006 88 11.226*** 22.539 0.763 
2007 71 14.738*** 29.878 0.702 
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Table 4.3. Investor Sentiment Data, Dec 1986- Dec 2007 
 
This table reports the summary statistics of sentiment indicator components and their correlations with the constructed sentiment indicator. The investment 
trust discount (ITD) is the monthly weighted average difference between the net asset value of investment trust shares and their market p rices. FTSE 
turnover (TURN) is based on the total number of constituent shares traded on a particular day. Since turnover presents an upward trend during the sample 
period, the natural log of the raw turnover volume is then detrended by removing the 5-year moving average to generate TURN. Consumer confidence index 
(CCI) is the difference between current month confidence index and its average value over sample period. Similarly, number of IPOs (NIPO) is the 
difference between current month IPO volume and its average value over sample period . Fo llowing first princip le component analysis, the sentiment indictor 
is calculated as: 
SENTIMENTt = −0.446ITDt-1 + 0.064TURNt−1 + 0.527NIPOt + 0.337CCI t−1                                                                                              (4.1) 
 
 
Sentiment Indicator Components  
           Correlation Coefficients with   
 
Mean  SD Min Max   Sentiment Indicator   NIPOt ITDt-1 CCIt-1 TURNt-1 
 
             NIPOt  1.000 1.032 0 7.257 
 
0.998 
 
1.000 
    ITDt-1 0.125 0.061 0.021 0.274 
 
-0.553 
 
-0.540 1.000 
   CCIt-1  -0.0001 0.076 -0.202 0.148 
 
0.377 
 
0.339 -0.258 1.000 
  TURNt-1 0.002 0.288 -0.730 0.877   0.127   0.097 0.149 0.175 1.000 
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Table 4.4. Investor Sentiment, Premium and Targets’ Gains 
 
This table reports targets‘ cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) and takeover premium conditional 
on prevailing investor sentiment. Monthly investor sentiment indicators between 1987 and 2007 
are sorted into 5 groups, where Group 5 represents the highest sentiment classification. The 
difference in CARs between sentiment Group 1 and 5 is presented in the last column (HML). CAR 
(-2, 2) and CAR (-1, 1) is the abnormal returns to targets over a 5-day and a 3-day window 
respectively. The premium is measured as: 
Premium=100×(offer price –P4w) / P4w                                                                   (4.2) 
where P4w is target share price 4 weeks prior to the announcement date. No. of observations are 
provided in parenthesis . T statistics are provided in italics. Superscripts *, **, and *** indicate a 
significant level of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.   
 
      Sentiment  HML 
    Group 1  Group2 Group3 Group4 Group5 (Group5-Group1) 
No. 
 
174 181 271 231 291 
 Sentiment Mean -0.078*** 0.110*** 0.348*** 0.749*** 1.341*** 1.419*** 
 
t-Value -36.18  24.30  59.63  109.66  45.19  47.67  
Premium Mean 17.855*** 30.088*** 27.441*** 26.587*** 28.355*** 10.500*** 
 
t-Value 8.33 12.66 16.59 13.37 18.26 4.03 
CAR3D  Mean 11.619*** 16.014*** 13.969*** 13.626*** 15.142*** 3.523** 
 
t-Value 8.75 11.21 11.75 10.23 13.75 2.01 
CAR5D Mean 11.807*** 17.042*** 14.990*** 13.988*** 16.025*** 4.218** 
  t-Value 8.37 10.87 12.30  10.44  14.06  2.30  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Chapter 4                                      Investor Sentiment, Targets‘ Gains and Takeover Premium  
164 
 
Table 4.5. Premium, Targets’ Gains, Investor Sentiment and Firm Speculative 
Characteristics 
This table compares takeover premium and targets‘ short-run returns (CARs) conditional on 
investor sentiment and firm speculative characteristics . A target is grouped into a high (low) 
speculation category if the value of its speculative characteristics proxies, includ ing SIZE, AGE, 
EPS, DPS, PPE/TA, GS and SIGMA, fall into the top (bottom) one thirds of those in the entire 
sample. The rest are classified into the neutral group. Market value of equities is used as a proxy  
of firm size (SIZE), measured at the calendar year end, prior to announcement date. Firm age 
(AGE) is the number of days from a firm‘s based date to the acquisition announcement date. 
Earning per share (EPS) measures a firm‘s profitability. Asset tangibility is measured as a firm‘s 
property, plant and equipment scaled by its total assets (PPE/TA). Return volatility (SIGMA) is 
the standard deviation of market adjusted residual of targets ‘ daily stock returns measured during 
the period (t -205, t-6), where t  is the acquisition announcement date. Growth in  sales (GS), which  
is the change in net sales of a firm divided by its net sales in the prior year, is the proxy fo r growth  
opportunity. Apart from SIZE, AGE and SIGMA, all of other speculative characteristics variables 
are measured at the fiscal year end, prior to the takeover announcement day. HML presents the 
difference in CARs and premium between sentiment Group 1 and 5. CAR(-2,2) is the 5-day 
window abnormal returns to targets. The premium is measured as: 
Premium=100×(offer price –P4w) / P4w                                                                   (4.2) 
where P4w is target share price 4 weeks prior to the announcement date. No. of observations are 
provided in parenthesis . T statistics are provided in italics. Superscripts *, **, and *** indicate a 
significant level of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
Speculative 
Characteristics 
  CAR(-2,2) HML Premium HML 
  
Sentiment 
Group1 
Sentiment 
Group5 (Group5-Group1) 
Sentiment 
Group1 
Sentiment 
Group5 (Group5-Group1) 
          Low Age Mean 12.742*** 12.977*** 0.235 
 
20.924*** 24.899*** 3.975 
 
 
t-Value 4.72  9.19  0.08 
 
5.45  9.78  0.88 
 
 
N (44) (90) 
  
(44) (90) 
  High Age Mean 13.213*** 19.860*** 6.647** 
 
17.603*** 32.645*** 15.042*** 
 
 
t-Value 6.17  7.61  1.98  
 
5.78  10.26  3.42  
 
 
N (90) (83) 
  
(90) (83) 
  Low Size Mean 18.181*** 21.849*** 3.668 
 
23.492*** 37.223*** 13.731** 
 
 
t-Value 5.64  7.83  0.82  
 
6.03  9.59  2.50  
 
 
N (47) (87) 
  
(47) (87) 
  High Size Mean 8.060*** 12.896*** 4.836*  
 
13.296*** 22.907*** 9.611** 
 
 
t-Value 4.30  7.90  1.94  
 
3.88  10.96  2.40  
 
 
N (71) (95) 
  
(71) (95) 
  Low DPS  Mean 11.907*** 15.400*** 3.493 
 
18.476*** 28.599*** 10.123* 
 
 
t-Value 3.10  7.69  0.84  
 
3.29  9.36  1.67  
 
 
N (32) (102) 
  
(32) (102) 
  High DPS  Mean 11.629*** 15.706*** 4.077 
 
14.866*** 27.873*** 13.007*** 
 
 
t-Value 6.53  8.06  1.54  
 
4.37  10.90  3.12  
 
 
N (68) (94) 
  
(68) (94) 
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Table 4.5 continued 
Low EPS Mean 13.576*** 16.530*** 2.954 
 
19.547*** 30.106*** 10.559* 
 
 
t-Value 4.14  7.83  0.75  
 
3.52  9.29  1.70  
 
 
N (38) (95) 
  
(38) (95) 
  High EPS Mean 11.802*** 15.446*** 3.644 
 
14.089*** 27.020*** 12.931*** 
 
 
t-Value 6.59  8.21  1.40  
 
5.05  11.22  3.51  
 
 
N (75) (101) 
  
(75) (101) 
  Low GS Mean 14.498*** 18.688*** 4.190 
 
25.713*** 31.963*** 6.250 
 
 
t-Value 4.28 7.90  1.00  
 
5.09 9.66 1.05 
 
 
N (42) (91) 
  
(42) (91) 
  High GS Mean 9.855*** 14.944*** 5.089*  
 
10.375*** 25.848*** 15.473*** 
 
 
t-Value 5.16 8.08  1.91  
 
3.86 10.30  4.21 
 
 
N (86) (96) 
  
(86) (96) 
  Low PPE/TA Mean 14.404*** 17.313*** 2.909 
 
20.398*** 26.649*** 6.251 
 
 
t-Value 4.81 7.94  0.76  
 
5.62 9.66 1.30 
 
 
N (46) (104) 
  
(46) (104) 
  High PPE/TA Mean 8.016*** 12.713*** 4.697*  
 
10.754*** 27.017*** 16.263*** 
 
 
t-Value 4.20  8.19  1.80  
 
3.08  10.58  3.67  
 
 
N (46) (98) 
  
(46) (98) 
  Low Sigma Mean 5.988*** 17.567*** 11.579*** 
 
10.531*** 27.322*** 16.791*** 
 
 
t-Value 3.70  8.15  4.29  
 
3.79  10.91  4.49  
 
 
N (75) (93) 
  
(75) (93) 
  High Sigma Mean 19.865*** 16.166*** -3.699 
 
26.826*** 30.682*** 3.856 
 
 
t-Value 5.82  9.28  0.97  
 
5.36  10.86  0.71  
   N (45) (106)    (45) (106)   
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Table 4.6. Effects of Investor Sentiment on Premium and Target's CARs 
This table provides the results of a cross-sectional regression analysis based on the regression 
equation: 
Ri-Rm =α+β1SENTIMENTt +β2ControlVariableit                                                       (4.3) 
Premium =α+β1SENTIMENTt+ β2ControlVariableit                                                    (4.4) 
where Ri-Rm is the 5-day window abnormal returns to targets. The Premium is measured as: 
Premium=100×(offer price –P4w) / P4w                                                                   (4.2) 
where P4w is target share price 4 weeks prior to the announcement date. SENTIMENT is a dummy 
variable for prevailing sentiment, which takes the value of 1 (0), if a monthly sentiment indictor 
falls into the top (bottom) 20% of those during the entire sample period. ControlVariab le includes 
Multiple Bidder Dummy (Multip le Bidder=1, Single Bidder=0) , target‘s debt to equity ratio (DE), 
target‘s free cash flow per share (FCF), target‘s market to book value (MTBV), target‘s  market  
value (MV), Transaction Attitude Dummy (Hostile=1, Friendly=0), Cash Dummy (Cash Offer=1, 
Others=0), Listed Bidder Dummy (Listed Bidder=1, Unlisted Bidder=0). T statistics are provided 
in italics. Superscripts *, **, and *** indicate a significant level of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
  Target's CARs   Sentiment    
Variables Model (1)   Model (2)   
     Constant 0.061 *** 9.606 *** 
 
2.88 
 
3.22 
 SENTIMENT 0.042 ** 9.335 *** 
 
2.25 
 
3.52 
 Mutiple Bidders 0.116 *** 19.625 *** 
 
3.42 
 
4.1 
 DE -1.00E-04 
 
-0.010  
 
 
-1.56 
 
-1.14 
 FCF -4.00E-04 
 
-0.119 
 
 
-0.67 
 
-1.35 
 MTBV -0.002 
 
-0.384 
 
 
-1.1 
 
-1.22 
 MV -8.07E-06 ** -0.001 ** 
 
-1.78 
 
-2.05 
 Attitude Dummy 0.099 *** 10.101 ** 
 
3.17 
 
2.29 
 Cash Dummy 0.047 ** 9.115 *** 
 
2.43 
 
3.34 
 Listed Bidder Dummy 0.580  *** 7.274 *** 
 
3.07 
 
2.71 
 
     
Adj. R-S quared (% ) 8.23 
 
10.41 
 
F 5.62 
 
6.97 
 
N 464   464   
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Table 4.7. Cross-Sectional Variation in the Role of Sentiment 
This table provides the estimated coefficient of sentiment (β1) based on the regression: 
Ri-Rm =α+β1SENTIMENTt+β2ControlVariableit                                                        (4.3) 
Premium =α+β1SENTIMENTt+β2ControlVariableit                                                     (4.4) 
These regressions are estimated separately for sub-samples of targets sorted on speculative 
characteristics. A target falls into the group H (L), if the values of its speculative characteristics 
fall into the top (bottom) one third of those in the entire sample. The regressants Ri-Rm is the 
5-day window abnormal returns to targets. The Premium is measured as: 
Premium=100×(offer price –P4w) / P4w                                                                   (4.2) 
where P4w is target share price 4 weeks prio r to the announcement date. T statistics are provided in  
italics. Superscripts *, **, and *** indicate a significant level of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
    Sentiment Coefficient (β1) 
  
CAR(-2,2) 
 
Premium 
 
Subsamples   (1)   (2)   
AGE H 0.081 ** 13.634 *** 
  
2.17  
 
2.85  
 
 
L -0.010 
 
1.265 
 
  
-0.36  
 
0.28  
 
SIZE H 0.055 ** 7.025 * 
  
2.14  
 
1.73  
 
 
L 0.033 
 
12.516 ** 
  
0.71  
 
2.05  
 
DPS H 0.046 
 
11.547 *** 
  
1.61  
 
2.60  
 
 
L 0.016 
 
7.171 
 
  
0.37  
 
1.04  
 
EPS H 0.041 
 
11.026 *** 
  
1.51  
 
2.89  
 
 
L 0.044 
 
7.559 
 
  
1.06  
 
1.20  
 
PPE/TA H 0.064 ** 17.654 *** 
  
2.23  
 
3.67  
 
 
L 0.045 
 
10.139 ** 
  
1.14  
 
2.14  
 
GS  H 0.047 * 12.543 *** 
  
1.68  
 
3.35  
 
 
L 0.044 
 
7.727 
 
  
0.94  
 
1.16  
 
SIGMA H -0.029 
 
4.024 
 
  
-0.79  
 
0.70  
 
 
L 0.105 *** 13.243 *** 
    3.70    3.37    
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Table 4.8. Robustness Test: Premium, Target's CARs, Investor Sentiment and 
Firm Speculative Characteristics 
 
This table compares takeover premium and targets‘ short-run returns (CARs) conditional on 
investor sentiment and firm speculative characteristics. Targets are grouped into high (low) 
speculation category if the value of their speculative characteristics proxies, including EPS and 
DPS, are negative/zero (positive).  
CAR (-2, 2) is the 5-day window abnormal returns to targets. The premium is measured as: 
Premium=100× (offer price –P4w) / P4w                                                                   (4.2) 
Where P4w is target share price 4 weeks prior to the announcement date. No. of observations are 
provided in parenthesis . Superscripts *, **, and *** indicate a significant level of 10%, 5% and 1% 
respectively. 
 
Speculative 
Characteristics 
  Premium HML CAR(-2,2) HML 
  
Sentiment 
Group1 
Sentiment 
Group5 (Group5-Group1) 
Sentiment 
Group1 
Sentiment 
Group5 (Group5-Group1) 
          
Positive DPS Mean 18.070 28.524 10.454*** 
 
11.752 16.332 4.58**  
 
 
t-Value 8.03  17.68  3.77  
 
7.94  12.82  2.32  
 
 
N (156) (237) 
  
(156) (237) 
 
 
Negative DPS Mean 15.990 27.612 11.622 
 
12.280 14.678 2.398 
 
 
t-Value 2.23  6.15  1.32  
 
2.58  5.73  0.46  
 
 
N (18) (54) 
  
(18) (54) 
 
 
Positive EPS Mean 18.107 28.624 10.517*** 
 
11.519 16.835 5.316*** 
 
 
t-Value 7.92  17.68  3.75  
 
7.91  13.29  2.75  
 
 
N (161) (264) 
  
(161) (264) 
 
 
Negative EPS Mean 14.729 26.884 12.155* 
 
15.373 11.594 -3.779 
 
 
t-Value 3.07  5.62  1.79  
 
2.70  4.73  -0.69  
 
  N (13) (45)    (13) (45)     
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Table 4.9. Robustness Test: Cross-sectional Sentiment Effects on Premium and Target's CARs 
 
 
This table provides the results of a cross-sectional regression analysis based on the regression equations: 
Ri-Rm=α+β1SENTIt×Speculative+β2SENTIt×NonSpeculative +β3CVit                                                                  (4.5) 
Premium=α+β1SENTIt×Speculative+β2SENTIt×NonSpeculative +β3CVit                                                                (4.6) 
Ri-Rm is the 5-day window abnormal returns to targets. The premium is measures as:  
Premium=100×(offer price –P4w) / P4w                                                                                                                                             (4.2) 
where P4w is target share price 4 weeks prior to the announcement date.  
SENTIMENT is a dummy variab le for p revailing sentiment, which takes the value of 1 (0), if a  monthly sentiment indictor falls into the top (bottom) 20% of 
those during the entire sample period. SpeculativeTargets and NonSpeculativeTargets are vectors of dummy variables based on speculative characteristics 
proxies ((non-)div idend-paying and (non-)profitable);ControlVariable includes Multiple Bidder Dummy (Mult iple Bidder=1, Single Bidder=0) , target‘s debt 
to equity ratio (DE), target‘s free cash flow per share (FCF), target‘s market to book value (MTBV), target‘s  market value (MV), Transaction Attitude Dummy 
(Hostile=1, Friendly=0), Cash Dummy (Cash Offer=1, Others=0), Listed Bidder Dummy (Listed Bidder=1, Unlisted Bidder=0). T statistics are provided in  
italics. Superscripts *, **, and *** indicate a significant level of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
  CAR5D   Premium 
Varaible Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4)   Model (5) Model (6) Model (7) Model (8) 
Constant 0.082*** 0.064*** 0.084*** 0.060*** 
 
14.072*** 10.945*** 14.051*** 10.958*** 
 
4.27  3.15  4.39  2.98  
 
5.14  3.77  5.12  3.79  
SENTIMENT*ZeroDPS -0.006  
   
 
1.706  
   
 
-0.23  
   
 
0.43  
   SENTIMENT*PositiveDPS 
 
0.040** 
  
 
 
7.619*** 
  
  
2.27  
  
 
 
3.03  
  SENTIMENT*NegativeEPS  
  
-0.036  
 
 
  
1.657  
 
   
-1.21  
 
 
  
0.39  
 SENTIMENT*PositiveEPS  
   
0.051*** 
 
   
7.857*** 
    
2.89  
 
   
3.10  
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    Table 4.9 continued 
Mutiple Bidders 0.124*** 0.116*** 0.125*** 0.115*** 
 
21.489*** 20.032*** 21.462*** 20.116*** 
 
3.68  3.45  3.71  3.42  
 
4.46  4.17  4.45  4.20  
DE -1E-04 -1E-04*  -1E-04*  -1E-04*  
 
-0.010  -0.013  -0.010  -0.012  
 
-1.58  -1.72  -1.68  -1.73  
 
-1.09  -1.36  -1.10  -1.33  
FCF -3E-04 -4E-04 -3E-04 -4E-04 
 
-0.096  -0.113  -0.096  -0.114  
 
-0.49  -0.64  -0.48  -0.69  
 
-1.08  -1.27  -1.08  -1.28  
MTBV -0.002  -0.002  -0.002  -0.002  
 
-0.399  -0.321  -0.399  -0.316  
 
-1.07  -0.95  -0.95  -0.90  
 
-1.24  -1.01  -1.24  -1.00  
MV -8E-06*  -9E-06*  -9E-06*  -9E-06*  
 
-0.001**  -0.001**  -0.001**  -0.001**  
 
-1.84  -1.90  -1.91  -1.90  
 
-2.07  -2.22  -2.07  -2.19  
Attitude Dummy 0.084*** 0.094*** 0.082*** 0.098*** 
 
7.172  8.772** 7.126  9.023** 
 
2.74  3.06  2.68  3.19  
 
1.63  2.01  1.63  2.06  
Cash Dummy 0.057*** 0.050*** 0.057*** 0.046** 
 
11.058*** 9.983*** 11.125*** 9.642*** 
 
2.97  2.62  3.02  2.42  
 
4.07  3.69  4.11  3.54  
Listed Bidder Dummy 0.062*** 0.060*** 0.061*** 0.058*** 
 
7.896*** 7.761*** 7.970*** 7.418*** 
 
3.24  3.19  3.24  3.06  
 
2.90  2.89  2.94  2.76  
 
    
 
    
          
Adj. R-S quared (% ) 7.22  5.63  7.51  8.88  
 
8.00  9.78  7.99  9.87  
F 5.01*** 8.26*** 5.18*** 6.02*** 
 
5.47*** 6.58*** 5.47*** 6.63*** 
N 464 464 464 464  464 464 464 464 
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Chapter 5: 
Information Asymmetry, Information Contents and Serial 
Acquisitions 
  
Chapter 5                           Information Asymmetry, Information Contents and Serial Acquisitions 
172 
 
5.1 Introduction 
In the previous two empirical chapters, a takeover deal is regarded as a static 
information dissemination process, which corrects existing information asymmetry 
surrounding takeover firms. Along this process, the information contents signalled by 
takeover announcement have been addressed in chapter 3; the sentiment shown by 
investors in interpreting this information has been considered in chapter 4. Developed 
upon these two research focuses, the potential influence of information sender on the 
wealth creation of corporate takeovers requires evaluation. Research development 
upon previous chapters can also be made by extending this static information 
dissemination process into a dynamic one. This can be achieved by examining 
information asymmetry surrounding acquiring firms in takeover series, where a 
decreasing scale of information dissemination is inherent. 
This research focus on information asymmetry along series acquisitions bears 
some research importance, as the public press has been increasingly sceptical about 
the performance of frequent acquirers. Specifically, growing concerns have been given 
to frequent acquirers who are engaging in constant acquisitions rather than organic 
growth. Companies that are constantly involved in acquisitions, for example Tyco, 
AutoNation, U.S. Office Products and AT&T, tend to underperform their peers (Henry, 
2002). However, some doubts have been cast on the scepticism towards frequent 
bidders, as frequent acquirers such as Cisco or General Electric have achieved 
successful integration by frequent acquisitions on a small scale (Stern, 2006).  
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It seems the mergers and acquisitions industry has provided the business press 
with various serial acquisition outcomes, from which no commonly held view can be 
drawn. In the academic field, there are a number of theories which can generate an 
equally wide range of predictions about the performance of frequent acquirers. These 
theories include diminishing returns hypothesis, capitalization hypothesis, 
organizational learning hypothesis, managerial hubris hypothesis, indigestion 
hypothesis and information asymmetry hypothesis.65 These theories predict that serial 
acquisitions may have increasingly positive, or negative, value effects on the 
performance of acquiring companies.  
Contrary to the differing theoretical predictions, relatively consistent empirical 
evidence is documented in literature. In general, serial acquisitions have  a more 
favorable impact on an acquirer‘s long-run performance than single acquisitions. This 
outperformance of frequent bidders is represented by their high long-run returns and 
improvements in profit margins (e.g., Stegemoller, 2001; Rovit and Lemire, 2003). 
However, frequent bidders underperform in the short-run compared with casual 
bidders (e.g., Ismail, 2008); there is a decline in their short-run returns with 
subsequent mergers (e.g., Schipper and Thompson, 1983; Loderer and Martin, 1990). 
Additionally, more recent research reports a positive correlation between the similarity 
in an acquisition series and the frequent acquirers‘ performance in both short-run and 
long-run (e.g., Haleblian and Frikelstein, 1999; Fuller et al., 2002).  
                                                 
65
 For organizat ional learning hypothesis, see for example, Conn et al. (2004) and Aktas et al. (2007); 
for dimin ishing return hypothesis and indigestion hypothesis, see for example, Conn et al. (2004);  for 
capitalizat ion hypothesis and managerial hubris hypothesis, see for example, Ismail (2008).  
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Although existing theories, including diminishing returns hypothesis, 
capitalization hypothesis, organizational learning hypothesis, managerial hubris 
hypothesis and indigestion hypothesis, can be employed to theorize some of the 
findings on both the differing performance between casual and frequent bidders and 
on serial returns generated by frequent bidders, none can adequately provide a 
thorough understanding of frequent acquirers‘ gains. For instance, managerial hubris 
hypothesis (Malmendier and Tate, 2004) and indigestion hypothesis (Conn et al., 2004) 
cannot explain the long-run outperformance of frequent bidders, as they predict the 
opposite outcomes. Moreover, capitalization hypothesis suggests that no significant 
return should be seen in subsequent acquisitions, and thus fails to rationalize why 
frequent bidders‘ announcement returns remain positive to the fourth bid (Ismail, 
2008). Given that the great majority of takeover deals are announced by frequent 
bidders, the inadequacy of these existing theories highlights the research need in 
applying a theory which can sufficiently rationalize the performance of frequent 
bidders and provide a more coherent description of the value effects of serial 
acquisitions.  
A takeover deal is regarded as a static information dissemination process in 
previous chapters. This static process can be extended into a dynamic one where serial 
takeover announcements can be treated as a process of a decreasing scale of 
information dissemination. This is because as more information becomes readily 
available in the market, there is less information left to be released, through 
subsequent acquisitions. As discussed in Chapter 3 along the static information 
dissemination process, the revaluation, based on information released, has some 
bearing on firms‘ announcement returns. Accordingly, along a dynamic process, the 
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changes in this revaluation, based on the continual release of information, are 
expected to influence frequent bidders‘ gains.  
This conjecture highlights the potential for information asymmetry, in particular 
changes in information asymmetry, to rationalize the performance of serial 
acquisitions. Given this, the aforementioned inadequacy of existing theories in 
providing a coherent description of the value effects of serial acquisitions may 
possibly be filled by the information asymmetry hypothesis. Information asymmetry 
has rarely been directly applied to theorize the performance of frequent bidders (see 
Draper and Paudyal (2008) for one of the few examples). However, the documented 
implications of information asymmetry on the announcement returns of various 
corporate events (e.g., Dierkens, 1991; Krishnaswami and Subramaniam, 1999) can 
shed light on the relevance of Information asymmetry for acquisition series. Given the 
documented information asymmetry gains that are constantly captured by firms (e.g., 
Finnerty, 1976; Seyhun, 1986)66, it is intuitive to expect that the declining scale of 
information dissemination, and thus the declining information asymmetry, in an 
acquisition series should accompany diminishing bidders‘ gains.   
Nevertheless this conjectured decline in gains, generated by decreasing 
information asymmetry inherent in acquisition series, may not hold across all 
acquisition types, as information asymmetry gains are conditional on the content of 
the information. As suggested by Moeller et al. (2006), the value effects of 
information asymmetry are conditional on the information content. More specifically, 
                                                 
66
 Seyhun (1992) and Jeng et al. (1999) report that information advantage can lead to insider gains. 
Insider trading, although a separate issue, helps in understanding what will happen to stock returns if 
informat ion is unevenly distributed between market part icipants. 
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they point out that for a given distribution of returns, the expected returns conditional 
on good news increase with an increase in asymmetric information, and those which 
are conditional on bad news decrease as asymmetric information increases. Given that, 
in the takeover context, cash (equity) payment is generally interpreted as a positive 
(negative) signal (Myers and Majluf, 1984; Eckbo et al., 1990), Moeller et al. (2006) 
report that bidders‘ announcement returns for acquisitions of public firms paid for 
with equity, decrease as information asymmetry increases. Conversely, abnormal 
returns for acquisitions of public firms paid for with cash, increase as information 
asymmetry increases.  
These changes in information asymmetry can be quantified within a serial 
acquisition framework. Accordingly, developed upon the research of Moeller et al. 
(2006), this chapter fills the aforementioned literature gap existing in serial 
acquisitions, 67by evaluating the relevance of dynamic information asymmetry to 
frequent bidders‘ gains. This research objective is achieved by examining the 
following research question. What are the value effects of information asymmetry in 
serial acquisitions? Is information asymmetry itself, sufficient to explain announcement 
announcement returns of serial acquisitions?  
Examining these two research questions, is to identify a balance between the 
effects of information asymmetry and information contents on frequent bidders‘ gains. 
Different from the study of Moeller et al. (2006), and developed upon the empirical 
results reported in Chapter 3, the contents of information signalled by takeover 
                                                 
67
 The literature gap, as prev iously mentioned, exists in the inadequacy of these extant theories in 
sufficiently rationalizing the performance of frequent bidders and providing a coherent description of 
the value effects of serial acquisitions. 
Chapter 5                           Information Asymmetry, Information Contents and Serial Acquisitions 
177 
 
announcements is measured by a hybrid of a transaction‘s payment method and 
financing source. This is because, in evaluating takeover announcements, investors not 
only take payment mechanisms into consideration but also extract information from 
the transaction‘s financing sources (Schlingemann, 2004). Specifically, both share 
deals and equity financed cash deals signal negative information to the market, while 
internal cash and debt financed cash deals send out positive information.   
An insight into these questions can further the understanding of the theoretical 
implications of information asymmetry hypothesis on corporate takeovers by 
introducing a relation between takeovers and a dynamic information asymmetry. 
Moreover, it contributes to the understanding of the rationale underlying frequent 
bidders‘ performance which, thus far, has been inadequately researched.  
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a comprehensive literature 
review on serial acquisitions and information asymmetry, and further presents the 
development of hypotheses and testable predictions. Section 3 discusses sample 
selection and description, and introduces the methodology of measuring information 
asymmetry. Results from univariate tests and cross-sectional regression analyses are 
given in Section 4. Section 5 concludes the chapter and points out potential 
contributions to literature. 
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5.2 Literature Review 
5.2.1 Literature Review on Subsequent Acquisitions  
Developed upon fundamental economic theories, for example the law of 
diminishing returns, several hypotheses have been suggested to shed light on the value 
creation of frequent bidders. More recent development in behavioural finance adds to 
the understanding of this issue by introducing the relevance of industrial and 
managerial behaviour to the value effects of acquisition series. Related literature and 
documented empirical evidence are reviewed in this subsection.  
5.2.1.1 Theoretical Implications  
The law of diminishing returns is a key concept in economics. It states that in a 
given production system, the marginal physical product of an input will fall as the 
investment of that input increases. These declining returns can be attributed to market 
saturation or natural environment limits. This concept, once applied in the takeover 
context, suggests that, after a certain increase in returns or economic benefits, there 
will be a moment when the increase in the number o f bids cannot improve a firm‘s 
investment productivity or efficiency (e.g., Conn et al., 2004; Ismail, 2008).  
Due to the learning curve effects and the experience curve effects, 68  in a 
manufacturing setting, the more often a task is performed the lower the cost of doing it 
will be. Applying this line of research to a takeover context, the learning hypothesis 
                                                 
68
 The learning curve effects state, the more often a task is performed, the less time will be required on 
subsequent repetitions. The experience curve effects suggest, that the more times a task has been 
performed, the lower the costs incurred in subsequent iterations will be.  
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postulates that returns from subsequent acquisitions should present an increasing trend, 
as the experience built up by frequent acquirers will enhance their shareholders‘ value 
over time (Aktas et al., 2007).  
Variations of the organizational learning hypothesis suggest that the positive 
effects of learning and experience in the manufacturing context cannot be applied to 
any other organization experience, for example mergers and acquisitions. This is 
because manufacturing a product generally follows a standardized practice, where the 
experience drawn is applied to similar practices; while other organizational activities 
may not have a standardized practice to follow and thus no similar experience can be 
drawn (Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1999). Given this dissimilarity, here develops the 
behavioural learning theory, which regards industrial learning behaviour as the action 
upon analyzing both present and past environmental influences. The outcome of such 
a learning behaviour depends on the similarity of the present and past conditions. 
When a current condition is similar to a previous one, the behavior presented in the 
previous situation is likely to be generalized to the current situation. This is a 
beneficial learning process. However, when a current antecedent condition is 
dissimilar to a previous condition, drawing on past experience may result in 
detrimental outcomes.    
Given that acquisitions are discrete and easily discernible events, organizational 
learning hypothesis therefore indicates that there are several learning curves to follow, 
conditional on the type of acquisition (Conn et al. 2004). If acquirers tend to only 
learn from similar experiences, the increasing returns from subsequent acquisitions 
should exist exclusively in an acquisition series where constituent deals share similar 
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characteristics. On the other hand, for a series of bids which are of different types, an 
acquirer‘s learning from past experience fails to create value for the subsequent bids.   
What underlies the organizational learning hypotheses is that managers draw 
from previous mergers and acquisitions experiences in a rational manner. However, 
managers may be over-confident in making takeover decisions as suggested by 
managerial hubris hypothesis (Roll, 1986; Malmendier and Tate, 2004). The success 
of the initial acquisitions may lead managers to erroneously believe they can 
constantly create takeover synergies and thus become less careful in choosing targets 
and determining takeover premium. The consequence of this managerial 
overconfidence, underlying the decision to merge, is a series of value-destroying 
acquisitions. Therefore, a decline, instead of an increase, in acquirers‘ returns is 
expected for subsequent bids, especially when the initial bid is successful (Ismail, 
2008).  
Even if managers do rationally learn from past takeover transactions, the benefits 
of their accumulated experience may not be fully exploited, as a high takeover 
frequency leaves acquiring firms with little time to ‗digest‘ the synergies created by 
individual transactions. This indigestion69 can be shown as an inverse relationship 
between a frequent acquirer‘s performance and the number of the acquirer‘s bids. 
More specifically, as the number of an acquirer‘s bids increases, its per formance 
deteriorates (Conn et al., 2004). 
In addition to the expected synergies generated by takeovers, revaluations 
                                                 
69
 Indigestion means the inability of successful integration of subsequent acquisitions, due to the short 
time period between transactions. 
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through information dissemination can also influence bidders‘ value creations. In the 
presence of information asymmetry, a firm may fail to reveal its true potential to the 
investment community. An improvement in information dissemination, through 
takeover announcements, has the potential of drawing the attention of investors. They 
then revaluate the firm‘s existing assets and growth opportunities. Accordingly, 
compared with bidders surrounded by less severe information asymmetry, acquirers 
with greater asymmetric information can expect larger absolute changes in their stock 
returns via revaluations (Draper and Paudyal, 2008).  
When developing this line of research in a frequent bidder context, this value 
enhancement of revaluation via information dissemination is expected to be more 
evident for casual bidders. This is because frequent bidders, compared with casual 
bidders, continually disseminate firm information to the market by announcing 
acquisitions, and hence are exposed to less information asymmetry. Consequently, 
fewer revaluation effects are generated for these firms. In addition, where exclusively 
concerned with frequent bidders, the revaluation effects should decrease with a 
frequent bidder‘s subsequent bids, since the initial bid is surrounded with greater 
asymmetric information relative to subsequent bids.    
In summary, research efforts towards theorizing the value creations of ser ial 
acquisitions have generated a wide range of predictions. These developed hypotheses 
predict that subsequent acquisitions can have increasingly positive, or negative, effects 
on the performance of acquiring firms. These theoretical predictions are, in the next 
subsection, tested against the empirical evidence of frequent bidders‘ performances.  
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5.2.1.2 Previously Observed Empirical Evidence  
The observed empirical evidence of frequent bidders‘ gains largely consists of 
two groups of findings, which concern i) differences in the value effects of takeovers 
generated for casual and frequent bidders, and ii) changes in frequent bidders‘ 
announcement-period returns along their acquisition series.    
Firstly, various attempts have been made to examine the differences in 
announcement returns, long-run returns, and long-run accounting performances 
between casual bidders and frequent bidders.  
Based on a sample of 16,211 US takeovers, announced during the period 
1985-2004, Ismail (2008) finds that casual bidders, on average, outperform frequent 
bidders by 1.66% during announcement periods. This superior short-run performance 
shown by single bidders is consistent across all subsamples, after the effects of some 
firm and deal characteristics, such as target public status, geographic scope, industrial 
scope and payment methods, have been controlled.  
Although frequent bidders underperform relative to casual bidders in the 
short-run, this trend reverses in the long-run. As suggested by Stegemoller (2001), 
acquisitions announced by frequent acquirers have more favourable impacts on 
acquirers‘ long-term performance. This better long-term performance is represented 
by both higher post-announcement stock returns and improvements in profit margins. 
Similar findings are reported by Rovit and Lemire (2003), who find acquirers carrying 
out more than twenty transactions during a 15-year period outperform those who 
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announce one to four deals. This long-term outperformance of frequent bidders is 
inconsistent with the predictions of indigestion hypothesis and hubris hypothesis. As 
suggested by these two hypotheses, frequent bidders‘ inability to digest potential 
synergies, or their managerial overconfidence, results in value destroying acquisitions. 
Accordingly, frequent bidder should underperform, rather than outperform, relative to 
causal bidders in the long-run. 
Secondly, growing research efforts have been made towards examining the 
changes in frequent bidders‘ returns along their acquisition series. A decline in 
short-run returns with subsequent mergers has been widely documented. By 
examining the announcement returns of 55 firms engaging in acquisition programs 
from 1952 to 1968, Schipper and Thompson (1983) evaluate the performance changes 
of frequent acquirers through their subsequent acquisitions. They find that announcing 
a merger program generates significantly positive returns to the acquirer, but there are 
insignificant stock price reactions to subsequent merger announcements.  
Subsequent studies document similar findings. Loderer and Martin (1990) 
identify serial acquisitions as a series of transactions starting after and ending with a 
2-year non-acquisition hiatus. Compared with subsequent acquisitions, the first bid in 
an acquisition series leads to significantly larger announcement effects. This 
subsequent decline in announcement returns support diminishing return and 
indigestion hypotheses. These two hypotheses suggest that the law of diminishing 
returns, or frequent bidders‘ inability to digest created synergies of the combined units, 
is inherent in an acquisition series; these further give rise to a decline in frequent 
bidders‘ gains with subsequent acquisitions.  
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Furthermore, findings that abnormal returns remain significantly positive through 
the fourth bid have also been reported by Asquith et al. (1983), Malatesta and 
Thompson (1985) and Ismail (2008). This finding refutes the capitalization hypothesis, 
which suggests that the market capitalizes the value of subsequent acquisitions when 
the first deal is announced, and thus predicts that no significant returns should be seen 
on subsequent acquisitions. 
Despite the widely documented declining returns with subsequent bids, 
counterviews argue that this trend is not generalizable. Furthermore, more recent 
empirical findings suggest that a frequent bidder‘s performance is conditional on 
factors along its acquisition series, including the condition of the first bid, the 
frequency and similarity between deals.    
Ismail (2008) examines the subsequent performance of acquirers with a 
successful first acquisition. It is found that for acquirers with unsuccessful first 
acquisitions, their announcement returns exhibit an increasing trend from -7.47% for 
the first deal to 1.21% for the third deal. These announcement returns remain 
significantly positive until the fourth bid. Conversely, acquirers with successful initial 
bids earn 8.15% from the first deal but have lower announcement returns from the 
second and the third deal (1.86% and 1.61% respectively). The findings that 
successful (unsuccessful) first bid leads to a decline (increase) in subsequent 
transactions are in line with the theoretical implications of hubris hypothesis. This 
hypothesis suggests that acquirers with unsuccessful first bids learn from this 
experience; while bidders with successful first bids suffer from managerial hubris, in 
particular managerial overconfidence. This overconfidence leads managers of these 
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firms to wrongly believe that they can constantly create value for the firms via 
takeovers, and hence makes them more acquisitive. As a consequence, decreasing 
returns with their subsequent acquisitions are expected. 
Fuller et al. (2002) investigate the announcement returns of 539 bidders carrying 
out at least 5 acquisitions over a 3-year period from 1990 to 2000. They find that the 
greater the time interval between deals in an acquisition series, the larger the 
announcement returns. This is in line with indigestion hypothesis, as a longer time 
period between acquisitions allows a frequent bidder to better digest the synergies 
created by the combined firm.  
However, a ‗U‘ shaped relation, rather than a linear relation, between bidders‘ 
gains and takeover frequency is reported by Hayward (2002). He indicates that 
initially the greater the time difference the larger the announcement returns; however, 
if the time difference is too large, then the announcement return starts to decrease. The 
indigestion hypothesis, therefore, does not seem to hold in this non-linear relation.   
Haleblian and Frikelstein (1999) investigate similarities between deals in an 
acquisition series. Concerning the entire sample, they report a significant negative 
relation between acquisition experience and short-run performance. However, for 
similar deals (dissimilar deals), bidders‘ experiences are positively (negatively) related 
with their long-run and short-run performance. Similar findings are also documented 
by Conn et al. (2004). Organizational learning hypothesis is then used to rationalize 
these empirical results. As most deals are dissimilar to each other, simply drawing on 
past experience will give rise to detrimental outcomes. Thus, there is a negative 
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relation between a frequent bidder‘s experience and their performances. However, 
acquirers will benefit from their experience if, in their acquisition series, subsequent 
bids share similar characteristics with preceding ones.  
A summary of all of this empirical evidence on frequent bidders and their 
theoretical implications are presented in Table 5.1. Although Diminishing returns 
hypothesis, organizational learning hypothesis, managerial hubris hypothesis and 
indigestion hypothesis can be employed to theorize some of the findings on 
performance difference between casual bidders and frequent bidders, and further on 
serial returns generated by frequent bidders, panel B shows that none can adequately 
provide a thorough understanding of frequent acquirers‘ gains. Given this inadequacy, 
a different theory needs to be applied to provide a more coherent description of 
frequent bidders‘ performance. This research need is expected to be achieved by 
applying theories concerning information asymmetry and information contents. 
Literature on these two research areas is then reviewed in the following subsection.   
5.2.2 Information Asymmetry and Information Contents 
Few studies have directly examined the effects of information asymmetry on 
serial acquisitions. However, abundant literature has investigated the relations 
between asymmetric information and stock returns and has drawn connections 
between information asymmetry and the announcement effects of various corporate 
events. These developed research areas are discussed in the paragraphs below, which 
can shed light on the relevance of information asymmetry to serial acquisitio ns. 
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The asymmetric information between two parties poses potential benefits for the 
informed group to capture. As in the case of corporate insiders 70 , information 
asymmetry allows insiders to possess and further trade on information that is not 
included in the market price. This enables them to identify and exploit share 
mispricing. Accordingly, information advantage can lead to insider gains.  
Such insider gains have been widely acknowledged in existing literature, 
although estimates of the gains from insider tradings may vary widely. Lakonishok 
and Lee (2001) report a mild market response of 0.59% around insider tradings. Jaffe 
(1974), Finnerty (1976) and Seyhun (1986) document significant abnormal stock 
returns generated by insider tradings in the US market. For a period of 8-month 
following an intensive trading event, insiders can gain an average return of 5% (Jaffe, 
1974). Finnerty (1976) examines insider tradings from January 1969 to December 
1972, and reports an average risk-adjusted gain of 4.3% for stock purchasers and 2.2 % 
for sellers. Similar results are reported by Fowler and Rorke (1984) and Pope et al. 
(1990) concerning the Toronto Stock Exchange and the London Stock Exchange 
respectively. An overview of these findings indicates that insiders are able to 
outperform the market and thus there are constantly information asymmetry gains to 
be captured.  
In addition to the effects of information asymmetry on stock returns, information 
asymmetry also has some bearing on various corporate financing and investment 
activities. In line with the implication of market timing, Chang et al. (2006) document 
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 Insider trading, although a separate issue, assists in understanding what will happen to stock returns 
if information is unevenly distributed between market participants. Therefore, literature on insider 
trading is reviewed to shed light on the valuation effects of informat ion asymmetry.   
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that firms subject to more information asymmetry have greater incentives and 
opportunities to incorporate market conditions into their financing decisions. Mo re 
specifically, firms surrounded by greater information asymmetry will issue equity less 
frequently. However, when the market conditions are good, these firms issue equities, 
usually in large amounts, to meet their leverage targets.  
The result that firms issue equity more frequently, if their information asymmetry 
is relatively low, is consistent with the findings of Dierkens (1991). Meanwhile, she 
provides some other evidence on the relevance of information asymmetry to the equity 
issue process. More specifically, the cross-sectional tests show that an increase in the 
information asymmetry surrounding an issue firm intensifies the drop in that firm‘s 
share price at the equity issue announcement-period. Additionally, the time-series test 
suggests that information asymmetry surrounding issue firms decreases after equity 
issue announcements.  
In addition to corporate financing practice, a firm‘s de- investment, and 
investment activities, are also exposed to the influences of information asymmetry. 
Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999) investigate the effects of information 
asymmetry on corporate de- investment activities by testing whether a firm‘s value is 
more transparent after a spin-off. Their logic regression analysis provides evidence 
that firms engaging in spin-offs have a higher degree of information asymmetry 
compared with other companies. Moreover, as indicated by their paired t-test results, 
this asymmetry significantly decreases after a spin-off. 
The theoretical implications of information asymmetry on a firm‘s investment 
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activities, for example mergers and acquisitions, largely surround the payment 
mechanism of takeover transactions. The stock market reaction to an ex post 
investment decision reflects both the market‘s uncertainty about the firm‘s ability to 
materialize the investment opportunity and whether the financing decision is driven by 
overvaluation (Myers and Majluf, 1984). As discussed in 2.3.2, an equity payment is 
generally regarded as a reflection of the acquirer‘s private information concerning its 
overvaluation (Myers and Majluf, 1984; Eckbo et al., 1990). Accordingly, this 
overvaluation is reflected by a negative stock market reaction. Furthermore, external 
financing is generally considered to be more costly than internal financing, in terms of 
adverse selection costs and transaction costs. As for external financing, issuing equity 
is assumed to be more costly that issuing debt (Myers and Majluf, 1984). Therefore, 
given both the perceived overvaluations and the financing costs associated with equity 
payments, there are negative stock price reactions at the announcements of share deals. 
Conversely, cash deals generate positive, or at least higher, announcement returns 
(Frank et al., 1991; Andrade et al., 2001; Bouwman et al., 2003). 
Other than the payment mechanism of takeovers, Draper and Paudyal (2008) 
provide some insight into the information asymmetry effects on bidders‘ gains, 
namely from the perspective of misvaluation. If bidders‘ gains can be deconstructed 
into synergies and revaluation gains, information asymmetry has the potential to boost 
bidders‘ share prices through a revaluating process. More specifically, if a firm is 
previously surrounded by severe asymmetric information and fails to reveal its 
potential to the investment community, the improvement in information dissemination 
through takeover announcements can draw the attention of investors. Consequently, 
this generates the opportunity of revaluating the firm‘s existing assets and growth 
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opportunities. Therefore, compared with bidders surrounded by less severe 
information asymmetry, acquirers subjected to greater information asymmetry can 
expect larger absolute changes in their stock returns via revaluation.  
The overview of literature on the relevance of information asymmetry for 
corporate announcement returns suggests that, in general, a firm‘s information 
asymmetry decreases after a corporate event announcement. Furthermore, contrary to 
the findings on the relations between stock returns and private information, firms do 
not constantly capture information asymmetry gains at their corporate event 
announcement periods. For instance, information asymmetry intensifies the drop in 
issuers‘ share prices observed at the equity issue announcement-periods. In addition, 
acquisitions paid with bidders‘ equities, which present the asymmetric information 
about the bidders‘ value, generate negative announcement returns to the acquirers.   
These differing stock market reactions, in the presence of information asymmetry, 
can be explained by information asymmetry gains being conditional on the signalling 
implications of information released. More specifically, since stock returns are 
conditional on the nature (positive or negative) of arriving information (Diamond and 
Verecchia, 1987), the aforementioned different announcement returns of several 
corporate financing and investment activities can be attributed to the effects of 
information contents inherent in these corporate event announcements.  
To clarify, ―in a rational expectation model with normally distributed returns, the 
absolute expected return conditional on the sign of the returns increase with volatility 
of the return (because of Jensen‘s inequality)‖ (Moeller et al., 2006, p.3). Based on 
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this model, expected returns conditional on bad news should be negative for more 
volatile stocks, and the expected returns conditional on good news should be more 
positive for these stocks (Diamond and Verecchia, 1987). Since stock return volatility 
is regarded as a proxy of information asymmetry, 71 this prediction can be interpreted 
as the expected returns conditional on bad news being negative for firms with a higher 
level of information asymmetry, and the expected returns conditional on good news 
being more positive for these firms.  
The understanding of this relevance of information contents to stock returns is 
furthered by Moeller et al. (2006). After taking the payment mechanism and the target 
public status into consideration, they report that bidders‘ announcement returns, for 
acquisitions of public firms paid for with equity, decrease as information asymmetry 
increases. Conversely, abnormal returns for acquisitions of public firms paid for with 
cash increase as information asymmetry increases. These findings are attributable to 
the information contents signalled by takeover deals. When a firm makes a cash offer, 
the market infers that the firm‘s equity is worth more than its market value, which is 
good news for the market and hence leads to higher abnormal returns. Conversely, the 
announcement of a share deal for a public target, signals to the market that the 
bidder‘s management believes the firm‘s common stock is overvalued, which is 
negative news. 
In general, literature on the relevance of private information to insider gains 
suggests that information advantage can always generate benefits to the informed 
party. However, according to corporate finance literature, the unevenly distributed 
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 For extensive d iscussion on the rationalization  underlying the use of stock return volat ility as a 
measurement of informat ion asymmetry see section 5.3.2.   
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information between a firm and its outside investors does not constantly generate 
positive announcement returns to the firm. The reason why a firm‘s information 
advantage does not necessarily lead to benefits is that the effects of information 
asymmetry on a firm‘s announcement returns are conditional on information content 
signalled by the announcements. This relevance of information asymmetry and 
information contents to corporate announcement returns is then applied to a context of 
acquisition series in the following subsection, upon which the hypotheses of this study 
are developed. 
5.2.3 Hypotheses Development 
Information asymmetry has rarely been applied to theorize the performance of 
frequent bidders. However, the documented implications of information asymmetry on 
the announcement returns of various corporate events can shed light on the relevance 
of information asymmetry to corporate takeover series.  
Since a firm‘s information asymmetry generally decreases after corporate event 
announcements (see Dierkens, 1991 for equity issue; see Krishnaswami and 
Subramaniam, 1999 for corporate spin-offs), takeover announcements, as a process of 
information dissemination, have the potential to lower the information asymmetry 
between acquiring firms and outside investors. Compared with casual bidders, 
frequent bidders engage more often in releasing firm information to the market, and 
thus are expected to have lower information asymmetry. In a similar manner, 
information asymmetry should decrease with subsequent bids in a merger series due to 
the growing amount of information becoming readily available in the market. In 
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summary, it is predicted that:  
Hypothesis (1): Takeover announcements reduce information asymmetry between 
acquiring firms and outside investors through information 
dissemination.  
If Hypothesis (1) stands, then it is expected that: 
Testable Prediction (1): Information asymmetry surrounding acquiring firms falls after 
takeover announcements.   
Testable Prediction (2): Information asymmetry surrounding acquiring firms decreases 
with subsequent bids in an acquisition series.  
If empirical results lend support to the assumption that takeover announcements 
reduce information asymmetry between acquiring firms and outside investors 
(Hypothesis (1)), then a process of declining asymmetric information is inherent in 
serial acquisitions. This further provides a dynamic context to examine whether the 
value effects of information asymmetry are conditional on information contents or not. 
If there are constant information asymmetry gains to capture as shown by the relation 
between stock returns and private information (Seyhun, 1992; Jeng et al., 1999), then 
the second hypothesis is expected: 
Hypothesis (2)A: Both casual and frequent bidders can constantly capture information 
asymmetry gains.  
This constant asymmetric information gain suggests that information asymmetry 
generates gains to acquiring firms, regardless of the information content. Therefore, in 
the context of serial acquisitions, it is expected: 
Testable Predication (3): Casual bidders have higher announcement returns than 
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frequent bidders. 
Testable Predication (4): For frequent bidders, their gains decrease with subsequent 
bids in their respective acquisition series.  
However, if, besides the information asymmetry itself, the content of information 
also matters, the above predicted effects of information asymmetry should not hold 
across all transactions. As suggested by Moeller et al. (2006), for a given distribution 
of returns, the expected returns conditional on good news increase as asymmetric 
information increases, while those conditional on bad news decrease as asymmetr ic 
information increases. Therefore, deal characteristics (such as payment methods and 
transaction financing source) that convey information to the market should collaborate 
with information asymmetry in explaining announcement returns generated by 
acquisition series. More specifically, debt or internal cash flow financed cash deals 
should generate diminishing announcement returns in an acquisition series, as returns 
conditional on good news decrease with declining information asymmetry. On the 
other hand, equity paid or equity financed cash deals should expected increasing, or at 
least non-decreasing, announcement returns in an acquisition series, as returns 
conditional on bad news increase with a declining information asymmetry.  
Consequently, against the aforementioned null hypothesis (Hypothesis (2)A), 
here arises the alternative hypothesis:  
Hypothesis (2)B: The relevance of information asymmetry to the value creation of 
acquisition series is conditional on the information content 
signalled by takeover announcements. 
This alternative hypothesis, that the value effects of information asymmetry are 
Chapter 5                           Information Asymmetry, Information Contents and Serial Acquisitions 
195 
 
conditional on the information content, indicates that: 
Testable Prediction (5): For frequent bidders, the declining returns in an acquisition 
series are exclusive to debt or internal cash flow financed 
cash deals.  
Testable Prediction (6): For frequent bidders, equity paid or equity financed cash deals 
generate increasing, or at least non-decreasing, returns in an 
acquisition series. 
5.3 Data and Methodology 
5.3.1 Sample Selection and Description 
Merger and acquisition data is collected from Thomson Financial for the period 
of 01/01/1985 to 31/12/2007. The following sample selection criteria are then applied 
to these observations.  
(1) Acquirers are listed for trading on the UK stock market, namely LSE, AIM, USM 
and London Tech. The value of a deal announced by an acquirer is no less than 
£1mil. 18,615 bids survive these criteria.  
(2) In order to match SDC data with acquiring firms‘ share performances and 
accounting information, DataStream code are required. A minimum size criterion 
that a bidder‘s DataStream market value one month prior to announcement is more 
than £1mil reduces the sample size to 14,775. 
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(3) To control the toehold effects and to exclude economically insignificant deals, 
only acquires who have less than 50% holding of the targets before 
announcements and acquire more than 50% of targets‘ shares are included, which 
excludes 3904 observations.  
(4) A merger series of a firm is identified by deals announced by the firm during a 
36-month rolling period prior to an announcement date. The order (rank) of a 
transaction in a merger series is determined by the number of bids in the prior 
36-month. The first transaction in a merger series is then classified as a casual 
bidder or the 1st order bid of a frequent bidder. Since bids announced between 
January 1985 and November 1987 are used to identify the merger series of 
acquisitions announced in December 1987, takeovers during January 1985 to 
November 1987 are excluded from the sample. This last criterion generates a final 
sample consisting of 10556 observations. 
Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 5.2, where observations fall into 10 
categories according to their ranks in their respective merger series. As shown in 
column 2 of Table 5.2, there are 2865 casual bidders and ‗1st order bids‘ of frequent 
bidders, which corresponds to 7691 ‗2nd and higher order bids‘ announced by frequent 
bidders. Out of the 10556 observation, 35.87% bids are ranked as the 2nd or 3rd in a 
merger series. This ratio highlights the salient feature of UK bidders, namely that they 
tend to be moderately acquisitive72, which is consistent with the findings of Conn et al. 
(2004).  
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 Conn et al. (2004) identify moderately acquisitive bidders as bidders announced 2 or 3 acquisitions 
and highly acquisitive bidders as bidders announced more than 3 acquisitions.    
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Column 5 and 6 show a clear trend of declining announcement returns with 
subsequent bids in a merger series regardless of the duration of the event window used. 
These declining announcement returns coexist with decreasing time intervals and 
increasing bidders‘ size (measured by their capitalization). The decrease in time 
intervals along acquisition series suggest that, acquiring firms have an ever decreasing 
time to ‗digest‘ the synergies with subsequent acquisitions. The increasing bidders‘ 
size, which is a commonly used proxy for information asymmetry, implies that 
information asymmetries surrounding acquiring firms decrease with subsequent 
bids.73 Hence, the coexistence of these three trends is a preliminary result lending 
support to indigestion hypothesis and information asymmetry hypothesis.  
The information asymmetry examined in this study lies between acquiring firms 
and outside investors. In addition to this setting, information is also unevenly 
distributed between acquirers and targets. Such unevenly distributed information can 
be intensified by some deal characteristics, including acquisitions of private targets, 
cross-border acquisitions and industrial diversified acquisitions. These deal 
characteristics have some bearing on the value effects of mergers and acquisitions in 
light of related information asymmetry. For example, acquiring unlisted targets 
generates higher returns than listed-target acquisitions, because acquisitions of listed 
targets are relatively more predictable and thus the gains for firms acquiring listed 
targets would more likely be anticipated and reflected in stock price before their 
takeover announcements (Faccio et al, 2006). The outperformance of domestic 
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 Although a decrease in MV in a takeover series can be a direct consequence of continually acquiring 
new businesses, a bidder‘s size (MV) still has some bearing on measuring the changes in informat ion 
asymmetry surrounding the bidder with subsequent acquisitions. This is because both completed and 
withdrawn transactions are included in the sample, which means an increase in  a b idder‘s M V does not 
always arise from an increased capitalizat ion from acquiring a new entity. Moreover, rigorous tests on 
changes in informat ion asymmetry along an acquisition series are presented in 5.4.1.; the results from 
which show that information asymmetry surrounding a frequent bidder decreases with subsequent bids.   
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acquisitions over cross-border acquisitions can be attributed to the imperfect 
information in evaluating overseas targets and the difficulties in international 
post-merger integrations (Conne et al., 2005). In a similar manner, an industrial 
diversification exposes bidders to higher informational imperfections, concerning 
target firms and the resultant units, compared with industry-focused transactions. 
Accordingly, the sample is further partitioned into subsamples according to target 
public status, target domicile, industrial diversification and payment financing 
methods to control the effects of information asymmetry existing between bidders and 
targets. Public targets are denoted as listed firms, while private and subsidiary targets 
are denoted as unlisted firms. Acquisitions announced by bidding firms who share the 
same 3-digit SIC code as their targets are referred to as related transactions. Equity 
financed cash deals are cash deals with new equity issues 12 month prior to takeover 
announcements; non-equity financed cash deals are those without new equity issues.  
Table 5.3 shows that the observed changes in bidders‘ announcement returns and 
bidders‘ size along an acquisition series (as in Table 5.2) still hold when the sample is 
segregated according to various firm and deal characteristics which present 
information asymmetry between acquirers and targets. More specifically, compared 
with casual bidders, frequent bidders are subject to less severe information asymmetry 
(shown by a higher MV) and capture lower announcement returns (shown by a lower 
CAR3D or CAR5D). 
Additionally, as shown in the second column of Table 5.3, the great majority of 
UK deals involve acquiring unlisted targets. Moreover, UK deals are more likely to be 
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concentrated in a geographic scope and diversified in an industrial scope. Panel B and 
C evaluate differences in these deal characteristics between casual and frequent 
bidders. Compared with casual bidders, frequent bidders are more likely to acquire 
unlisted targets (92.19% of the bids are unlisted targets acquisitions) and to diversify 
their industrial and geographic scope. Specifically, cross-border and unrelated industry 
acquisitions constitute 40.47% and 74.96% of the bids announced by frequent bidders, 
corresponding to 33.46% and 72.75% for casual bidders.74  
These high levels of industrial and geographic diversifications represent the 
existence of dissimilarities between deals announced by frequent bidders. According 
to organizational learning hypothesis (Conn et al., 2004), these dissimilarities indicate 
the inability of acquirer to successfully draw on past experience, since acquirers tend 
to learn only from similar experiences. Thus, detrimental outcomes, at least 
non- increasing returns from subsequent acquisitions, are expected. These predicted 
announcement returns by the organizational learning hypothesis are consistent with 
the findings reported in this study (as shown in Table 5.3). This thus lends preliminary 
support to the organizational learning hypothesis.  
In summary, the descriptive statistics in Table 5.2 and 5.3 support the predictions 
of information asymmetry hypothesis, but they seem also to be consistent with the 
                                                 
74 As shown in panel A-C of Table 5.3, announcement returns to share deals are not significantly  
different from 0, while returns to non-equity financed cash deals and equity financed cash deals are all 
statistically significant. The mean  values of these share deals, however, are on the whole h igher than 
those of others. For example, 3-day announcement returns generated by share deals are on average 
4.197%, corresponding to 0.991% and 0.847% for equity and non-equity financed cash deals 
respectively. The reason why higher returns are insignificant and lower returns are significant can be 
due to different standard deviation. Compared with other deals, share deals have a higher standard 
deviation with large outliers. For instance, 3-day announcement returns to share deals range from 
-0.444 to 15.366 with a standard deviation of 0.632; returns to equity financed cash deals range from 
-0.208 to 0.342 with a standard deviation of 0.052. 
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theoretical implications of indigestion hypothesis and organizational learning 
hypothesis. Univariate tests and cross-sectional regression analyses based on the 
following methodologies are carried out in section 5.4, the results from which can be 
used to test against these theoretical predictions.  
5.3.2 Information Asymmetries Measurements 
To examine the difference in information asymmetry between pre- and 
post-takeover announcements and further to value information asymmetry gains, 
information asymmetry needs to be quantified. This asymmetry is measured based on 
the principle that managers and outside investors have different access to information. 
More specifically, managers and investors have equal exposure to the market-wide 
information and thus the same market-wide uncertainties; however, managers may 
hold firm-specific information which is unknown to the market. This firm-specific 
information will eventually be transferred to the market, for example through 
information releasing events. However, the market bears certain firm-specific 
uncertainties even before the release of such information. Therefore, a firm‘s 
information asymmetry corresponds to only a subset of the total uncertainties 
surrounding the firm, which is measured as the total uncertainties of the firm corrected 
for the market-wide uncertainties (Dierkens, 1991).  
Based on this rationale, Dierkens (1991) introduced a market-adjusted residual 
variance (standard deviation) of daily stock abnormal returns as an information 
asymmetry proxy. Since then, this measurement has been widely used in succeeding 
literature (e.g., Krishnaswami and Subramaniam, 1999; Moeller et al., 2004b & 2006; 
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Alexandridis et al., 2008). Compared with other asymmetric information proxies 
which reflect numerous firm size attributes, for example analysts‘ coverage, 
idiosyncratic volatility (Sigma) is less likely to be exposed to this size noise. In this 
study, Sigma is calculated as the standard deviation of market adjusted residuals of a 
bidder‘s daily stock returns measured during the period (t-205, t-6) where t is the 
acquisition announcement day. 
However, the use of idiosyncratic volatility is disputable. As pointed out by 
Dierkens (1991), it may undervalue the size of uncertainties surrounding a firm shared 
by the managers of the firm and the market. Hence, it can attribute a higher percentage 
of the total uncertainties to information asymmetry. 75 Since information asymmetry of 
a firm is not only determined by the characteristics of the firm‘s assets, but also 
influenced by the behavior of the market, it is necessary to take the information 
environment surrounding the firm into consideration. Firm size, analysts‘ coverage 
and trade volume are therefore included to be used jointly with Sigma.  
Freeman‘s (1987) differential information hypothesis suggests that information 
about large firms is more readily available in the market than information concerning 
small firms. This is attributable to large firm‘s institutional ownership or strong market 
presence.76 Therefore, outside investors are expected to be better informed about 
large firms compared with small firms. Following Draper and Paudyal (2008), a 
                                                 
75
 Dierkens (1991) claims that the uncertainty about industry developments may be included in 
idiosyncratic volatility, but this uncertainty is likely  to be shared by the managers of the firm and the 
market. Therefore, this proxy may include a higher percentage of the total uncertainty of the firm than 
being a perfect measure of information asymmetry.  
76
 As indicated by Draper and Paudyal (2008), in general, large companies are owned by institutional 
investors, which make monitoring these companies more cost -effective. Moreover, they have sufficient 
funds to maintain their public presence via different media. Both of these factors can contribute to a low 
informat ion asymmetry surrounding large firms.  
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bidder‘s size (MV) is measured as the market capitalization of the bidder 10 days prior 
to an announcement date.  
Analysts disseminate firm information to the market and their buy/sell 
recommendations represent a primary source of information for individual investors 
(Marcus and Wallace, 1991). In addition to the information distribution role of 
security analysts, they are engaged in monitoring activities by addressing the agency 
problems within companies, and further reducing information asymmetry surrounding 
the firm (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Therefore, firms under substantial analyst 
coverage are expected to have a lower degree of information asymmetry between 
managers and outside investors; firms followed by few analysts are more likely to be 
plagued by information asymmetry. Accordingly, the number of analysts following a 
firm has been used as a generally accepted proxy (Doukas et al., 2005; Draper and 
Paudyal, 2008). Analysts‘ coverage (F1NE) is measured by the number of analysts, 
reporting a bidder‘s EPS forecasts for the forthcoming fiscal year to I/B/E/S, in the 
month prior to a takeover announcement day.  
Trading volume of a firm‘s share is another measure of asymmetric information 
often suggested in literature (e.g., Chari et al., 1988; Dierkens, 1991; Draper and 
Paudyal, 1999). The rationale underlying the use of this proxy is that trading activities 
bring information to the market. Specifically, when there is a high trading intensity of 
a firm‘s shares, more information about the firm may be included in the firm‘s market 
value and information asymmetry surrounding the firm will be lower after the time- lag. 
In order to control size effects, the total trading volume of a firm‘s shares is scaled by 
the firm‘s size in this study. This proxy measures the trading intensity of the firm‘s 
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shares. It is calculated as the average number of a bidder‘s shares traded during the 
month prior to a takeover announcement day, divided by the number of the bidder‘s 
shares outstanding (VO/NOSH). 
5.3.3 Information Contents Materialization 
Developed upon the empirical findings of the first empirical chapter, information 
contents are represented by a hybrid of a transaction‘s payment method and financing 
source. Although there is an inability to link a pound raised to a pound spend in 
takeovers, a approximate relation between a transaction and its equity financing 
source can be created by measuring transaction financing with pre-takeover equity 
issues (Baker and Wurgler, 2002; Schlingemann, 2004).   
Consistent with the methodology employed in Chapter 3, acquirers‘ new equity 
issues, held in SDC New Issue database, 1 year prior to acquisitions are employed as a 
proxy of equity financing. Accordingly, all observations are classified into the 
following four groups: share deals, equity financed cash deals, non-equity financed 
cash deals and mixed deals.  
5.4 Empirical Evidence 
5.4.1 Dynamic Information Asymmetry in Serial Acquisitions 
This study examines the relevance of information asymmetry to the value effects 
of acquisition series. This relevance is based on the assumption (Hypothesis (1)) that 
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takeover announcements reduce information asymmetry between acquiring firms and 
outside investors through information dissemination. In testing this hypothesis, pre- 
and post-bid information asymmetry surrounding acquiring firms are compared. 
Further, changes in information asymmetry surrounding an acquirer alo ng this firm‘s 
acquisition series are then examined. Results from these two univariate tests are 
reported in this subsection. 
5.4.1.1 Pre- and Post-bid Information Asymmetries  
Testing Hypothesis (1) starts with examining whether information asymmetry, 
surrounding an acquirer, falls after a takeover announcement (Testable Prediction (1)). 
Related results are presented in this subsection. As discussed above, information 
asymmetry is quantified by stock idiosyncratic volatility (Sigma), analyst coverage 
(F1NE), firm size (MV) and trading volume (VO/NOSH). Therefore, pre-bid (post-bid) 
Sigma is calculated as the standard deviation of market adjusted residuals of a bidder‘s 
daily stock returns measured during the period (t+6, t+205) ((t-205, t-6)) where t is the 
acquisition announcement day. Pre-bid (Post-bid) F1NE is measured by the number of 
analysts, reporting a bidder‘s EPS forecast for the forthcoming fiscal year to I/B/E/S, 
in the month before (after) the bidder‘s takeover announcement day. Pre-bid (Post-bid) 
MV) is measured as the market capitalization of a bidder 10 days prior to (after) the 
announcement date. 77  Pre-bid (Post-bid) VO/NOSH is the average number of a 
bidder‘s shares traded during the month ending before (after) the takeover 
announcement divided by the number of the bidder‘s shares outstanding. These 
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 Although an increase in MV after a takeover announcement can be a direct consequence of acquiring 
a new business, a bidder‘s size is still included to examine the changes in information  asymmetry  
surrounding the bidder after an announcement. This is because the date announced is not the same as 
the date effective in most cases and hence the post-bid MV can still have some bearing on measuring 
informat ion asymmetry surrounding the bidder after its takeover announcement.   
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post-bid information asymmetry proxies are compared with their corresponding 
pre-bid values. The paired differences, calculated as ‗post-announcement IA minus 
pre-announcement IA‘ are reported in Table 5.4.  
As shown in the last three rows of panel A in Table 5.4, the paired differences are 
significantly positive for MV, VO/NOSH, and F1NE, indicating an dramatic increase 
in the value of these proxies after takeover announcements (by 19.34, 0.0005, and 
0.029 respectively). Since small firm size, low trading volume and low analyst 
coverage are regarded as signs of excessive information asymmetry, the growth in MV, 
VO/NOSH and F1NE after takeover announcements suggests a consequent fall in 
information asymmetry surrounding acquiring firms. Meanwhile, Sigma decreases by 
0.009, revealing a drop in uncertainty and information asymmetry surrounding 
acquiring firms after takeover announcements.  
Panel B and C of Table 5.3 partition the entire sample into acquisitions of listed 
and unlisted targets, in order to control the asymmetric information between bidders 
and targets. The reported declining information asymmetry for the entire sample still 
holds for transactions acquiring unlisted targets, regardless of which information 
asymmetry proxy is used. For listed target acquisitions, information asymmetry is 
alleviated after takeover announcements, when it is quantified by VO/NOSH and 
Sigma.  
These empirical results lend support to Hypothesis (1) and Testable Prediction (1), 
which suggests that the information dissemination, inherent in takeover 
announcements, has the potential to lower information asymmetry between mangers 
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of acquiring firms and outside investors. Furthermore, the results are consistent with 
the findings concerning other corporate events, for example equity issue and spin-offs, 
where a firm‘s information asymmetry generally decreases after its corporate event 
announcements (Dierkens, 1991; Krishnaswami and Subramaniam, 1999).  
5.4.1.2 Information Asymmetry with Subsequent Bids 
Having suggested that a takeover announcement disseminates new firm 
information to the market and hence lowers information asymmetry surrounding an 
acquiring firm, it is then expected that information asymmetry should decrease with 
subsequent bids in an acquisition series (Testable Prediction (2)).  
Table 5.5 evaluates this prediction. Columns 2 to 6 in panel A present a 
monotonically declining trend in information asymmetry from the 1st bid in an 
acquisition series to bids ranked as 6th or more. This trend is quantified by an increase 
in F1NE from 5.576 to 9.2273, a rise in MV from 709.8392 to 2413.16, a growth in 
VO/NOSH from 0.0036 to 0.0046 and a decrease in Sigma from 0.266 to 0.018.  
In panel B, paired t-tests on information asymmetry surrounding acquiring firms 
between subsequent bids are reported. As shown in columns 2 to 6, in most cases, 
differences in this information asymmetry between higher ranked bids and the 1st 
order bid are significant. The only exception is found in VO/NOSH between the 1st 
order, and 2nd & higher order bids.  
Overall, these two groups of results, reported in subsections 5.4.1.1 and 5.4.1.2, 
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show that information asymmetry, between acquiring firms and outside investors, is 
significantly higher for the initial bid than subsequent bids. Further, this asymmetry, in 
general, consistently decreases with subsequent acquisitions. Accordingly, Hypothesis 
(1) and Testable Prediction (2) are supported.  
An overview of these results reveals that, through information dissemination, 
information asymmetry surrounding an acquiring firm decreases after the firm‘s 
takeover announcement. If the firm is a frequent bidder, its information asymmetry, in 
general, declines gradually and constantly with subsequent acquisitions. Therefore, a 
process of declining information asymmetry is inherent in serial acquisitions to some 
extent. This change in information asymmetry along an acquisition series forms the 
framework in which the value effects of information asymmetry can be examined. 
Related results are presented in the following subsection.  
5.4.2 Bidders’ Gains, Dynamic Information Asymmetry and Information 
Contents 
The above reported results from testing Hypothesis (1) suggest that takeover 
announcements reduce the information asymmetry surrounding acquiring firms. 
Further, this information asymmetry on the whole decreases with subsequent bids in 
an acquisition series. These results form the fundamental basis on which the relevance 
of information asymmetry, and information content, to the value effects of serial 
acquisitions can be examined. In doing so, Hypotheses (2)A and Hypotheses (2)B are 
tested in this subsection.  
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Bidders‘ gains along their respective acquisition series are reported in the last two 
columns of Table 5.5. As shown, there is a continuing decrease in bidders‘ 
announcement returns, which follows a similar pattern to changes in information 
asymmetry, along the acquisition series, with the only exception being the 10th and 
higher order bid. Specifically, as a transaction in an acquisition series moves from the 
1st order (or casual bidders) to the 9th and higher order, bidders‘ 3-day cumulative 
abnormal returns decrease from 2.0254% to 0.1385% and their 5-day cumulative 
abnormal returns decline gradually from 2.1909% to 0.1966%. To evaluate the 
significance of these changes, paired t-tests on bidders‘ gains between subsequent bids 
are implemented. As reported in panel B, all of the paired differences are significantly 
positive.  
The outperformance of single bidders compared with frequent bidders is in line 
with the empirical results of Ismail (2008). Further, the decline in bidders‘ 
announcement returns along their respective takeover series is consistent with the 
widely documented decreasing short-run returns with subsequent acquisitions (e.g., 
Schipper and Thompson, 1983; Loderer and Martin, 1990 for the US market; Draper 
and Paudyal, 2008 for the UK market).  
In addition, similar to US frequent bidders, who capture significantly positive 
announcement returns till the 4th bid in their respective acquisition series (e.g., Asquith 
et al., 1983; Malatesta and Thompson, 1985; Ismail, 2008), UK frequent bidders also 
benefit from being moderately acquisitive. However, even extremely acquisitive UK 
acquirers still gain. Unlike their US counterparts, the announcement returns of 
extremely acquisitive UK bidders remain positive after the 4 th bid in an acquisition 
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series. The inconsistency can be attributed to the high frequency of using cash in 
acquiring targets shown by UK bidders.78  
Overall the reported empirical results reveal that declining information 
asymmetry in an acquisition series is accompanied by diminishing bidders‘ gains. 
However, it does not necessarily regard information asymmetry as the sole driving 
force of frequent bidders‘ gains, which is unrelated to information content. In order to 
test the potential influence of information contents (Hypothesis (2)), the relevance of 
information asymmetry to serial acquisitions needs to be examined for subsamples 
partitioned by the nature (positive or negative) of information content signalled by 
acquisition announcements.  
Hypotheses (2)A and (2)B are then tested on subsamples with different payment 
financing methods, which present the information content signalled by takeover 
announcements. Table 5.6 reports changes in short-run returns along an acquisition 
series for equity-paid offers, equity financed cash deals and non-equity financed cash 
deals respectively.  
Columns 2 and 3 in panel A present changes in announcement returns with 
subsequent bids when share deals are announced. Differences in announcement 
returns between the first- and higher order-bids in an acquisition series are shown in 
Panel B. The reported decreasing returns with subsequent bids for the entire sample 
cannot be applied here, as almost none of the pair-wised differences are significant. It 
implies that the value-enhancing effects of information asymmetry do not exist in the 
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 Abundant studies have documented the positive stock return associated with cash deals. For a 
literature review on this specific area, see section 2.3.2.  
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context of share deals. Specifically, although information asymmetry surrounding an 
equity bidder decreases with subsequent bids, this declining information asymmetry is 
not accompanied by decreasing information asymmetry gains (bidders‘ announcement 
returns).  
Results for subsamples of equity financed cash deals are reported in columns 4 
and 5. As shown in panel A, there is no constantly monotonic decrease in bidders‘ 
gains as bid order increases from the 1st order bid to the 10th and higher order bids. 
However, as shown by most of the pair-wised differences, the first bid generates 
significantly higher returns than higher order bids.79 
With regards to non-equity financed cash deals, as shown in columns 6 and 7, 
bidders‘ announcement returns decrease more monotonically, compared with equity 
financed cash deals. Their returns decline constantly until the 6th and higher order bids. 
In addition, most of the ‗1st minus higher order bids‘ values are significantly positive. 
These results indicate that, in most cases, value effects of information asymmetry are 
higher for the 1st order bid than subsequent bids, where the 1st order bid corresponds to 
a relatively high degree of information asymmetry.    
A collective view of these results, on frequent bidders‘ gains for subsamples that 
convey different information contents, rejects Hypothesis (2)A and accepts Hypothesis 
(2)B. Specifically, the relevance of information asymmetry to announcement returns 
generated by acquisitions series is inconsistent within different acquisition 
announcements, which signals differing information contents. A declining information 
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 A cross-sectional regression analysis on equity financed cash deals shows that subsequent bids 
actually outperform initial b id. See section 5.5.3 for details.  
Chapter 5                           Information Asymmetry, Information Contents and Serial Acquisitions 
211 
 
asymmetry surrounding acquirers is inherent in their respective acquisition series. In 
these series, debt or internal cash flow financed cash deals (positive information 
content) generally exhibit declining returns, while this pattern is not evident for share 
deals or equity financed cash deals (negative information content). These findings 
support Testable Predictions (5) and (6) and oppose Testable Predictions (3) and (4).  
These empirical results are in line with the findings of Moeller et al. (2006). 
They claim that for a given distribution of returns, the expected returns conditional on 
good news increase as asymmetric information increases and those conditional on bad 
news decrease as asymmetric information increases. These results further suggest that 
information content signalled by payment financing methods collaborate with 
information asymmetry in explaining frequent bidders‘ performance around takeover 
announcement periods. 
Takeover announcements release firm information to the market. With the arrival 
of new information, investors update their evaluations of the acquiring firms. This 
revaluation, together with estimated synergies of the resultant units, determines 
bidders‘ announcement returns. The scale of this revaluation is influenced by the 
information environment of the firm concerned. Less-covered companies subject to 
severe information asymmetry are given more value corrections around their takeover 
announcement periods. On the other hand, the direction of this revaluation largely 
depends on the information content.80 Releasing good (bad) news to the market has 
the potential of driving up (down) a firm‘s share price. Investors regard non-equity 
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 Another determinant of the direction of investor revaluation is firm misvaluation. As reported in 
Chapter 3, previous undervaluated (overvalued) firms  are in  general associated with positive (negative) 
value corrections.  
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financed cash deals (share deals and equity financed cash deals) as positive (negative) 
signals and assign more (less) value to the acquiring firms. This generates an upward 
(non-upward) revaluation effect.  
Therefore, in a merger series, the scale of investor revaluation should constantly 
decrease because of the declining information asymmetry with subsequent bids. 
Frequent acquirers announcing non-equity financed cash deals should expect their 
upward revaluations to decrease with subsequent takeover announcements. 
Consequently, serial non-equity financed cash deals should generate declining 
announcement returns. Conversely, serial equity financed cash deals and share deals 
should generate non-declining announcement returns, as their non-upward 
revaluations decrease with subsequent offers.  
5.4.3 Cross-sectional Regression Analysis  
The aforementioned univariate test results suggest that the value effects of 
information asymmetry on corporate takeover series are conditional on information 
contents. These univariate test results are then examined for consistency by applying 
cross-sectional regression analyses to the entire sample and subsamples that convey 
different information contents. The regression analysis is based on estimating the 
following regression equation:  
Ri-Rm = α + β1Frequent Bidder + β2 Bid Order + β3 Time Interval + β4X + β5Z + 
β6Control Variable                                                                   (5.1) 
In equation (5.1), the regressand is the bidders‘ 5-day accumulative abnormal 
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returns based on a market-adjusted model. Frequent Bidder is a dummy variable, 
which takes the value of 1 (0), if the acquirer is a frequent (casual) bidder. Bid Order 
is the order of a deal in an acquisition series. Time Interval is the time difference 
between bids in an acquisition series measured by days. The vector of explanatory 
variables X consist of proxies of bidders‘ information asymmetry measured by market 
capitalization (MV), number of analysts following (F1NE), trading volume 
(VO/NOSH) and return volatility (Sigma). Another vector of explanatory variables Z 
present the information content signalled by a takeover announcement, including 
Non-equity Financed Cash Deals (non-equity financed cash deals=1) and Share Deals 
(share deals=1). Control Variable are factors which are suggested to be related to 
acquirer‘s performance, including Relative Size (deal value divided by the bidder ‘s 
market value), Target Status (listed targets=1), Target‘s Domicile (cross border 
transactions=1), Industrial Diversification (cross industry transactions=1).   
The regression analysis begins with estimating the regression model (as in 
Equation (2)) with selected information asymmetry proxies. To control the correlation 
between explanatory information asymmetry variables, which may underestimate the 
explanatory power of these factors, only one proxy presenting the information 
uncertainty of a firm (SIGMA) and one proxy measuring information environment of 
the firm (MV, F1NE or VO/NOSH) are included in models (1) – (3). All information 
asymmetry proxies are included in model (4).  
Following the regression equation (5.1), bidders‘ announcement returns over a 
5-day event window are regressed on Frequent Bidder, Bid Order, Time Interval, 
Information Asymmetry and Control Variables for subsamples that are expected to 
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signal different information (i.e. equity financed cash deals, non-equity financed cash 
deals and share deals). Estimations are reported in Table 5.7. 81  
Hypothesis (2)B suggests that the relevance of information asymmetry to the 
value creation of acquisition series, largely depends on the information content 
signalled by these acquisition announcements. Testing this hypothesis, is to examine 
whether the coefficients of Frequent Bidder and Bid Order remain significantly 
negative for both a subsample conveying negative information (equity financed cash 
deals and share deals) and a subsample conveying positive information (non-equity 
financed cash deals).82 
As shown in Table 5.7 panel B, for non-equity financed cash deals, the 
coefficients of Frequent Bidder and Bid Order estimated by model (2) are -0.014 and 
-0.0006 respectively, and both of them are significant. If model (3) is applied, the 
coefficient of Frequent Bidder (-0.0132) remains significantly negative. These 
estimations suggest that acquisition announcements, which are interpreted as positive 
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 Table 5.7 also reports estimations for the entire sample. As shown in Panel A, there is a significantly 
negative coefficient of Frequent Bidders after factors having potential influence on bidders‘ 
announcement returns have been controlled, regardless of which model is used. The coefficient of Bid  
Order is significantly negative at a value of -0.0006 and -0.0007 respectively when models (2) & (3) are 
used for estimation. These negative relations suggest that the acquisitiveness exhib ited by bidders, 
drives the stock market  response towards takeover announcements in the opposite direct ion, which is 
consistent with the empirical findings specified in section 5.5.2. In addition, informat ion asymmetry, 
measured by Sigma and F1NE, generates significant gains for acquires. In unreported results, a -0.0004 
unit decrease in analyst coverage or a 0.2534 unit increase in Sigma, as estimated by model (1), will 
give rise to a unit increase in bidders‘ announcement returns. 
82
 Another way to test Hypothesis (2)B is to examine whether the coefficient of Information 
Asymmetry is significantly negative for a subsample conveying negative information (equity financed 
cash deals and share deals) and positive for a subsample conveying positive information (non -equity 
financed cash deals). In unreported results, the estimated coefficient of Sigma is positive at a 1% 
significant level for non-equity financed cash deals, regardless of the model employed. While it is 
insignificant for equity financed cash deals and significantly negative for share deals, when it is 
estimated by model (1) and (2). The change in the sign of estimated coefficient of Informat ion 
Asymmetry (Sigma) indicates a negative (positive) relation between the value effects of informat ion 
asymmetry conditional on bad (good) news and the degree of information asymmetry. Thus, this lends 
support to Hypothesis (2)B, that the value effects of informat ion asymmetry are conditional on 
informat ion content. 
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signals by investors, have diminishing returns with subsequent bids. Therefore, 
Testable Prediction (5) is supported.  
These results can be explained as a consequence of a declining scale of 
upward-revaluation through constant information dissemination. More specifically, 
the information released via takeover announcements leads investors to revaluate 
acquiring firms. In the revaluation process, investors regard other-financed cash deals 
as a sign of undervaluation which signals positive information. Hence they assign 
positive value-correction to these acquiring firms. The scale of this revaluation by and 
large decreases in a merger series due to the declining information asymmetry with 
subsequent bids. Given that revaluation is a determinant of a bidder‘s announcement 
return, the scale of this upward revaluation in a declining trend should result in 
declining bidders‘ gains.  
For share deals (presented in Table 5.7 panel D), neither the coeffic ient of 
Frequent Bidder nor the coefficient of Bid Order is significant, regardless of which 
model is used to estimate the coefficients. This insignificance is inconsistent with the 
results reported on non-equity financed cash deals. It implies that the there is no clear 
trend on bidders‘ gains with subsequent share deals. Thus, the declining abnormal 
returns, as shown by non-equity financed cash deals, do not hold for serial 
acquisitions which send out negative information. This result is supportive evidence to 
Testable Prediction (6).  
Table 5.7 panel C reports estimations for equity financed cash deals. Model (3) 
estimates the coefficient of Frequent Bidder as 0.0387, which is 5% significant. The 
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significant positive relation indicates that, rather than underperforming, subsequent 
bids actually outperform the initial bid. Therefore, increasing, rather than decreasing, 
abnormal returns expected for acquisitions conveying negative information, as 
suggested by Testable Prediction (6). 83  This is attributable to the downward 
revaluation effects in relation to serial equity financed cash deals. Investors revaluate 
acquiring firms around takeover announcements. They regard equity financed cash 
deals as a sign of overvaluation which signals negative information. Hence, they 
assign negative value-correction to these acquiring firms in the revaluation process. In 
a merger series, information asymmetry decreases with subsequent bids, and hence the 
magnitude of revaluation also declines. This revaluation, together with estimated 
synergies created by the combined units, determines bidders‘ gains. The constant 
decrease in the scale of this negative revaluation, therefore, should lead to increasing 
bidders‘ gains with subsequent acquisitions.       
Overall, the estimation results are considerably diverse across three subsamples. 
This indicates that the observed declining abnormal returns in an acquisition series, 
accompanied by decreasing information asymmetry surrounding the acquiring firm, 
are not generalizable for all observations. The different patterns shown by 
announcement returns in serial acquisitions arise from variations in revaluation effects. 
These variations are driven by differing information contents signalled by takeover 
announcements, in particular the payment financing methods of takeovers. Therefore, 
it can be concluded that the value-enhancing effects of information asymmetry on 
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 In univariate tests (subsection 5.4.2), the first order bids generate higher abnormal returns than 
higher order bids, when equity financed cash deals are announced. However, frequent bidders do 
significantly outperform casual bidders, as suggested in this cross -sectional regression analysis. The 
inconsistency between results from univariate tests and cross -sectional regression analyses can be 
attributed to the influence of other exp lanatory variables. The acquisitiveness of acquiring firms has 
significantly positive effects once other factors are accounted for.  
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takeovers are conditional on information contents. Thus, Hypothesis (2)A is rejected, 
and Hypothesis (2)B is accepted.  
5.4.4 Robustness Test Results  
Results from univariate tests and cross-sectional regression analyses show that 
information asymmetry surrounding a frequent bidder decreases with subsequent bids. 
Furthermore, there is a decline in bidders‘ announcement period returns w ith 
subsequent mergers. However, once frequent bidders are partitioned by their payment 
financing methods, the patterns of their short-run gains along their respective 
acquisition series are characterized differently. Non-equity financed serial cash deals 
generate declining announcement returns with subsequent bids, while this trend 
cannot be seen in serial equity financed cash deals or share deals. The robustness of 
these empirical results is then tested in this subsection by using a different information 
asymmetry proxy, bid order classification and acquisition series identification.  
Previously, stock idiosyncratic volatility (Sigma) was measured over a (t+6, 
t+205) event window as one of the post-bid information asymmetry proxies. For 
frequent bidders, the time interval between bids in a merger series may be less than 
206 days. Therefore, the use of this (t+6, t+205) window in measuring post-bid Sigma 
may include the announcement effects of subsequent bids. In order to control these 
announcement effects, acquisitions with less than a 30-day time interval are excluded 
from the sample, and a (t+5, t+30) ((t-30, t-5)) window is used in measuring post-bid 
(pre-bid) Sigma. Table 5.8 reports the results from this robustness test. As shown in 
column 2 & 3, the positive difference between Post- & Pre-bid MV and VO/NOSH 
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remain significant, indicating a decline in information asymmetry after a takeover 
announcement. However, there is no significant different between post- and pre-bid 
Sigma.84  
The bid order classification was previously based on a cumulative method, i.e. 
serial bids were classified into the 1st order bids, 2nd and higher order bids, 3rd and 
higher order bids, etc. To eliminate the effects of higher-ranked bids in a portfolio, 
only transactions with exactly the same ranking in their respective merger series are 
included in one portfolio. This approach partitions the sample into the 1st order bids, 
2nd order bids, 3rd order bids, etc. Information asymmetry around the 1st order bid is 
then compared with asymmetric information around the 2nd to the 10th order bids 
respectively. The results, based on this bid order classification, are presented in Table 
5.9. It shows that there is a constant increase in F1NE and MV, and a constant 
decrease in Sigma with subsequent bids. These findings further support Hypothesis (1) 
and Testable Prediction (2).  
Ideally, the conditional effects of information contents can be evaluated by 
comparing frequent bidders‘ gains, for subsamples of takeover series with consistent 
payment financing methods. However, over a 3-years window, there are only 301 
transactions announced by frequent bidders who make cash payments for all 
transactions during the 3 years. In addition, there are only 4 transactions announced by 
frequent bidders who constantly make equity payments during the 3 years. Given the 
limited number of observations, a different methodology is then employed for a 
                                                 
84
 The insignificance may not necessarily indicate an unchanged information asymmetry  surrou nding 
an acquirer, as SIGMA can be affected by factors other than the information asymmetry between 
managers and investors. For instance, informat ion asymmetry between investors and a divergence of 
opinion among investors about the value of acquisitions can all attribute to changes in stock return 
volatility. 
Chapter 5                           Information Asymmetry, Information Contents and Serial Acquisitions 
219 
 
robustness test. Specifically, merger series of a firm are identified by the number of 
bids the firm announced during a rolling 36-month period. These bids are successive 
bids using the same payment methods. The order of a transaction is then determined 
by the rank of the bid in the merger series it belongs to. The difference in bidders‘ 
gains with subsequent cash/share deals are reported in Table 5.10. The first two 
columns show that there is no significant difference in announcement returns with 
subsequent share deals. However, the last two columns present announcement returns 
generated by first order cash deals as significantly higher than those generated by the 
5th & higher order and 6th & higher order cash deals. The indifferent subsequent 
announcement returns in share deal series, and the decreasing subsequent 
announcement returns in cash deal series, are consistent with the results reported in 
5.3. They further suggest that the value effects of information asymmetry are 
conditional on the information content (Hypothesis (2)B).  
5.5 Conclusions 
Developed upon Diamond and Verecchia‘s (1987) announcement return model, 
Moeller et al. (2006) find that for a given distribution of returns, the expected returns 
conditional on good news increase as asymmetric information increases, while those 
conditional on bad news decrease as asymmetric information increases. 85 Exploiting 
their line of research, this chapter examines the value effects of dynamic information 
asymmetry inherent in serial acquisitions. This serial acquisition framework provides 
an ideal context where these changes in information asymmetry can be quantified. 
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 More specifically, Moeller et al. (2006) documents that bidders‘ announcement returns for 
acquisitions of public firms paid for with equity decrease as information asymmetry increases. In 
contrast, abnormal returns for acquisitions of public firms paid for with cash increase as informat ion 
asymmetry increases. 
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More specifically, a decreasing rate of information dissemination is inherent in a 
bidder‘s serial takeover announcement process, as gradually more information 
concerning this bidder becomes readily available in the market, and thus less 
information remains to be released, with subsequent acquisitions. Therefore, it is 
assumed that the higher the rank of a bid in an acquisition series, the lower the degree 
of information asymmetry surrounds it.  
Empirical evidence based on univariate tests show that information asymmetry 
surrounding an acquirer decreases after the firm‘s takeover announcement, and this 
asymmetry further decreases with subsequent bids in most cases. Moreover, such a 
decline in information asymmetry is generally accompanied by diminishing bidders‘ 
gains in an acquisition series. However, this decrease in bidders‘ gains, as shown by a 
t-test on difference of means, is attributed almost exclusively to non-equity financed 
cash deals. Specifically, most of the statistically significant paired differences, in 
bidders‘ gains between the initial and following bids in a merger series, are reported 
for non-equity financed cash deals.  
Furthermore, when bidders‘ short-run returns over a 5-day event window are 
regressed on bid order and other factors, the coefficients of Bid Order and Frequent 
Bidder dummy are significantly negative for non-equity financed cash deals. However, 
they are insignificant and even significantly positive for equity financed offers and 
share deals respectively. The negative coefficient suggests that if the information 
signalled by a takeover announcement were positive (a non-equity financed cash deal 
is announced), a decline in information asymmetry (presented by increasing bid order 
in a merger series) significantly pulls down frequent bidders‘ gains. However, as 
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indicated by the insignificant or significantly positive coefficients, if the information 
content is negative, decreasing information asymmetry has either no significant effect 
or significantly positive effects on frequent bidders‘ gains.  
Accordingly, these empirical results show that information asymmetry and 
information content together can explain frequent bidders‘ announcement returns. 
Takeover announcements release firm information to the market. With the arrival of 
new information, investors update their valuation of the acquiring firms. This 
revaluation, together with estimated synergies of the combined unit, determines 
bidders‘ announcement returns. The scale of this revaluation is influenced by the 
information environment of the firm concerned. Less-covered companies, subject to 
severe information asymmetry, are likely to be given more value corrections with their 
takeover announcements. On the other hand, the direction of this revaluation largely 
depends on the information content. Investors regard non-equity financed cash deals 
(equity financed cash deals or share deals) as positive (negative) signals and assign 
more (less) value to the acquiring firms.  
Therefore, in a merger series, the scale of investor revaluation, in general, 
constantly decreases because of the declining information asymmetry inherent in this 
series. Frequent acquirers announcing non-equity financed cash deals (equity financed 
cash deals or share deals) should expect their upward (non-upward) revaluations to 
continually decrease, in general, with subsequent takeover announcements. 
Consequently, given that revaluation is a component of bidders‘ gains, non-equity 
financed serial cash deals should generate declining announcement returns. 
Conversely, this trend cannot be seen in serial equity financed cash deals and share 
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deals, because their non-upward revaluations constantly decrease with subsequent 
takeover announcements. 
This rationale underlying frequent bidders‘ short-run performance is in line with 
the predications of the information asymmetry hypothesis (Moeller et al., 2006). 
Moreover, it has furthered the theoretical implications of the information asymmetry 
hypothesis on corporate takeovers by introducing a relation between takeovers and 
dynamic information asymmetry. The relationship between information asymmetry 
and corporate takeovers was previously a one-side connection, where the signaling 
effects of payment methods in the presence of information asymmetry, influenced the 
value creation of takeover transactions (Eckbo et al., 1990 and Myers and Majluf, 
1984). In this chapter, this one-side connection has been extended into a dynamic 
interaction which allows for a change in the information environment, surrounding 
acquiring firms, brought about by takeovers. The changes in such an information 
environment also bear an impact on bidders‘ gains.  
In addition to the contribution made to information asymmetry literature, this 
research has furthered the understanding of frequent bidders‘ short-run returns. A 
decline in bidders‘ announcement period returns with subsequent mergers has been 
widely documented in literature (e.g., Schipper and Thompson, 1983; Loderer and 
Martin, 1990). The empirical findings in this chapter have indicated that such 
declining returns are not generalizable. Once frequent bidders are partitioned by their 
payment financing methods, the patterns of their short-run gains along their respective 
acquisition series can be characterized differently. This inconsistency with existing 
literature is attributable to the significant signaling implications of payment financing 
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methods in the presence of information asymmetry. This is one of the primary factors 
underlying the stock performances of frequent bidders.  
Given the relevance of both information asymmetry and information content to 
the value effects of serial acquisitions, this research has gone beyond the inadequate 
existing studies on frequent bidders by applying a theory which can sufficiently 
rationalize the performance of frequent bidders. Furthermore, it has provided a more 
coherent description of the value effects of serial acquisitions. More specifically, the 
reported subsequent bidders‘ gains are inconsistent with the predictions of the 
capitalization hypothesis (Ismail, 2008),  as announcement returns of the 4th bids 
remain positive. Although the documented declining returns in an acquisition series 
are in line with the theoretical implications of diminishing returns hypothesis or 
organizational learning hypothesis (Conn et al., 2004), both fail to explain why this 
declining pattern does not exist in equity financed offers or share deals. It leaves 
information asymmetry hypothesis (conditional on information contents) as the theory 
which can begin to rationalize the performance of serial bids. 
In addition to the three contributions to literature discussed above, the findings of 
this study, on the relevance of dynamic information asymmetry to the value effects of 
serial takeovers, carry significant implications for corporate organizations in the 
takeover market. Specifically, this research can facilitate acquiring firms to balance 
their information and investment efficiency. Information asymmetry surrounding a 
frequent acquiring firm is ever changing, as the firm‘s takeover announce ments 
constantly disseminate firm information to the market. Given this, as well as the 
trade-off between information efficiency and investment efficiency (Singh and 
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Yerramilli, 2009) 86 , purely seeking positive revaluation effects at takeover 
announcements, generate more destructive investment outcomes to extremely 
acquisitive bidders than to casual bidders. Instead, acquisitive bidders should focus 
more on investment projects that generate long-run value.  
                                                 
86
 Singh and Yerramilli (2009) claim that the balance between transparency and investment efficiency 
depends on the proportion of a firm‘s value attributable to  its growth  opportunities. For firms with a 
fewer growth opportunities, the losses from shrinking investment opportunities far outweigh the gains 
from increased transparency. Conversely, for firms with greater growth opportunities, an increase in 
transparency lowers the sensitivity of stock price to managers ‘ efforts, corrects overinvestment, and 
thus increases firm value. Developing upon this line of research in the takeover context, acquisitive 
bidders, who attribute a great  proportion of their firm value to growth opportunities, should improve 
informat ion transparency, lowers unnecessary managerial pay-performance sensitivity, and in turn 
increase firm value in the long-run.  
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Table 5.1. Empirical Evidence on Frequent Bidders and Theoretical Implications 
 
Panel A: Empirical Evidence   
 
 
1. Casual vs. Frequent Bidders  2. Subsequent Bids 
 
  
    2.1 Subsequent decline in 
acquisition series 
  2.2 Successful first bid 
in acquisition series 
  2.3 Frequency in 
acquisition series 
  2.4 Similarities in acquisition 
series  
 
1.a. Acquisitions announced by 
frequent acquirers have more 
favourable impacts on the long-run 
performance (returns & changes in 
profit margins) than do single 
acquisitions (Stegemoller, 2001; 
Rovit and Lemire, 2003);  
 2.1.a. Frequent bidders‘ 
short-run returns remain 
positive to the 4
th
 bid 
(Asquith, Bruner and 
Mullins, 1983; Malatesta 
and Thompson, 1985; 
Ismail, 2008); 
 2.2. Successful 
(unsuccessful) first bid 
is followed by a decline 
(increase) in 
performance (Ismail,  
2008). 
 2.3.a The greater the 
time difference, the 
larger the 
announcement returns 
(Fuller et al. 2002) ; 
 2.4. For dissimilar (similar) 
deals, bidders‘ experience is 
negatively (positively) related 
with long-run and short-run 
performance (Haleblian and 
Frikelstein, 1999; Fuller et al., 
2002). 
 
         1.b. Frequent bidders do 
underperform in the short-run 
(Ismail, 2008) . 
 2.1.b. Frequent bidders‘ 
short-run returns decline 
with subsequent mergers 
(Schipper and Thompson, 
1983; Loderer and Martin, 
1990). 
  2.3.b If the difference 
is too large, the returns 
start to decline 
(Hayward, 2002).  
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Table 5.1 Continued 
 
Panel B: Theoretical Implications   
Indigestion Hypothesis 
Doesn‘t support 1.a 
but support 1.b 
  Support 2.1.b but 
doesn't support 2.1.a 
  /   Support 2.3.a but 
doesn't support 3.b 
  / 
Managerial Hubris Hypothesis Doesn‘t support 1.a 
but support 1.b 
 /  Support 2.2    / 
Diminish Return Hypothesis /  Support 2.1.b   Support 2.2    
/ 
Capitalization Hypothesis 
/  Doesn‘t Support 2.1.a 
but support 2.1.b 
 /    / 
Organizational Learning 
Hypothesis 
Support 1.a but 
doesn't support 1.b 
 Support 2.1.b (due to 
2.3.a) 
 Support 2.2  /  Support 2.4 
Info. 
Asymmetries 
Hypothesis 
Irrelevant of 
info. Contents 
Support 1.b   Support 2.1.b   /  Support 2. 3.a   / 
Conditional on 
info. Contents 
Conditionally 
support 1.b  
  Conditionally Support 
2.1.b 
  /   Conditionally Support 
2.3.a 
  Conditionally Support 
2.4 
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Table 5.2. Comparative Sample Statistics for Merger Series across Different Deal 
Characteristics 
 
The descriptive statistics in this table are based on the sample  of 10,556 acquisitions. Acquisitions 
announced during1985-2007 are included in  this sample, if the b idder is, a UK firm listed in LSE, 
AIM, USM or London Tech, with more than £1 mil market value, has less than 50% holding of the 
targets before announcements, acquire more than 50% of target shares in the transaction and with 
sufficient DataStream data. Moreover, the deal value is required to be over £1 mil. Merger series 
of a firm are identified by the number of bids the firm announced during a 36-month period prior 
to an announcement date. The order (rank) of a transaction in a merger series is determined by the 
number of bids in the prior 36-month. The first transaction in a merger series is then classified as a 
casual bidder or the 1st order bid  of a frequent bidder. Deal value is presented in £mil. CAR3D 
(CAR5D) is the abnormal returns to bidders in a 3-day (5-day) event window. Superscripts *, **, 
and *** indicate a significant level of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively, based on t -test of the mean 
equals to 0 or not. 
 
Bid Order in a 
Merger Series 
Number 
Time 
Interval 
Deal Value MV of 
Bidders CAR3D CAR5D 
  (in Days) (￡Mil) (￡Mil) (%) (%) 
1
st
 2865 1776.840  4572.180  709.839  2.025*** 2.191*** 
2
nd 
and more 7691 263.904  50437.810  1712.890  0.723*** 0.833*** 
3
rd
 and more 5515 201.750  64830.340  1947.220  0.618*** 0.697*** 
4
th
 and more 3905 162.322  85553.740  2244.090  0.511*** 0.586*** 
5
th
 and more 2780 138.405  28794.450  2460.560  0.448*** 0.514*** 
6
th
 and more 1958 118.472  1725.330  2413.160  0.384*** 0.467*** 
7
th
 and more 1419 105.771  969.864  2338.360  0.362*** 0.459*** 
8
th
 and more 1045 89.763  925.328  1887.360  0.312** 0.380*** 
9
th
 and more 794 79.722  849.094  1807.040  0.138  0.197  
10
th
 and more 628 74.064  680.420  1740.780  0.333*  0.405*  
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Table 5.3. Comparative Sample Statistics for All, Casual and Frequent Bidders 
across Different Deal Characteristics  
The table compares descriptive statistics for all bidders, casual bidders and frequent bidders 
conditional on target public status, target domicile, industrial diversificat ion and payment financing 
methods. Public targets are named as listed firms, while private and subsidiary targets are referred 
to as unlisted firms. Acquisitions between firms that share the same 3-digit  SIC code are referred  to 
as related transactions. Equity financed cash deals are cash deals with new equity issues 12 month 
prior to the takeover announcements, and non-equity financed cash deals are those without new 
equity issues. Deal value is p resented in £mil. CAR3D (CAR5D) is the abnormal returns to bidders 
in a 3-day (5-day) event window. Superscripts *, **, and *** indicate a significant level of 10%, 5% 
and 1% respectively, based on t-test of the mean equals to 0 or not.  
  Number  Deal Value 
MV of 
Bidders CAR3D CAR5D 
    (￡Mil) (￡Mil) (%) (%) 
Panel A: All Bidders           
Target Public Status: 
     Unlisted 8028 27752.400  1233.410  1.215*** 1.360*** 
Listed 701 154437.240  3889.440  -0.597*** -0.700*** 
      Target's Domicile: 
     Domestic  5270 52.874  757.838  1.211*** 1.325*** 
Cross-Border 3459 102028.520  2606.110  0.827*** 0.975*** 
      Industrial Diversification: 
     Related Industry 2209 56970.400  1469.320  1.666*** 1.842*** 
Unrelated Industry 6520 31160.400  1438.830  0.856*** 0.962*** 
      Payment & Financing Combinations:  
    Share deals 432 17398.053  1286.651  4.197  4.321  
Equity financed Cash deals  379 8859.780  1646.010  0.991*** 1.222*** 
Non-equity financed Cash deals 2543 6667.140  1808.110  0.847*** 0.971*** 
Panel B: Casual Bidders           
Target Public Status: 
     Unlisted 945 4950.720  661.345  2.224*** 2.454*** 
Listed 101 629.961  1221.470  -0.213  -0.602  
      Target's Domicile: 
     Domestic  696 51.920  383.387  2.263*** 2.480*** 
Cross-Border 350 15903.270  1515.060  1.440*** 1.479*** 
      Industrial Diversification: 
     Related Industry 285 5825.390  633.684  3.248*  3.454*  
Unrelated Industry 761 4027.470  743.005  1.492*** 1.640*** 
      Payment & Financing Combinations: 
    Share deals 73 311.491  282.878  8.397  8.626  
Equity financed Cash deals  24 2152.150  403.976  1.859*** 2.176*** 
Non-equity financed Cash deals 325 895.168  768.518  1.075*** 1.251*** 
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      Table 5.3 continued 
Panel C: Frequent Bidders            
Target Public Status: 
     Unlisted 7083 36160.300  1438.000  0.848*** 0.966*** 
Listed 600 218566.190  4956.630  -0.750*** -0.740*** 
      Target's Domicile: 
     Domestic  4574 53.300  918.988  0.761*** 0.825*** 
Cross-Border 3109 124653.710  2887.850  0.668*** 0.844*** 
      Industrial Diversification: 
     Related Industry 1924 80032.150  1836.690  0.967*** 1.130*** 
Unrelated Industry 5759 40557.640  1671.830  0.642*** 0.734*** 
      Payment & Financing Combinations: 
    Share deals 359 30972.372  2057.911  0.959  1.001  
Equity financed Cash deals  355 10994.880  2037.870  0.715*** 0.919*** 
Non-equity financed Cash deals 2218 8494.930  2129.000  0.777*** 0.884*** 
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Table 5.4. Pre- and Post-Announcement Information Asymmetries  
This table reports the pre- and post-bid differences in information asymmetry. Informat ion 
asymmetry is quantified by Sigma, F1NE, VO/NOSH and MV. Post -bid (Pre-bid) Sigma is 
calculated as the standard deviation of market adjusted residuals of bidders‘ daily stock returns 
measured during the period (t+6, t+205) ((t-205, t-6)) where t is the acquisition announcement 
day. Post-bid (Pre-bid) F1NE is measured by the number of analysts reporting EPS forecasts for 
the forthcoming fiscal year to I/B/E/S in the month after (before) the announcemen t day. Post 
(Pre) VO/NOSH is the average number of shares traded during the month ending after (before) the 
takeover announcement divided by the number of shares outstanding. Post -bid (Pre-bid) MV is 
measured as market capitalizat ion of the bidder 10 days after (prior to) the announcement date. T 
statistics are repented in italics. 
 
    F1NE MV VO/NOSH Sigma 
Panel A. All Observations           
Pre-bid Mean 7.3023 1446.8627 0.0040 0.0218 
 
t-value 112.13 20.40 33.08 69.19 
Post-bid Mean 7.2747 1466.1859 0.0043 0.0209 
 
t-value 112.37 20.54 46.97 160.00  
Post-bid minus Pre-bid Mean 0.0290 19.3400 0.0005 -0.0009 
 
t-value 2.15 3.13 5.52 -3.08 
Panel B. Listed Targets           
Pre-bid Mean 10.2915 3889.4432 0.0045 0.0212 
 
t-value 37.05 8.45 16.99 34.20  
Post-bid Mean 10.2140 3948.5817 0.0055 0.0203 
 
t-value 36.50 8.42 17.49 50.85 
Post-bid minus Pre-bid Mean -0.0595 53.5700 0.0009 -0.0009 
 
t-value -0.86 1.58 3.44 -1.85 
Panel C. Unlisted Targets           
Pre-bid Mean 7.0356 1233.4060 0.0039 0.0218 
 
t-value 107.22 18.86 30.42 64.60  
Post-bid Mean 7.0141 1249.1841 0.0042 0.0209 
 
t-value 107.66 19.09 43.85 152.16 
Post-bid minus Pre-bid Mean 0.0360 16.3500 0.0005 -0.0009 
  t-value 2.78 2.71 4.84 -2.87 
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Table 5.5.Changes in Information Asymmetries with Subsequent Bids 
 
This table reports the differences in informat ion asymmetry between subsequent bids. Informat ion asymmetry is 
quantified by Sigma, F1NE, VO/NOSH and MV. Pre -bid Sigma is calculated as the standard deviation of market  
adjusted residuals of b idders‘ daily stock returns measured during the period (t -205, t-6) where t  is the acquisition 
announcement day. Pre-bid F1NE is measured by the number of analysts reporting EPS forecasts for the 
forthcoming fiscal year to I/B/E/S in  the month before the announcement  day. Pre VO/NOSH is the average 
number of shares traded during the month ending before the takeover announcement divided by the number of 
shares outstanding. Pre-b id MV is measured as market capitalization  of the b idder 10 days prior to the 
announcement date. CAR3D (CAR5D) is the abnormal returns to bidders in a 3-day (5-day) window. Merger 
series of a firm are identified by the number of bids the firm announced during a 36-month period prior to an 
announcement date. The order (rank) of a t ransaction in a merger series is determined by the number of b ids in the 
prior 36-month. The first transaction in a merger series is then classified as a casual bidder or the 1st order bid  of a 
frequent bidder. No. of observations are provided in  parenthesis. T-values of pair-wised differences in mean are 
presented in italics. Superscripts *, **, and *** indicate a significant level of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
    Pre-Bid IA   Bidders’ gains 
Bid Order   F1NE MV VO/NOSH Sigma   
CAR3D 
(%) 
CAR5D 
(%) 
Panel A. Mean Value of information asymmetries and bidder's gain (mean & No. of observations)  
1st Bid 
Mean 5.5760  709.8392  0.0036  0.0271  
 
2.0254*** 2.1909*** 
N (1762) (2749) (977) (2749) 
 
(2760) (2760) 
2nd Bid & 
more 
Mean 7.7622  1712.8900  0.0041  0.0198  
 
0.7235*** 0.8328*** 
N (6614) (7616) (3440) (7610) 
 
(7612) (7612) 
3rd Bid & 
more 
Mean 8.1455  1947.2200  0.0044  0.0188  
 
0.6185*** 0.6969*** 
N (4936) (5470) (2580) (5465) 
 
(5467) (5467) 
4th Bid & 
more 
Mean 8.4987  2244.0900  0.0045  0.0184  
 
0.5107*** 0.5864*** 
N (3567) (3872) (1927) (3868) 
 
(3870) (3870) 
5th Bid & 
more 
Mean 8.8749  2460.5600  0.0046  0.0182  
 
0.4484*** 0.5140*** 
N (2573) (2755) (1387) (2753) 
 
(2755) (2755) 
6th Bid & 
more 
Mean 9.2273  2413.1600  0.0046  0.0181  
 
0.3837*** 0.4671*** 
N (1826) (1942) (1017) (1941) 
 
(1942) (1942) 
7th Bid & 
more 
Mean 9.5177  2338.3600  0.0047  0.0180  
 
0.3617*** 0.4590*** 
N (1329) (1411) (766) (1411) 
 
(1411) (1411) 
8th Bid & 
more 
Mean 9.6218  1887.3600  0.0049  0.0180  
 
0.3120** 0.3803*** 
N (981) (1040) (574) (1040) 
 
(1040) (1040) 
9th Bid & 
more 
Mean 9.5386  1807.0400  0.0048  0.0180  
 
0.1385  0.1966  
N (752) (790) (438) (790) 
 
(790) (790) 
10th Bid & 
more 
Mean 9.5850  1740.7800  0.0046  0.0181  
 
0.3326* 0.4051* 
N (600) (625) (368) (625)   (625) (625) 
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Table 5.5 Continued 
Panel B. Difference in mean (mean & t -value)     
 
    
1-2 Mean -2.1861*** -1003.0508*** -0.0005 0.0073***   1.3019*** 1.3581** 
 
t-Value -14.29  -7.89  -1.12  7.49 
 
2.22 2.22 
1-3 Mean -2.5694*** -1237.3808*** -0.0007*  0.0084*** 
 
1.4069** 1.4941*** 
 
t-Value -16.22 -8.39 -1.76 8.80 
 
2.40  2.44 
1-4 Mean -2.9227*** -1534.2508*** -0.0009** 0.0087*** 
 
1.5147*** 1.6045*** 
 
t-Value -17.58  -8.62  -2.01  9.14 
 
2.58  2.62 
1-5 Mean -3.2988*** -1750.7208*** -0.0010** 0.0089*** 
 
1.5770*** 1.6770*** 
 
t-Value -18.62  -8.53  -2.18  9.34 
 
2.68  2.73 
1-6 Mean -3.6512*** -1703.3208*** -0.0010** 0.0091*** 
 
1.6416*** 1.7239*** 
 
t-Value -19.24  -7.74  -2.23  9.46 
 
2.78  2.79 
1-7 Mean -3.9416*** -1628.5208*** -0.0011** 0.0091*** 
 
1.6636*** 1.7319*** 
 
t-Value -19.27  -7.06  -2.35  9.41 
 
2.80  2.79 
1-8 Mean -4.0458*** -1177.5208*** -0.0013*** 0.0091*** 
 
1.7134*** 1.8107*** 
 
t-Value -18.16  -6.97  -2.46  9.34 
 
2.87  2.89 
1-9 Mean -3.9625*** -1097.2008*** -0.0012** 0.0091*** 
 
1.8869*** 1.9943*** 
 
t-Value -16.35  -6.42  -2.16  9.23 
 
3.13  3.15 
1-10 Mean -4.0090*** -1030.9408*** -0.0010*  0.0090*** 
 
1.6928*** 1.7858*** 
  t-Value -15.23  -6.26  -1.80  9.06  2.78  2.78  
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Table 5.6.Information Asymmetries, Payment Financing and Bid Order 
This table reports the differences in bidders‘ gains between subsequent bids, conditional on 
payment financing. Merger series of a firm are identified by the number of bids the firm announced 
during a 36-month period prior to an announcement date. The order of a bid is determined by the 
rank of the bid in a merger series. The first transaction in a merger series is then classified as a 
casual bidder or the 1st order bid of a frequent bidder. Equity financed (Non -equity financed) cash 
deals are cash acquisitions with (without) equity issues 1-year prior to the announcement days. 
T-values of pair-wised differences in mean are presented in italics. Superscripts *, **, and *** 
indicate a significant level of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.  
 
    Share deals   
Equity financed Cash 
deals 
  
Non-equity financed 
Cash deals 
Bid 
Order  
CAR3D 
(%) 
CAR5D 
(%) 
  
CAR3D 
(%) 
CAR5D 
(%) 
  
CAR3D 
(%) 
CAR5D 
(%) 
Panel A. Mean Value of bidder's gain  
1st Bid 8.3973  8.6265  
 
1.8591*** 2.1755*** 
 
1.0749*** 1.2513*** 
  
1.46  1.45  
 
2.76  2.94  
 
5.28  5.28  
2nd Bid & more 0.9586* 1.0011*  
 
0.7148*** 0.9186*** 
 
0.7767*** 0.8842*** 
  
1.72  1.77  
 
3.12  3.54  
 
8.29  8.26  
3rd Bid & more -0.0848  -0.2362  
 
0.5159* 0.6765** 
 
0.6864*** 0.7736*** 
  
-0.16  -0.43  
 
1.87  2.18  
 
6.54  6.25  
4th Bid & more 0.2815  0.0238  
 
0.2476  0.4051  
 
0.5912*** 0.7090*** 
  
0.37  0.03  
 
0.88  1.18  
 
5.21  5.22  
5th Bid & more 0.5931  0.1836  
 
0.2034  0.3063  
 
0.4886*** 0.6163*** 
  
0.63  0.19  
 
0.69  0.93  
 
3.62  3.80  
6th Bid & more 1.3034  1.0410  
 
0.3123  0.4503  
 
0.4903*** 0.6333*** 
  
1.21  1.01  
 
0.93  1.17  
 
3.29  3.44  
7th Bid & more 1.2958  0.7926  
 
0.3179  0.5554  
 
0.7067*** 0.8396*** 
  
1.00  0.64  
 
0.88  1.30  
 
3.87  3.67  
8th Bid & more 0.0143  -0.6769  
 
0.4063  0.4552  
 
0.6044*** 0.5250* 
  
0.01  -0.51  
 
0.93  0.89  
 
2.69  1.90  
9th Bid & more -0.6125  -1.5478  
 
0.3862  0.3687  
 
0.3609  0.2054  
  
-0.40  -1.04  
 
0.67  0.54  
 
1.41  0.63  
10th Bid & more -0.5845  -1.6122  
 
0.7396  0.7779  
 
0.6425** 0.5950  
    -0.31  -0.90    1.06  0.95    2.14  1.57  
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Table 5.6 continued 
Panel B. Difference in mean  
1-2 
 
7.4387  7.6254  
 
1.1443  1.2569  
 
0.2982 0.3671 
  
1.29 1.27 
 
1.61 1.61 
 
1.33  1.41  
1-3 
 
8.4821  8.8627  
 
1.3432* 1.4990* 
 
0.3885* 0.4777* 
  
1.47 1.48 
 
1.84 1.87 
 
1.70  1.79  
1-4 
 
8.1158  8.6027  
 
1.6115**  1.7704** 
 
0.4837** 0.5423** 
  
1.40 1.43 
 
2.20 2.17 
 
2.07  1.99  
1-5 
 
7.8042  8.4429  
 
1.6557** 1.8692** 
 
0.5863** 0.6350** 
  
1.34 1.40 
 
2.25 2.31 
 
2.40  2.21  
1-6 
 
7.0939  7.5855  
 
1.5468** 1.7252** 
 
0.5846** 0.6180** 
  
1.21 1.25 
 
2.05 2.07 
 
2.32  2.06  
1-7 
 
7.1015  7.8339  
 
1.5412** 1.6201** 
 
0.3682 0.4117 
  
1.20 1.28 
 
2.01 1.90 
 
1.35  1.25  
1-8 
 
8.3830  9.3034  
 
1.4528* 1.7203* 
 
0.4705  0.7263** 
  
1.42 1.52 
 
1.81 1.91 
 
1.55  2.00  
1-9 
 
9.0098  10.1743*  
 
1.4729* 1.8068* 
 
0.7140** 1.0469*** 
  
1.51  1.65  
 
1.66 1.79 
 
2.18  2.59  
1-10 
 
8.9818  10.2387*  
 
1.1195  1.3976  
 
0.4324 0.6563*** 
    1.48  1.64   1.15  1.27   1.19  1.47  
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Table 5.7. Subsequent Decline in Bidders’ Announcement Return 
This table provides the estimated coefficients of two explanatory variables, based on the 
cross-sectional regression equations: 
Rm-Ri = α + β1Frequent Bidder + β2  Bid Order + β3  Time Interval + β4X + β5Z + β6Control 
Variable                                                                    (5.1) 
Where the regressand is the 5-day window abnormal returns to bidders. Frequent Bidder is a 
dummy variable, which takes the value of 1 (0), if the acquirer is a frequent (casual) bidder. Bid 
Order is the order of a deal in an acquisition series. Time Interval is the time d ifference between 
bids measured by days. The vector of exp lanatory variables X consist of proxies of bidders‘ 
informat ion asymmetry  which are measured by market capitalizat ion (MV), number of analysts 
following (F1NE), trading volume (VO/NOSH) and return volatility (Sigma); another vector of 
explanatory variables Z present the informat ion content signalled by a takeover announcement, 
including Non-equity financed Cash deals (non-equity financed cash deals=1) and Share deals 
(share deals=1). Control Variable are factors which are suggested to be related with acquirer‘s 
performance, including Re lative Size (deal value divided by the bidder‘s market value), Target 
Status (listed targets=1), Target‘s Domicile (cross border transactions=1), Industrial 
Diversificat ion (cross industry transactions=1). T statistics are provided in italics. Superscripts *, 
**, and *** indicate a significant level of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
Model (1) is: Rm-Ri = Frequent Bidder + Bid Order + Time Interval + Relative Size + Target‟s 
Domicile + Industrial Diversification + Target Status + Non-equity financed Cash deals + Share 
deals + F1NE + Sigma 
Model (2) is: Rm-Ri= Frequent Bidder + Bid Order + Time Interval + Relative Size + Target‟s 
Domicile + Industrial Diversification + Target Status + Non-equity financed Cash deals + Share 
deals + MV + Sigma 
Model (3) is: Rm-Ri = Frequent Bidder + Bid Order + Time Interval + Relative Size + Target‟s 
Domicile + Industrial Diversification + Target Status + Non-equity financed Cash deals + Share 
deals + VO/NOSH + Sigma  
Model (4) is: Rm-Ri = Frequent Bidder + Bid Order + Time Interva l + Relative Size + Target‟s 
Domicile + Industrial Diversification + Target Status + Non-equity financed Cash deals + Share 
deals + F1NE + MV + VO/NOSH + Sigma  
 
    Bidder's CARs Bidder's CARs Bidder's CARs Bidder's CARs 
Variables   Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) 
Panel A: Estimation for entire sample 
Frequent Bidder  -0.0089 *** -0.0111 *** -0.0132 *** -0.0083 ** 
  
-2.72 
 
-3.24 
 
-3.31 
 
-2.22 
 Bid Order 
 
-0.0003 
 
-0.0006 *** -0.0007 *** -0.0003 
 
  
-1.45 
 
-2.86 
 
-3.16 
 
-1.50  
 
          Adj. R-S quared (% ) 1.35 
 
1.32 
 
1.17 
 
1.16 
 F 
 
10.24 
 
11.49 
 
8.33 
 
6.33 
 N 
 
7407 
 
8637 
 
6798 
 
5905 
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 Table 5.7 continued 
Panel B: Estimation for non-equity financed cash deals 
Frequent Bidder  -0.0057 
 
-0.014 *** -0.0132 ** -0.0036 
 
  
-1.11 
 
-2.73 
 
-2.27 
 
-0.62 
 Bid Order 
 
-0.0004 
 
-0.0006 ** -0.0005 
 
-0.0003 
 
  
-1.46 
 
-2.07 
 
-1.59 
 
-0.98 
 
          Adj. R-S quared (% ) 1.18 
 
1.64 
 
1.35 
 
0.88 
 
F 
 
4.08 
 
5.68 
 
4.1 
 
2.53 
 N 
 
2318 
 
2525 
 
2041 
 
1898 
 Panel C: Estimation for equity financed cash deals 
Frequent Bidder  0.0258 
 
0.024 
 
0.0387 ** 0.0402 * 
  
1.32 
 
1.42 
 
2.04 
 
1.85 
 Bid Order 
 
-0.0004 
 
-0.0005 
 
-0.0004 
 
-8.44E-06 
 
  
-0.54 
 
-0.80  
 
-0.52 
 
-0.01 
 
          Adj. R-S quared (% ) 1.82 
 
0.87 
 
1.32 
 
2.46 
 F 
 
1.61 
 
1.37 
 
1.48 
 
1.6 
 N 
 
296 
 
379 
 
326 
 
263 
 Panel D: Estimation for share deals  
Frequent Bidder  0.0057   0.0071   -0.0052   0.0173   
  
0.23 
 
0.29 
 
-0.18 
 
0.57 
 
Bid Order 
 
0.0006 
 
-0.0032 
 
-0.0034 
 
0.0006 
 
  
0.34 
 
-1.44 
 
-1.39 
 
0.33 
 
          Adj. R-S quared (% ) 13.88 
 
8.81 
 
8.46 
 
14.33 
 F 
 
6.07 
 
5.55 
 
4.25 
 
4.16 
 N   284   425   318   209   
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Table 5.8. Robustness Test: Pre- and Post-Announcement Information 
Asymmetries 
   
This table reports the pre- and post-bid differences in informat ion asymmetry. 
Information asymmetry is quantified by Sigma, F1NE, VO/NOSH and MV. Post -bid 
(Pre-bid) Sigma is calculated as the standard deviation of market adjusted residuals of 
bidders‘ daily stock returns measured during the period (t+6, t+30) (t -30, t-6) where t is 
the acquisition announcement day. Post-bid (Pre-bid) F1NE is measured by the number 
of analysts reporting EPS forecasts for the forthcoming fiscal year to I/B/E/S in the 
month after (before) the announcement day. Post (Pre) VO/NOSH is the average 
number of shares traded during the month ending after (before) the takeover 
announcement divided by the number of shares outstanding. Post-bid (Pre-b id) MV is 
measured as market capitalizat ion of the bidder 10 days after (prior to) the 
announcement date. No. of observations are provided in parenthesis. T statistics are 
provided in italics. Superscripts *, **, and *** indicate a significant level of 10%, 5% 
and 1% respectively.  
 
    F1NE MV VO/NOSH Sigma 
Pre-bid Mean 7.6123*** 1741.3400*** 0.0040*** 0.0177*** 
 
t-Value 101.29  18.54  38.96  113.08  
 
N (6463) (7509) (3386) (7504) 
Post-bid Mean 7.5868*** 1764.7500*** 0.0044*** 0.0179*** 
 
t-Value 101.26  18.66  40.35  117.43  
 
N (6471) (7512) (3307) (7510) 
Post-bid minus 
Pre-bid 
Mean -0.0255 22.4100 0.0005 0.0003 
t-Value -0.28 2.71 5.00 1.45 
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Table 5.9.Robustness Test: Changes in Information Asymmetries with 
Subsequent Bids 
 
This table reports the differences in informat ion asymmetry between subsequent bids. Information 
asymmetry is quantified by Sigma, F1NE, VO/NOSH and MV. Pre -bid Sigma is calculated as the standard 
deviation of market adjusted residuals of b idders‘ daily stock returns measured during the period (t-30, t-6) 
where t  is the acquisition announcement day. Pre-bid  F1NE is measured by the number of analysts 
reporting EPS forecasts for the forthcoming fiscal year to I/B/E/S in the month before th e announcement 
day. Pre VO/NOSH is the average number of shares traded during the month ending before the takeover 
announcement divided by the number of shares outstanding. Pre-bid MV is measured as market 
capitalizat ion of the bidder 10 days prior to the announcement date. Merger series of a firm are identified 
by the number of b ids the firm announced during a 36-month period prior to an announcement date. The 
order (rank) of a transaction in a merger series is determined by the number of bids in the prior 36-month. 
The first transaction in a merger series is then classified as a casual b idder or the 1st order b id of a frequent 
bidder. No. of observations are provided in parenthesis. T values of pair-wised difference in  mean are 
repented in italics. Superscripts *, **, and *** indicate a significant level of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
    Pre-Bid IA   Bidders’ gains 
Bid Order   F1NE MV VO/NOSH Sigma   
CAR3D 
(%) 
CAR5D 
(%) 
Panel A. Mean Value of information asymmetries and bidder's gain (mean & No. of observations) 
1st Bid 
 
6.3009  826.6502  0.0033  0.0188  
 
1.4901*** 1.7154*** 
  
(1632) (2183) (808) (2182) 
 
(2183) (2183) 
2nd Bid 
 
7.2530  1412.4940  0.0035  0.0173  
 
0.5406*** 0.7297*** 
  
(1478) (1728) (744) (1727) 
 
(1727) (1727) 
3rd Bid 
 
7.5381  1421.7835  0.0043  0.0169  
 
1.0361*** 0.9735*** 
  
(1154) (1282) (589) (1281) 
 
(1281) (1281) 
4th Bid  
 
7.8399  2526.2873  0.0044  0.0166  
 
0.4347*** 0.5085*** 
  
(762) (824) (412) (823) 
 
(824) (824) 
5th Bid 
 
8.7720  2968.7502  0.0042  0.0165  
 
0.6245*** 0.6064*** 
  
(579) (604) (322) (603) 
 
(603) (603) 
6th Bid 
 
9.3806  3992.9150  0.0044  0.0184  
 
0.7176*** 0.8344*** 
  
(310) (327) (180) (327) 
 
(327) (327) 
7th Bid  
 
9.9907  3806.0946  0.0065  0.0174  
 
0.0153  0.3928  
  
(214) (223) (125) (223) 
 
(223) (223) 
8th Bid  
 
10.7583  3041.8402  0.0052  0.0182  
 
0.6458** 0.8625*** 
  
(120) (123) (77) (123) 
 
(123) (123) 
9th Bid  
 
10.6941  3066.3045  0.0046  0.0162  
 
0.0559  0.0093  
  
(85) (86) (52) (86) 
 
(86) (86) 
10th Bid 
 
9.2791  2640.1432  0.0035  0.0210  
 
1.3255*** 1.2278** 
  
(129) (129) (77) (129)   (129) (129) 
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Table 5.9 continued 
Panel B. Difference in mean (mean & t -value)  
1-2 
 
-0.9522*** -585.8438*** -0.0002 0.0014***   0.9495*** 0.9857*** 
  
-4.41  -3.22  -1.00  3.00  
 
4.47  4.23  
1-3 
 
-1.2373*** -595.1333*** -0.0010*** 0.0018*** 
 
0.4540** 0.7419*** 
  
-5.51 -2.92  -3.24  3.57  
 
2.01  3.01  
1-4 
 
-1.5390*** -1699.6371*** -0.0011** 0.0021*** 
 
1.0554*** 1.2069*** 
  
-6.03  -3.79  -2.33  4.21  
 
4.54  4.56  
1-5 
 
-2.4712*** -2142.1000*** -0.0009*** 0.0022*** 
 
0.8656*** 1.1090*** 
  
-8.67  -4.70  -3.26  3.97  
 
3.40  3.99  
1-6 
 
-3.0798*** -3166.2648*** -0.0011** 0.0004 
 
0.7724*** 0.8810*** 
  
-8.44  -4.10  -2.12  0.51  
 
2.74  2.83  
1-7 
 
-3.6898*** -2979.4444*** -0.0032*** 0.0014* 
 
1.4748*** 1.3226*** 
  
-8.74  -3.20  -3.67  1.86  
 
4.13  3.33  
1-8 
 
-4.4575*** -2215.1900*** -0.0019*** 0.0005 
 
0.8433** 0.8529** 
  
-8.10  -3.15  -2.83  0.53  
 
2.51  2.17  
1-9 
 
-4.3933*** -2239.6543*** -0.0013*** 0.0025** 
 
1.4341*** 1.7061*** 
  
-6.81  -2.80  -2.06  2.41  
 
3.21  3.07  
1-10 
 
-2.9782*** -1831.4930*** -0.0003 -0.0022** 
 
0.1646 0.4876 
    -5.59  -3.92  -0.70  -2.09    0.34  0.86  
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Table 5.10. Robustness Test: Information Asymmetries, Payment Methods and 
Bid Order 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This table reports the differences in b idders‘ gains between subsequent bids 
conditional on payment methods. Merger series of a firm are identified by the 
number of bids the firm announced during a 36-month period prior to an  
announcement date, which are successive bids with same payment methods.  
The order (rank) of a transaction in a merger series is determined by the 
number of bids in the prio r 36-month. The first transaction in a merger series is 
then classified as a casual bidder or the 1st order bid of a frequent bidder. T 
statistics are provided in italics. Superscripts *, **, and *** indicate a 
significant level of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
    All Observations 
  
Share deals 
 
Cash deals 
Bid Order   CAR3D CAR5D   CAR3D CAR5D 
1-2 
 
0.2731 0.2898 
 
-0.0020 -0.0009 
 
 
1.05 1.07 
 
-1.18 -0.39 
1-3 
 
0.2731 0.2898 
 
-0.0020 -0.0010 
 
 
1.05 1.07 
 
-1.19 -0.40 
1-4 
 
0.2887 0.3066 
 
-0.0009 0.0009 
 
 
1.11 1.13 
 
-0.39 0.36 
1-5 
 
0.2683 0.2890 
 
-0.0010 0.0060 
 
 
1.03 1.07 
 
-0.55 0.19 
1-6 
 
0.2468 0.2662 
 
0.0042 0.0070** 
 
 
0.94 0.98 
 
1.40 2.16 
1-7 
 
/ / 
 
0.0028 0.0059* 
 
 
/ / 
 
0.91 1.66 
1-8 
 
/ / 
 
-0.0002 0.0015 
     /  /   -0.05 0.36 
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Chapter 6: 
Conclusion 
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6.1 Concluding Remarks 
This thesis has examined the value effects of the information environment and of 
changes in this environment on corporate takeovers. Further, it has suggested the 
mechanisms under which these value effects work. This research objective was 
motivated by the existing inadequate research efforts towards understanding the 
determinants of takeover wealth creation, as well as the importance of information 
environment, in the market for corporate control from both a theoretical and a 
practical perspective.  
Regarding the theoretical perspective, unevenly distributed firm information, and 
investors‘ different interpretations of such information, underlies fundamental theories 
and hypotheses (for example, neoclassical theory, managerialism theory and 
misvaluation theory)87 which have been suggested to rationalize the performance of 
firms engaged in mergers and acquisitions. When considering from the practical 
perspective, the nature of information distribution in corporate practice leads to 
unavoidable information asymmetry surrounding bidding and target firms. 88 
Continuous efforts have been made to alleviate this asymmetry through regulatory 
bodies, such as the Takeover Panel, attempting to enforce prompt and accurate 
information dissemination. Given the highlighted importance of the information 
environment from these two perspectives, this thesis has contributed to mergers and 
acquisitions literature by introducing significant information factors that impact upon 
                                                 
87
 For neoclassical theory, see for example Gort (1969), Mitchell and Mulherin (1996); for 
managerialis m theory, see for example Seyhun, (1990), Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993); for 
misvaluation theory, see for example Shleifer and Vishny (2003), Rhodes -Kropf and Viswanathan 
(2004). 
88
 The cost incurred for an outside investor to obtain a firm‘s informat ion, together with managers‘ 
organizational knowledge in interpreting the informat ion from an  insider‘s perceptive , which is 
unattainable for outside investors, leads to firm in formation remain ing unevenly distributed between 
corporate organizations and outside investors.   
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the wealth creation of takeovers which have not, or at least inadequately, been 
examined in previous research.  
This thesis addresses four issues inherent in the information dissemination 
process of takeover announcements. They are, the information asymmetry surrounding 
information sender (acquiring firms), the information contents (information signalled 
by takeover announcements), the sentiment shown by information recipients 
(investors) in interpreting information and market condition (misvaluation). As 
hypothesized, these factors, designed to describe the information environment  
surrounding firms engaged in the takeover market, are able to explain the value 
creation of takeovers to these firms. More specifically, a firm‘s takeover 
announcement disseminates firm information to the market and thus gives rise to 
changes in the information environment surrounding that firm. With the arrival of new 
information, investors update their assessment of the firm‘s value. This revaluation 
process depends on both the content of the information sent out by takeover 
announcements and investors‘ reasoning and sentiment involved in interpreting the 
information.  
The value effects of suggested information related factors, as well as the 
mechanisms under which these value effects work, have brought new factors to the 
limited focus of existing research that examines the relationship between corporate 
takeovers and the information environment. Further, the relationship has been 
extended so to be considered in a dynamic context.  
Chapter 1 has addressed the gap that exists in the under-researched and 
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mis- interpreted misvaluation effects on cash deals. 89 It has explicitly examined the 
relevance of market conditions (misvaluation) and information content (information 
signalled by a transaction‘s payment financing method) to merger activities and their 
value effects. The results have indicated that bidders‘ announcement returns are 
determined by estimated synergies of the resultant unit and revaluation effects of 
takeover announcements; both of which are influenced by the information 
environment, in particular market conditions and information content. Three main 
points can be derived. 
Firstly, consistent with Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004), the results of this 
chapter have suggested that investors‘ reasoning in synergy estimating is hindered by 
market conditions. In particular, their synergy-estimation errors can be intensified by 
market conditions. Based on available information, investors estimate the synergies of 
the resultant unit. Evaluating a bidding firm forms an indispensible part of this 
synergy-estimation. However, in the presence of misvaluation surrounding an 
acquiring firm, seldom could each component of misvaluation be correctly valued due 
to investors‘ limited access to information. More specifically, since macro level 
information is more transparent and accessible, they naturally allocate more weight to 
the market or industry component of misvaluation during high valuation periods ; thus 
underestimating the firm-specific overvaluation. Further, this mis-evaluation gives rise 
to a hyped synergy-estimation, which consequently leads to a more positive market 
                                                 
89
 Extant research on the relation between misvaluation and the takeover market has mainly a stock 
merger focus. Additionally, under the assumption that no equity issue is involved in cash deals, cash 
mergers are naturally associated with undervaluation, while equity deals correspond to overvaluation. 
For example, the Shleifer and Vishny (2003) model predicts that ―overvaluation could be the motive for 
most stock acquisition, which increase the buyer‘s wil lingness–to-pay in stock mergers, though it has 
no effect in cash acquisition‖ (Friedman, 2004, p.1). Nevertheless, this assumption and the conclusion 
based on it are debatable, since the use of cash as a payment mechanism does not necessarily mean that 
the actual source of the cash payment comes purely from a firm‘s internal cash flow. Instead, external 
equity flow and debt flow serve as two  financing alternatives (Schlingemann, 2004). Therefore, after 
distinguishing the fundamental difference between payment methods and transaction financing, the 
documented relevance of misvaluation to cash deals is shown to be flawed and needs re -examinations. 
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reaction to the takeover announcement. Therefore, takeovers tend to occur in clusters 
during high market- or industry- valuation periods. In addition, takeovers announced 
during these periods generate higher returns to bidders than those announced during 
low valuation periods.  
Secondly, corporate takeovers release information to the market and, 
consequently, attract investors and analysts to reappraise a bidder‘s value. If 
information asymmetry impedes a firm from revealing its potential to the investment 
community, this firm is likely to be undervalued by the market. Announcing takeovers 
disseminates information to the market and gives rise to revaluation. This revaluation 
process, similar to the findings of Draper and Paudyal (2008), generally raises the 
stock price around the announcement period. However, the price run-up after 
reappraisal is conditional on information contents sent out in takeover announcements. 
If a firm has true potential, releasing good news, for example announcing cash deals 
especially non-equity financed cash deals, can bid up its share price via revaluation. 
On the other hand, bad news released, for instance announcing share deals or equity 
financed cash deals, have a limited effect in driving up the bidder ‘s share price 
through this revaluation. 
These findings are inconsistent with existing literature which state that, cash 
deals are irrelevant to the overvaluation effects (Shleifer and Vishny, 2003). This 
inconsistency is attributed to: i) the fundamental difference between cash payment and 
cash financing, which is assumed not to exist in the majority of previous research and 
ii) the different effects of each misvaluation component (firm-, industry- and 
market-components) in the takeover market. Accordingly, this study clarifies the 
fundamental difference between ‗methods of payment‘ and ‗transaction financing 
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sources‘. It further suggests that, given the different financing sources of cash 
payment, the documented incentives and value effects of misvaluation on cash deals,90 
which are based on the flawed assumption of no equity- involvement in cash payment, 
are unlikely to be generalizable. In addition, by recognizing different components of 
misvaluation, this study provides a wider-ranging understanding of misvaluation 
effects. This understanding furthers the existing knowledge on the relevance of 
misvaluation to corporate takeovers. This misvaluation was previously examined in 
isolation by most existing literature, at either a market level or firm level, rather than 
being considered as a three-tiered system (for market valuation, see Tebourbi (2005) 
and Bouwman (2006) for example; for firm misvaluation, see Dong et al. (2006) and 
Ang and Cheng (2006) for example).  
Having examined the value effects of misvaluation on corporate takeovers, 
factors, which may cause this misvaluation, are expected to have some bearing on 
acquisition gains. Among the factors associated with misvaluation, investor sentiment 
has attracted great research interests. It has been regarded as an irrational exuberance 
that drives asset price away from its intrinsic value. The potential value effects of 
investor sentiment in the takeover market, therefore, have been examined in chapter 4. 
This research objective also fits into the overarching research area of this thesis (i.e., 
information environment). Given the potential effects the recipients of this 
information may have on the manner and outcomes of information processing, any 
market reaction to the arrival of new information, via takeover announcements, should 
not only incorporate the message itself (as examined in Chapter 3), but also include 
the effects of investors‘ behaviour acting upon the information released. Chapter 4 has 
examined the relevance of investors‘ sentiment to targets‘ gains and takeover premium. 
                                                 
90
 Previous research (e.g., Sh leifer and Vishny, 2003) associates undervaluation with cash deals. 
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It is one of the first attempts towards quantifying investor sentiment and examining its 
impacts on corporate takeovers. Moreover, it allows for individual differences in the 
relation between sentiment and corporate takeovers. 91  Accordingly, investor 
sentiment has been addressed at both an aggregate market and individual firm level in 
this chapter. The results are outlined below:  
Firstly, pre-takeover information asymmetry about a firm‘s value gives rise to 
revaluation during the firm‘s takeover announcement period. This is because 
information disseminated via a takeover announcement begins to clarify the existing 
information asymmetry and thus leads to a revaluation upon this newly released 
information. The accuracy of re-assessing the firm‘s asset value is obstructed by the 
investor sentiment involved. Due to investors‘ sentiment- laden reactions, their 
predictions for an acquired firm‘s stock performance are not necessarily correct. If a 
transaction is announced during a high sentiment period, then the high investor 
sentiment in interpreting information sent out by the takeover announcement, in 
general, drives up the target firm‘s announcement returns. This finding concerning the 
sensitivity of stock price to takeover announcements, in the presence of aggregate 
investor sentiments, is consistent with those of Mian and Sankaraguruswamy (2007). 
They document that during high sentiment periods, investors are more likely to bid up 
a firm‘s share price around a corporate announcement period. 
Meanwhile, this upward pricing of acquired firms‘ shares, in the presence of high 
investor sentiment, tends to pressurise bidders‘ managers to pay an inflated takeover 
                                                 
91
 Previous research on this issue confined investor sentiment to an aggregate market  level (e.g., Zhu et 
al., 2008). This market level research implies that sentiment-laden investors‘ reactions to one stock (or 
company) can equally be applied  to another stock (or company). However, counter-views, like those of 
Qiu and Welch (2006) and Baker and Wurgler (2006 & 2007), suggest that sentiment may have 
cross-sectional differences. Mergers and acquisitions, as individual corporate activities, are more likely  
to be exposed to these firm specific, rather than market-aggregate, sentiment factors. 
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premium. This further forces an increase in the premium required by these target firms. 
Consequently, investor sentiment, in general, drives takeover premium in the same 
direction as this sentiment. This effect of the prevailing aggregate sentiment on 
takeover premium is inconsistent with the empirical results of Zhu et al. (2008) 
concerning the US market. They report that it is begin-of-period sentiment rather than 
prevailing sentiment that is positively related to the premium paid. This inconsistency 
can be attributed to the different measurements of premium. In their study the 
difference in market to book value between bidders and targets is employed to 
measure takeover premium, while the widely accepted percentage difference between 
offer price and target‘s share price is used in this research to calculate premium. 
Secondly, where cross-sectional variation in the effects of sentiment is concerned, 
speculative targets, compared with non-speculative targets, are not more vulnerable to 
the aforementioned effects of sentiment on targets‘ announcement returns and 
takeover premium. A lack of such sensitivity is contrary to the empirical findings of 
Baker and Wurgler (2006 & 2007) on the US stock market. This could be explained 
by large institutional holdings in the UK market; the strong arbitrage forces of which 
make the mispricing, driven by investor speculative demands, nonpersistent. Thus, the 
value effects of sentiment become obscured for speculative targets. Added to this is 
the different research context. More specifically, takeover announcement returns are 
primarily driven by takeover bids themselves, rather than a general market condition. 
Taking over speculative targets is a risky project, regardless of the prevailing 
sentiment. An investor does not evaluate speculative targets more during a high 
sentiment period. Moreover, bidders, given an available pool of potential takeover 
targets, would not pay more for those associated with greater uncertainties and risks, 
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even if the transaction were announced during a high sentiment period.  
These results have complemented existing research on investor sentiments by 
extending the influence of cross-sectional sentiment from its original setting within 
asset pricing (e.g., Shiller, 1981; Fama and French, 1988; Brown and Cliff, 2005) to 
the context of mergers and acquisitions. Specifically, aggregate and cross-sectional 
investor sentiments have a certain bearing on targets‘ announcement returns and 
takeover premium. In addition to providing some original insight to existing literature, 
in relation to investor sentiment and takeovers, this chapter also sheds light on the 
issue of investor sentiment by bringing new techniques to this research area.  
Following Baker and Wurgler (2006), a relatively comprehensive investor sentiment 
indicator, rather than other noisy sentiment proxies, has been constructed for the UK 
market for the 1987 to 2007 period.92 This newly developed UK sentiment index 
forms a basis for future research on UK investor sentiment.  
Findings from chapter 4 have revealed that investor sentiment, as a factor 
associated to misvaluation, can explain gains from corporate takeover to some extent. 
This suggests that other factors, related to misvaluation, may have some influence on 
mergers and acquisitions. Information asymmetry surrounding a firm can increase the 
possibility of misevaluating this firm. Therefore, the relationship between information 
asymmetry and takeovers is also worth considering. The focus on information 
asymmetry surrounding acquirers fits into the overarching research area of this thesis 
(i.e. information environment). It also has the potential to further this research area. 
                                                 
92
 The Baker and Wurg ler (2006) sentiment index has been extensively used by financial economists 
since it was developed (Derrien and Kecskes, 2007; Zhu et al., 2008; Mian and Sankaraguruswamy, 
2008), as it extracts the common variation of suggested sentiment proxies and lines up perfectly with  
anecdotal evidence in the US stock market. However, up until now, no such sentiment index had been 
available for the UK market.  
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More specifically, the information environment addressed in the first two empirical 
chapters is a static one. Once the relationship between information environment and 
corporate takeovers is extended from a one-side-connection (i.e. information 
environment influences on the value effects of takeovers) to an interaction that, during 
takeovers, allows for a change in information environment surrounding the firms 
involved, these environment changes may also bear some impact on the value effects 
of takeovers. Chapter 5 has examined this conjecture.  
The results in Chapter 5 have indicated that changes in information asymmetry 
influence frequent bidders‘ gains via revaluation. The scale of revaluation is likely to 
be determined by the information environment of the firm concerned. Less-covered 
companies who are subjected to severe information asymmetry are given more value 
corrections around their takeover announcements. Since takeover announcements 
continually disseminate new information to the market, information asymmetry 
surrounding an acquiring firm decreases after the firm‘s takeover announcement. This 
asymmetry further decreases with subsequent bids announced by this acquirer. 
Therefore, in a merger series, the scale of investor revaluation should constantly 
decrease because of the declining information asymmetry with subsequent bids. 
Consequently, serial non-equity financed cash deals should generally be associated 
with declining announcement returns, as their positive revaluation constantly 
decreases with subsequent takeover announcements. 93  However, serial equity 
financed cash deals and share deals do not generate diminishing bidder‘s gains with 
subsequent bids, because their negative revaluation constantly decreases with 
                                                 
93
 In  addition to the scale of revaluation determined by the informat ion asymmetry surrounding a firm, 
the direction of this revaluation depends on the informat ion content. Investors regard 
otherwise-financed cash deals (equity financed cash deals or share deals) as positive (negative) signals 
and assign more (less) value to the acquiring firms. Therefore, with regard to serial non -equity financed 
cash deals, their positive revaluation constantly decreases with subsequent takeover announcements  
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succeeding takeover announcements.  
A decline in bidders‘ announcement period returns with subsequent mergers has 
been widely documented (e.g., Schipper and Thompson, 1983; Loderer and Martin, 
1990). The empirical findings in chapter 5 have indicated that such declining returns 
are not generalizable. Once frequent bidders are partitioned by their payment 
financing methods, the patterns of their short-run gains along their acquisition series 
can be characterized differently. This inconsistency with existing literature is 
attributable to the different signalling implications of payment financing methods in 
the presence of information asymmetry. These signalling implications are one of the 
primary factors underlying the stock performances of frequent bidders. Specifically, 
they drive frequent bidders‘ gains in the same direction as the nature of information 
signalled by respective payment financing methods.  
These findings have clarified the fundamental difference between ‗methods of 
payment‘ and ‗transaction financing sources‘, which are assumed to be the same in the 
majority of previous literature. These findings have also furthered the theoretical 
implications of the information asymmetry hypothesis on corporate takeovers by 
introducing a relation between takeovers and dynamic information asymmetry. This 
relation is beyond the current setting of takeovers and static information asymmetry.  
6.2 Implications of Findings 
The empirical results on the value effects of both static and dynamic information 
environment, and the suggested mechanisms under which these value effects work, 
make an important contribution to the knowledge of wealth creation through corporate 
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takeovers. Further, this carries significant implications for corporations, investors and 
researchers who are involved in the takeover market. These three groups of 
implications are outlined below. 
The findings of this thesis, especially those on the relevance of information 
contents and information asymmetry to the value effects of takeovers, can facilitate 
companies, engaged in mergers and acquisitions, to balance their information and 
investment efficiency. The findings also facilitate a coordinating of their financing and 
investment decisions. These two implications are outlined below.  
Firstly, information asymmetry surrounding bidding and target firms, in 
particular frequent acquiring firms, is ever changing, as the firms‘ takeover 
announcements constantly disseminate firm information to the market. Given this, as 
well as the trade-off between information efficiency and investment efficiency (Singh 
and Yerramilli, 2009), purely seeking positive revaluation effects at takeover 
announcements generates more destructive investment outcomes for extremely 
acquisitive bidders than to casual bidders. Instead, acquisitive bidders should focus 
more on investment projects that generate long-run value. 
Secondly, a hybrid of a transaction‘s payment method and its financing source 
influence both casual and frequent bidders‘ gains. Since mergers and acquisitions are 
among some of the main investment decisions made by corporate organizations, the 
documented relevance of payment financing methods to takeovers‘ value effects 
highlights the interdependence of investment and financing decisions. Such 
interdependence suggests that wealth creation not only depends on the pattern of 
resource allocation but also relies on the financing of the resource allocation. 
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Therefore, in order to enhance a firm‘s value, the need for a closer integration between 
strategic planning and the financial function of raising funds is required. From the 
perspective of cash bidders,  given the negative market responses that follow equity 
financed cash deals, funds from other sources, for example debt or cash, are presented 
as better transaction financing choices so long as they have sufficient cash reserve or 
debt capability. 
In addition to the contributions made to corporate organizations engaged in the 
takeover market, this thesis identifies some areas which investors can improve upon to 
maximize their interests. The findings of this thesis, especially those concerning the 
relevance of market condition and information asymmetry to value effects, provide 
investors with an additional guide for investing in stocks of firms engaged in mergers 
and acquisitions. Specifically, the empirical evidence in this research has shown that, i) 
acquisitions announced during a low market or industry period and, ii) acquisitions 
announced by overvalued bidders who make non-equity financed cash deals and, iii) 
acquisitions announced by acquisitive bidders who make non-equity financed cash 
deals, all generally underperform relative to their counterparts 94 . Therefore, if 
investors aim to capture benefits in the short-run, they should avoid investing in these 
types of acquiring firms.  
Financial researchers, examining the takeover market, form the third group of 
beneficiaries of the thesis. In particular, this research develops their awareness of 
information environment in theorizing the activities and the value effects of corporate 
takeovers. Furthermore, the empirical findings of this thesis, together with the related 
                                                 
94
 The counterparts refer to i) acquisitions announced during a high market or industry period and, ii) 
acquisitions announced by undervaluated bidders who make non-equity financed cash deals and, iii) 
acquisitions announced by acquisitive bidders who make equity financed cash deals. 
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theoretical implications, contribute to the ongoing debate on the rationale underlying 
the value effects of mergers and acquisitions.  
Much literature has drawn theoretical implications from traditional theories, 
including managerialism theory (Berkovitch and Narayanan, 1993 and Jensen, 1986), 
efficiency theory based indigestion hypothesis (Conn et al., 2004), neoclassical 
economics based capitalization and diminishing returns hypothesis (Ismail, 2008). 
Accordingly, determinants of the value effects of takeovers have been predicted by 
these hypotheses, yet none of them can provide a consistent and comprehensive 
explanation to this issue given the following three considerations.  
Firstly, a significant positive relation between market valuation and bidders‘ 
gains around takeover announcement periods has been presented in Chapter 3. These 
can be explained by managerial herding (Bouwman, 2006).95 However, this theory 
fails to rationalize merger performance when misvaluation is at a firm-specific level. 
In particular, managerial herding cannot explain the outperformance of undervalued 
bidders, relative to their overvalued counterparts. 
Secondly, investor sentiment exerts an influence on premium determination 
(Chapter 4), which suggests that the decision to merge is not flooded with private 
managerial gains as suggested by managerialism theory (Berkovitch and Narayanan, 
1993; Seyhun, 1990)96. Rather, managers of acquiring firms rationally evaluate the 
                                                 
95
 ‗Managerial herding‘ suggests that if a  large number of firms  get involved in mergers and 
acquisitions, subsequent firms will fo llow the trend ignoring their own motives and not fully 
considering the valuation of this investment decision. Therefore, the underperformance of high -market  
acquisitions is primarily driven by the low stock returns to firms acquiring later in a high -market  
merger wave.  
96
 The managerialism theory indicates that managers consciously s eek personal interest-maximizat ion 
at the cost of their shareholders. In determining the offering price paid to a target firm, the pure 
economic gains for acquiring firms are not the sole motivation , or even the primary mot ivation, of 
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investment and forecast future operations. It then follows, it is less likely that mangers 
knowingly overpay in acquiring targets.  
Thirdly, the reported sequential bidder‘s gains in Chapter 5 are inconsistent with 
the predictions of capitalization hypothesis97, as announcement period returns of the 
4th bids remain positive. Although the documented declining returns in an acquisition 
series are potential theoretical implications of diminishing returns hypothesis or 
indigestion hypothesis (Conn et al., 2004)98, both fail to explain why this declining 
pattern does not exist in equity financed offers or share deals. 
The comparisons between the empirical findings of this thesis against the 
theoretical predictions of several theories and hypotheses indicate that these theories 
and hypotheses are inadequate in rationalizing the documented performance of UK 
takeover activities. Rather, as discussed in the previous sub-section, a relatively 
thorough understanding regarding this issue can be provided by information 
environment related explanations. The information-related factors, including 
information contents (information signalled by takeover announcements), information 
sender (information asymmetry surrounding acquiring firms and information 
uncertainty regarding target firms), information recipient (investor sentiment involved 
in interpreting the information) and market condition (misvaluation) can give a 
coherent description of bidding and target firms‘ gains in the UK takeover market.  
                                                                                                                                            
managers from bidding firms. Instead, driven by personal benefits, they seek to acquire firms and 
overpay their targets. 
97
 ―The capitalization hypothesis suggests that the market capitalizes the value of subsequent 
acquisitions when the first acquisition in a program is announced. The prediction is that no returns 
should be observed on later acquisitions in a program‖ (Is mail, 2008, p.73).  
98
 For extensive discussion on dimin ishing returns hypothesis or indigestion hypothesis, see section 
5.2.1.1. Both of these hypotheses predict that bidders‘ announcement period returns decline with  
subsequent mergers.  
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6.3 Limitations and Areas for Future Research 
Effects of information content, in the presence of misvaluation, on the wealth 
creation of takeovers have been examined the chapter 3. This information content has 
been regarded as the signal sent out by a transaction‘s payment financing method, 
where cash payment and non-equity financing, in general, signal positive information 
to the market. This positive market reaction is based on the premise that acquirers are 
not using their inflated shares to acquire a target firm. However, according to the UK 
Takeover Code, cash payment can be mandatory or voluntary. Specifically, cash 
consideration is made mandatory in acquiring a public target if a bidder holds over 10% 
interests of the acquired firm over the offer period or 12 months prior to the 
announcement. In this case, the offer should be in cash or accompanied by a cash 
alternative at not less than the highest price paid by the bidder or any competitor 
during the offer period and within 12 months prior to the announcement.  
For mandatory cash deals, acquiring firms have to make cash payment, although 
they may have the intention to use their overvalued shares. Therefore, information 
inherent in mandatory cash deals may not be as positive as those in voluntary cash 
deals. Accordingly, in understanding the value effects of information contents on 
takeovers, there is the necessity of differentiating the market reactions to these two 
different types of takeover deals. Nevertheless, as acknowledged before, out of the 
6086 observations, there are 429 cash deals in acquiring public targets, of which 29 
(92) bidders have less (more) than 10% interests of the targets before announcements 
and 308 with unavailable information. Due to the data availability, distinguishing 
legally- or spontaneously-made cash deals becomes infeasible. Therefore, it remains 
as a question as to how to separate voluntary cash deals from mandatory ones with 
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adequate information. The answer to this question could be used to further the 
understanding on the relationship between information contents and takeover gains. 
Effects of investor sentiment, towards information released via takeover 
announcements, on the wealth creation of takeovers have been examined in chapter 4. 
Investor sentiment has been measured as the first principal component of four factors 
hypothesized to represent investor sentiment, namely, investment trust discount, FTSE 
turnover, the number of IPOs and consumer confidence index. Mergers and 
acquisitions deals have then been sorted into five groups according to the level of 
investment sentiment persistent during the announcement period. Although deals 
announced during the highest sentiment period, in general, generate higher gains to 
target firms than those announced during the lowest sentiment period, there is not a 
monotonic increase in target announcement returns with the increase in investor 
sentiment. The fluctuations in target firms‘ gains across the three neutral sentiment 
groups do not show a systematic pattern. Similarly, monotonic changes in takeover 
premium across the three neutral sentiment groups also cannot be seen. It remains a 
puzzle, how to explain this ‗grey area‘. Possible explanations may be given based on 
different investor sentiment, announcement returns or takeover premium 
measurements. Using abnormal returns based on CAPM or risk-adjusted model rather 
than market model, as well as takeover premium measured over a less than (or greater 
than) 4-week window, may reveal a monotonic trend in value as investor sentiment 
increases from the lowest level to the highest level. 
The effects of changes in information asymmetry surrounding acquiring firms, 
conditional on information contents signalled by takeover announcements, on the 
wealth creation of serial takeovers have been examined in chapter 5. As was the case 
Chapter 6  Conclusion 
258 
 
with the methodology employed in chapter 3, this information content has been 
regarded as the signal sent out by a transaction‘s payment financing method, where 
non-equity financed cash payment, in general, signal positive information to the 
market. As acknowledged before, there is an inability to link a pound raised to a 
pound spent in takeovers. Given this, an approximate, rather than an actual, relation 
between a transaction and its financing source has be created by measuring transaction 
financing with pre-takeover equity issues or changes in the balance sheet. However, 
the proceeds from a firm‘s equity issue may not necessarily finance the firm‘s 
acquisition. The fund can be used for the firm‘s other investment decisions. Similarly, 
an increase in equity showing on a firm‘s balance sheet may not suggest an equity 
financing source for the firm‘s acquisitions. Therefore, it remains as an open question 
as to how to establish an accurate, rather than an approximate, one-to-one relationship 
between transaction payment and transaction financing. Research on the value effects 
of payment financing methods, and thus the understanding of the value effects of 
information contents, could be furthered with the answer to this question.  
By examining the value effects of some information related factors, including 
market condition (misvaluation), information contents, sentiment showing by 
information recipients (investors sentiment) and information asymmetry surrounding 
information senders (acquirers), this thesis has rationalized the influence of 
information environment on the wealth creation of corporate takeovers. These factors, 
as well as their relationships to gains from mergers and acquisitions, have been 
assessed separately in the three empirical chapters. However, these elements are 
connected and inherent in the information dissemination process via takeover 
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announcements.99 The interactions between them, together with the relevance of these 
interactions to takeover gains have not yet been discussed. This uncovered area 
proposes a direction for further research, where all the information related elements 
can be examined in one framework that allows for interaction between these elements.   
 
 
                                                 
99 In addition, the connections between these factors exist beyond the setting of information dissemination. More 
specifically, one of information elements examined is misvaluation; its relationship with mergers and acquisitions 
has been reported. Investor sentiment and information asymmetry, as another two information elements examined, 
are factors related to misvaluation, which can increase the possibility of misevaluating a firm. 
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